dissenting.
I dissent to the majority opinion for the reasons stated by Justice Gunter in his dissent in Hill v. State, 237 Ga. 523 (228 SE2d 898) (1976) in which I concurred.
The 1968 amendment to the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1078) clearly expresses the legislative intent that defendants in criminal cases are excluded from the requirement of objecting to an allegedly erroneous charge or omission to charge in order to preserve that issue on appeal. I think this court is bound by that pronouncement until a contrary expression is made by the legislature.
I agree that a defendant can waive this benefit in the same manner as other rights might be waived. But the record should show an affirmative, clear and intelligent waiver, of this important right given to him under the law.
Such is not shown by the record in this case and the Court of Appeals erred in so holding.
I respectfully dissent.