Alam v. Chowdhury

WORKE, Judge

(dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. To reopen a marriage-dissolution judgment and decree nearly five years after entry of the judgment requires the moving party to prove fraud on the court. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 388 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Minn.1986) (stating district court has inherent authority to reopen decree only when circumstances amount to fraud on the court); Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn.App.2001) (stating moving party bears burden of proof), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001). This requires the moving party to prove an “intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure, having the result of misleading the court and ... making the property settlement grossly unfair.” Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn.1989). A district court’s decision whether to reopen the judgment and decree based on fraud on the court will be sustained absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 164. If there is evidence to support the district court’s decision, an abuse of discretion will not be found. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn.App.2001). In my opinion re*94spondent has not met that burden. Because disregard of legal process and lack of due diligence in objecting to the dissolution weigh heavily against reopening the judgment and decree after so much time has passed, I part from the majority, and determine that the district court abused its discretion by vacating the judgment and decree.

The majority’s recitation of the facts fails to consider respondent’s responsibilities to the legal process. Appellant commenced marriage-dissolution proceedings in July 2001. Respondent was personally served by a sheriffs deputy. In August, the parties and their two children met to discuss the divorce. Appellant presented respondent with a marital-termination agreement (MTA) that he prepared with the assistance of a paralegal service. Respondent contends that she needed her daughters to explain the document to her. But appellant asserts that respondent taught English in Bangladesh for 14 years before moving to the United States. And our review of the record shows that respondent lived in the United States for over a decade before appellant commenced the proceedings, she worked outside of the home, and the hearing transcripts demonstrate that she clearly understood the questions presented to her and appropriately responded. Respondent did not sign the agreement and she did not seek counsel. Respondent failed to file an answer and the matter proceeded to default. The district court held a hearing on October 16, 2001. Appellant appeared pro se and respondent did not appear. Appellant was questioned by the court and presented the court with the MTA that he had presented to respondent. The district court incorporated virtually the identical version of the MTA in the judgment and decree.

Following entry of the judgment and decree, appellant steadfastly fulfilled his financial requirements, including timely payment of child support for one minor child. Respondent acknowledges awareness of the dissolution when child-support payments were deposited into her account. The parties continued to reside together until August 2004, when their youngest daughter left home to attend college. In December 2004, appellant remarried. He asked respondent to sell the homestead or buy out his interest in the home. It was at this point that respondent hired an attorney. In September 2005, respondents counsel asked appellant to pay for repairs to the homestead. Importantly, there was no accompanying request to reopen the judgment and decree. Several months later, respondent moved to reopen the decree, challenging the valuation of jewelry, household goods, and her savings account. Respondent’s accompanying affidavit failed to produce evidence to support her claim that the goods were misvalued. After a hearing in front of a different district court judge, the court vacated the judgment and decree and conducted a trial on the submitted issues.

My review of the record discerns no evidence to support the conclusion that appellant engaged in an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure. Appellant provided his best estimates regarding valuation of the marital property that was available to him. The fact that some of the values may not have been accurate does not provide a basis for a finding of intentional course of material misrepresentation. Respondent was well aware of the valuation of the assets, but she did nothing to challenge the alleged faulty valuations. In a dissolution proceeding, a difference in opinion about valuation is likely the norm. But this difference of opinion does not create an inference of intentional misrepresentation.

*95Finally, respondent claimed that she refused to sign the proposed settlement because the terms were unfair. But the record does not show that the terms of the judgment and decree are grossly unfair. Respondent challenged only the valuation of a few specific items and those challenges amount to a mere fraction of the marital estate. The majority distinguishes the present case from Komberg, reasoning that respondent made very precise valuation allegations. But the proper time to contest the valuations was at the time of the dissolution or within the first year after the entry of judgment.

The majority also places great weight on the fact that respondent’s affidavit alleges that appellant promised her that she would receive an equal share of assets if she did not contest the divorce. But respondent was aware of the proposal for settlement and did nothing. Instead respondent waited nearly five years and now argues that she did not know that the divorce was happening. Not only is respondent’s allegation self serving but it underlies the fact that she knew the divorce was commencing.

Because respondent failed to act for nearly five years and the record fails to support a finding that appellant (1) engaged in an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure; (2) which misled the court and opposing counsel; or (3) that the property settlement was grossly unfair, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion by vacating the judgment and decree. I, therefore, take no part in the majority’s conclusion regarding the marital-property issue.