(dissenting) — The majority holds that there is an insufficient factual basis to make a choice of law determination. I disagree, and would affirm the Court of Appeals determination that Washington law governs.
This court in Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wn.2d 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976) rejected the rule of lex loci delicti and adopted instead the most significant relationship rule embodied in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). In Johnson, a Kansas resident was killed in Kansas when he fell from a scaffold designed, manufactured and shipped to Kansas by a Washington corporation. The decedent's wife, also a Kansas resident, brought a wrongful death action in Washington against the Washington corporation alleging defective design. Johnson, at 578. Kansas law placed a $50,000 damage limitation on wrongful death actions while Washington law allowed unlimited damage recovery. The issue before this court was which law applied; Kansas' which limited damages, or Washington's which had no limit on recoverable damage.
The Johnson court stated that the most significant relationship approach is not to count contacts but rather to consider those contacts which are most significant and determine where those contacts are found. In conjunction with the significant contacts approach, the court stated that in arriving at a choice of law decision the court must also evaluate the interest and policies of potentially concerned states as reflected in the conflicting laws at issue.
Relying on Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), the Johnson court found that Kansas interest in limiting wrongful death damages was to protect defendants from excessive financial *209burdens. Kansas also sought to eliminate speculative claims and difficult computation issues. Its interest, however, was primarily local as the protection against excessive financial burdens was designed to protect its own residents. Johnson, at 582-83. The court found that the Washington policy of full recovery was deterrent in nature as it more effectively penalizes the culpable defendant and deters it and others similarly situated from negligent conduct. Its primary purpose was also local, seeking to deter negligent conduct within its borders. It concluded that Kansas had no interest in applying its limitation to a nonresident defendant sued in Washington while Washington had a legitimate interest in applying its law. Therefore, although the contacts with each state were equal, Washington law would apply because it was the only state whose interest would be furthered by application of the particular law. Johnson, at 583-84.
Therefore, following Johnson in arriving at a choice of law decision, the court must first evaluate the contacts with each jurisdiction and the significance of each of those contacts. Then the court must analyze the public policy interest embodied in the conflicting laws at issue and determine which state, if any, has a greater interest in having its law applied. Accord, Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wn.2d 692, 649 P.2d 827 (1981); Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 96 Wn.2d 416, 635 P.2d 708 (1981); Mentry v. Smith, 18 Wn. App. 668, 571 P.2d 589 (1977).
The issue in the present case involves only the conflicting damage laws — specifically whether British Columbia law, which limits damages in wrongful death recovery, or Washington law, which doesn't limit damages, should apply.
I find this case indistinguishable from Johnson. As in Johnson, the issue in this case involves a wrongful death damage limitation of a foreign jurisdiction that conflicts with Washington's policy of unlimited recovery. The plaintiffs are residents of the foreign jurisdiction and the wrongful death occurred in that foreign jurisdiction. As in Johnson, the defendants are Washington residents and the negligent conduct that proximately caused the wrongful *210death occurred in Washington. As in Johnson, the contacts with each jurisdiction are of equal weight. The Court of Appeals listed the significant contacts as follows:
Washington
1. The truck driver, Noble, is a resident of and domiciled in Everett, Washington.
2. Widing is a corporation doing business in Washington with a principal place of business in Kent, Washington.
3. The trip undertaken by Noble began and ended within the State of Washington.
4. The truck was selected in Washington (the plaintiffs contend that the selection of a flatbed truck with no sides and inadequately low tail gate for carrying the load of disk-shaped castings constitutes negligence).
5. Third party defendant S. Madill, Inc. is a Washington corporation.
British Columbia
1. Plaintiffs are domiciled in and are residents of British Columbia, as was the decedent, Mark Southwell.
2. The truck was loaded in British Columbia.
3. The place of accident and death was in British Columbia.
3. Third party defendant S. Madill, Ltd. is a British Columbia corporation.
Southwell v. Widing Transportation, Inc., cause 11569-3-1 (Dec. 20, 1982), at 5-6.
In evaluating the interests of the relevant jurisdictions, they are identical with the policies expressed in Johnson. British Columbia limits damages to protect local resident defendants from excessive financial burdens and eliminate speculative claims and difficult computation issues. Washington's interest in allowing full recovery is to deter negligent conduct occurring within its borders. Johnson, at 581-83. Like the state of Kansas in Johnson, British Columbia would have no interest in applying its damage limitation to a nonresident defendant while application of Washington's unlimited recovery rule would advance Washington's policy of deterrence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct in directing the trial court to apply the law of Washington.
*211A differing aspect in the instant action from the facts of Johnson is the existence of the third party complaint against S. Madill, Ltd., seeking indemnification or contribution. The third party complaint alleges that the employees of S. Madill, Ltd., a British Columbia corporation, negligently loaded and secured the steel castings in British Columbia and that their negligence was the proximate cause of Southwell's death. The Court of Appeals explicitly held it was not considering the fact that the third party defendant was a British Columbia resident because the issue of damages was only between plaintiff Southwell and defendants Widing and Noble. As between the third party plaintiff Noble and Widing and the third party defendant (Madill), the only issue will be the comparative fault of the joint tortfeasors and contribution. Southwell v. Widing Transportation, Inc., cause 11569-3-1 (Dec. 20, 1982), at 6 n.2. I agree.
In Schulhof v. Northeast Cellulose, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Mass. 1982), the court applied the principles in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) in deciding choice of law issues concerning damages for wrongful death and contribution among joint tortfeasors. The court held that the wrongful death act of Massachusetts would govern with respect to issues of compensatory as well as punitive damages despite the fact that as between codefendants, a New Hampshire defendant would possibly be liable for contribution or indemnity. The court further held that New Hampshire law would govern the issue of indemnity or contribution since the relationship between the defendants apparently existed there.
In the present action, the choice of law issue involves only the proper measure of damages in the wrongful death action initiated by Southwell against Widing and Noble for acts allegedly committed in Washington. In accordance with Johnson, the law of Washington should apply. The question of choice of law governing any indemnity or contribution issues is not before this court and is not resolved.
*212Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Dore, J.