dissenting: While I might like to arrive at the same ultimate destination reached by my colleagues in this case, I find my way barred by the recent decisions of our Supreme Court, and in particular Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502, 638 P.2d 914 (1982). Unlike my colleagues, I do not see the doctrine of “animal law” as affording a route around the obstacle posed by Britt and its immediate predecessors, Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. 528, 581 P.2d 385 (1978), and Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978).
As I read “animal law” authorities, they deal basically with defining the duty of care of an animal’s owner or keeper. The *239principles I distill come down simply to these: If the animal is inherently dangerous or known to be vicious, the keeper may be liable regardless of the degree of care taken to prevent harm. This is “strict liability” or “liability without fault.” On the other hand, if an ordinary domestic animal is not known to be dangerous, liability exists only if its keeper failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harm. This latter basis for liability is ordinary negligence or, in PIK terms, “fault.” Even then there may be no liability if the animal is in a place where it has a right to be.
Nothing in the cases cited by the majority do more than define the keeper’s duty and determine whether it had been breached. Generally the determination is made with either explicit or implicit reference to the injured party’s status, if on the keeper’s premises, but sometimes with no apparent consideration to status at all. Thus, Gardner v. Koenig, 188 Kan. 135, 360 P.2d 1107 (1961), established a duty of due care in the handling of cattle owed to an invitee at a sales pavilion. It followed McComas v. Sanders, 153 Kan. 253, 109 P.2d 482 (1941), which found the same duty, with respect to a nonvicious horse, was also owed to an invitee at a sales ring. It was the latter case which first enunciated the principle:
“The general rule is that the owner of a domestic animal not naturally vicious is not liable for injury done by it when it is in a place where it has a right to be, unless it is to his knowledge, vicious.” 153 Kan. 253, Syl. ¶ 1.
Berry v. Kegans, 196 Kan. 388, 411 P.2d 707 (1966), approved a “controlling” instruction that there could be no liability to a child, at best a licensee, who was bitten by defendants’ dog, unless defendants knew the dog was vicious. Reliance was placed on the above quotation from McComas. Other allegations of negligence in keeping the dog and failing to warn were thus irrelevant, since lack of knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities absolved the defendants of liability.
Fredrickson v. Mackey, 196 Kan. 542, 413 P.2d 86 (1966), dealt only with the presence or absence of negligence of a stable owner in furnishing a horse to a customer. Plaintiff was an invitee, and negligence was the standard.
McKinney v. Cochran, 197 Kan. 524, 419 P.2d 931 (1966), involved a guest who fell when the owner’s horse stumbled and slipped on a concealed icy patch. The court didn’t characterize the guest’s status on the premises but found he was a “horse *240expert” who had come to test the horse and who had knowledge equal to the owner’s, both as to the horse’s characteristics and the condition of the ground. The court approved a directed verdict for defendant because there was no evidence of defendant’s negligence to go to the jury. Whether there could have been liability if there had been submissible evidence of negligence was not addressed, perhaps because it was unnecessary to the decision.
The same uncertainty hangs over Anderson, Administrator v. White, 210 Kan. 18, 499 P.2d 1056 (1972). The only issue addressed was whether the dog’s actions in injuring the plaintiff were or were not the result of defendants’ willful or wanton misconduct. All parties assumed that was the standard that plaintiff, a social guest, had to meet to impose liability. The court did observe, without amplification, that plaintiff made no objection to assuming that burden. To my mind the statement only demonstrated that which rule of premises law was to be applied was not an issue. It did not indicate any judicial dissatisfaction with the theory under which the case was tried.
Henkel v. Jordan, 7 Kan. App. 2d 561, 644 P.2d 1348 (1982), involved a barking dog in the public street. As the majority notes, it gives no guidance either way.
Finally, in Mills v. Smith, 9 Kan. App. 2d 80, 673 P.2d 117 (1983), this court adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort for the possessor of a wild animal that does harm to another, as set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 507 (1976). It also held that such liability was subject to the comparative fault principles of K.S.A. 60-258a. In that case a 21-month-old child, accompanying parents who were business invitees, was bitten by a lion. The issues were strict liability versus negligence and whether strict liability was to be compared to ordinary negligence. Premises law did not figure in the decision.
Applying these “animal law” cases to the present fact situation, the most I can come up with is that Elden, the owner of the mare and stallion, is not strictly liable for plaintiff s injuries. If he is to be liable it must be on the basis of “negligence” in his actions which are claimed to have contributed to those injuries: furnishing the unfamiliar saddle and bringing out the mare in front of the stallion. That is the extent of the conclusions I can draw from animal law.
*241It is at this point I run squarely into Britt and its predecessors. In Britt the plaintiff was judicially determined to be a licensee on the defendant college’s premises. She was injured when a college employee dropped a piano on her foot. The court assumed this could have been found to be ordinary negligence, but found it could not rise to the level of wanton or reckless conduct. Adhering to the ancient doctrines of premises law the court found the college could not be held liable for injuries to its licensee even though those injuries might have been caused by its negligence. The court further refused to adopt an “active” negligence exception for injuries caused by affirmative acts of the landowner as opposed to the condition of the premises.
It is this latter aspect of Britt which seems to me to foreclose liability on defendants’ part here. The plaintiff in Britt did not slip on an icy sidewalk or trip on a crack, she was hit with a piano. The plaintiff here did not slip or fall on any defect in the premises, she was thrown by a horse. In each case if there is to be liability it must be because of a breach of the defendant’s duty of due care. The duty is imposed in one case by general principles of tort law, in the other by that special branch of tort law called “animal” law: each is nothing more nor less than the general duty of due care we all owe each other in our society. The Supreme Court has said, however, that one may negligently drop a piano on another with impunity so long as the injured person is but a licensee on the negligent actor’s premises. I cannot see any meaningful difference between negligently dropping a piano and negligently using the wrong saddle or negligently exciting a stallion. Both types of conduct amount to nothing more or less than ordinary negligence.
Of course, I am likewise unable to see a meaningful difference between negligently injuring one’s social guest in one’s automobile and negligently injuring one’s social guest on one’s land. In the former instance even the legislature cannot immunize the negligent actor without running afoul of the constitution. Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974). In the latter, purely court-made immunity withstands all onslaughts. There must be subtleties in the distinctions made by our Supreme Court in those two instances which are based on policy considerations which escape me. It may be that similar distinctions exist that I similarly fail to perceive which justify the immunization of *242negligent piano dropping but not of poor saddling and handling of horses. If so, then the majority is correct in finding potential liability in this case.
Nevertheless, for reasons set forth in the first portions of the majority opinion, dealing with our duty to follow the law as declared by our Supreme Court, I conclude that so long as Britt is the law of this state we are compelled to affirm the decision of the trial court.