dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would hold that claimant failed to establish that he reasonably marketed his residual work capacity. One factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a claimant’s marketing efforts is the nature and extent of the job search. See ARA Servs. v. Swift, 22 Va.App. 202, 206, 468 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1996) (citing National Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 8 Va.App. 267, 272, 380 S.E.2d 31, 34 *191(1989)). Claimant may not restrict himself to contacting only his employer. See, e.g., Nowlin v. Westvaco Corp., Nos. 170-74-58, 170-74-59 (Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Feb. 13, 1996) (“an employee who is released to light duty work ... has the obligation to seek work from other employers in order to demonstrate a reasonable effort to market [his] residual work capacity”); Hall v. C.R. Hudgins Plating, Inc., 70 O.I.C. 237 (1991) (claimant failed to prove reasonable marketing where she had not sought light work elsewhere because she anticipated being recalled by employer). In the instant case, claimant merely inquired of his superiors whether a job within his capacity was available at USAir and made no effort to contact other employers.
I agree with the commission’s decisions in prior cases involving similar facts and would hold that claimant’s status as a union member, his seventeen-year history with employer, and the actions of his employer did not relieve him of the obligation to market himself to other employers. See, e.g., Nowlin, Nos. 170-74-58, 170-74-59 (“an injured employee cannot limit a job search because of considerations regarding ... the effect her efforts and potential employment might have on union benefits”); Reynolds v. Gust K. Newberg Constr. Co., 70 O.I.C. 236 (1991) (employee not justified in refusing selective employment because acceptance would jeopardize his union pension benefits); Diehl v. Reynolds Metals Co., 67 O.I.C. 188, 191 (1988) (The ‘Workers’ Compensation Act does not operate in a vacuum and ... collective bargaining agreements ... may be related to exercise by the parties of rights and duties prescribed under the Act. Nevertheless, the Act does not in any way define or guarantee the right of an employee to remain in a particular employment.”); Witt v. Kenrose Mfg. Co., 55 O.I.C. 381 (1973) (employee who abandoned non-union light duty to protect her union status not eligible for benefits). The rationale set out in those cases is compelling.
Whether a job is within a claimant’s ability has no relationship to his or her union status, benefits which may attach thereto, or longevity with an employer. No language in the *192Workers’ Compensation Act supplies a deference to a union employee when marketing his or her residual work capacity. An employer is not required to pay compensation to a claimant who is capable of performing selective employment but who fails to look for a non-union position. All employees are required to look beyond their pre-injury employers if no selective employment is available. Claimant may not excuse his failure to market residual work capacity because employer refused to release him from his contractual obligation. Claimant’s contractual limitation and the possibility of termination from his pre-injury employment do not justify his failure to market his residual work capacity.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the commission’s decision.