I agree with the majority that in light of the stark distinction between the requirements of subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1782,1 it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to permit a prospective defendant to derail a threatened class action by “picking off” named plaintiffs one-by-one through the provision of individual remedies to such plaintiffs. Thus, when a consumer complains about a widespread practice and notifies a prospective defendant that a “class” remedy is demanded, the Act must reasonably be construed to permit a defendant to avoid a subsequent class action only if it satisfies the requirements of subdivision (c).
Accordingly, if plaintiff had notified Gibraltar at the outset of her intention to seek class relief, I would agree with the majority that the trial court’s dismissal of this class action would be inappropriate. As the facts recited by the majority indicate, however, when plaintiff notified Gibraltar of her demands, she did not suggest that she was seeking classwide monetary relief. Instead, she sought such relief only with respect to her own and her husband’s accounts. Gibraltar responded by granting the very relief which plaintiff had requested. Under these circumstances, I believe that plaintiff is now barred from pursuing a class action for damages under the Act.
Elementary notions of fairness compel this result. It is clear, of course, that only the aggrieved consumer knows whether he or she intends to seek a monetary recovery only on his or her own behalf or additionally on behalf of the entire class. It is also clear that a prospective defendant’s response to a demand for relief will invariably be influenced by the scope of the *598demand. A defendant may be much more willing to settle or remedy a small, individual claim, even if it has strong doubts as to its validity, than it would be to provide expensive, wide-ranging class relief. If consumers are authorized to pursue the approach which plaintiff followed in this case, they can routinely “sandbag” prospective defendants by first seeking and obtaining an individual recovery and only thereafter transforming their complaints into class actions. To my mind, section 1782, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) must reasonably be construed to preclude a consumer who has demanded and has received individual relief from then instituting a class action for damages.
Accordingly, in light of the facts of this case, I would affirm the judgment of dismissal.
Richardson, J.,* concurred.
All section references are to the Civil Code. The Act refers to the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, codified at sections 1750 to 1784.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.