dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgments of affirmance because, in my view of the cases sub judice, defendants are estopped to deny that venue is proper in Fulton County. Based on the recent authority of G. H. Bass & Co. v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. 327 (1) (486 SE2d.810), I submit the majority errs in ruling that the subject of the admissions in these cases sub judice, namely proper venue, are strictly impermissible legal conclusions. Rather, it is my opinion that the pleadings admitting proper venue in Fulton County constitute permissible admissions of correct legal opinions or conclusions as applied to facts relevant to these cases. Id. at 329. Since these evidentiary admissions have not been withdrawn, the pretrial order formulating the issues does not control. Consequently, I would reverse the transfer of the cases to DeKalb County.
Plaintiff Franklin E. Ford III (“Franklin Ford”), an incapacitated adult, and his mother, plaintiff Claudia Ford, brought these multiparty tort actions seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained on August 26,1989, allegedly as a result of the failure of a defectively *16manufactured automobile tire, contributing to a highway collision in DeKalb County, Georgia. Appellee-defendants are Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a New York partnership (“the New York partnership”), and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a Delaware corporation (“the Delaware corporation”). Prior judgments for plaintiffs were set aside due to improper joinder of the cases without the consent of all parties, due to evidentiary errors, and also due to error in the charge on punitive damages. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248 (461 SE2d 877), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226 (476 SE2d 565).
On remand, defendants objected to venue in Fulton County and moved to transfer both cases to Clayton County. The following procedural history is relevant to the disposition of these motions: When the Franklin Ford case was initiated in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia in 1990, B. F. Goodrich Tire Company and International Automotive Corporation d/b/a NTW were named as the original defendants. Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleged: “Defendant B. F. Goodrich is subject to both the jurisdiction and venue of this CourtE, i.e., the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia].” In its answer, B. F. Goodrich “admit[ted] the allegations of Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Complaint.” But defense counsel stipulated to the trial court that the New York “partnership is the proper party because . . . it was the entity that actually manufactured it [the tire]. The manufacturing responsibilities were [subsequently] transferred to a corporation, [the] Delaware corporation, which is why the Delaware corporation is also a proper party.” By consent, the New York partnership voluntarily appeared in the Franklin Ford case and substituted itself as the correct party defendant “in all pleadings filed to date, including the Complaint, Answer, etc., and all future pleadings. The B. F. Goodrich Company [was] dropped as a party without prejudice and . . . [n]o further service of the Complaint or Answer is required.”
When Claudia Ford initiated her case in the State Court of Fulton County, the named defendants were International Automotive Corporation d/b/a NTW and simply Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, without any distinction between the New York partnership and the Delaware corporation. Service of process was effectuated on the Delaware corporation by serving its registered agent in Clayton County. In its answer, the Delaware corporation “admitted the allegations of Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Complaint.” The effect of this was to admit that this defendant “is a Delaware corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing tiré products for motor vehicles[; that defendant] transacted business in the State of Georgia^ that the Delaware corporation] may be served through its registered agent . . . [in] Forest Park, Georgia[; and that the Delaware *17corporation] is subject to both the jurisdiction and venue of this Court[, i.e., the State Court of Fulton County].”
According to the affidavit of Frank Skorzewski, the Assistant Secretary of the New York partnership, that partnership “was not formed or organized under Georgia law, was not registered to do business in Georgia, had no office in Georgia, and had no registered agent in Georgia. The principal activities of the . . . New York partnership were not in Georgia. As of August 26, 1989, the two partners in the . . . New York partnership were Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Uniroyal Tire Company, Inc., a New Jersey corporation. [The New Jersey corporation,] Uniroyal Tire Company, Inc. had a registered agent in Georgia on August 26, 1989.”
The trial court granted the motions by transferring both cases to DeKalb County, where the injuries occurred, but certified its orders for immediate review. Permission to pursue interlocutory appeals were granted by this Court, and timely notices of appeal were filed. In Case No. A97A2505, Franklin Ford appeals, and in Case No. A97A2506, Claudia Ford appeals.
Case No. A97A2505
1. Plaintiff Franklin Ford enumerates the transfer of his case to DeKalb County, arguing the New York partnership admitted venue is proper in Fulton County in its answer. The New York partnership contends that, because it is a nonresident of Georgia, venue is controlled by OCGA § 9-10-93, the venue provisions under Georgia’s Long Arm Statute. I do not reach the merits of defendant’s position. Rather, I conclude the New York partnership’s answer constitutes a solemn admission in judicio on this point, which estops the partnership to deny venue is proper in Fulton County. Consequently, I would reverse the transfer of Franklin Ford’s case. “Without offering the same in evidence, either party may avail himself of allegations or admissions made in the pleadings of the other.” OCGA § 24-3-30. “Conclusive presumptions of law are termed estoppels; averments to the contrary of such presumptions shall not be allowed.” OCGA § 24-4-24 (a). “Estoppels include presumptions in favor of: [s]olemn admissions in judicio.” OCGA § 24-4-24 (b) (7). “ ‘A party to a suit (or proceeding) will not be allowed to disprove an admission made in his pleadings, without withdrawing it from the record.’ Florida Yellow Pine Co. v. Flint River Naval Stores Co., 140 Ga. 321 (2) (78 SE 900). . . .” Anderson v. Oakley, 133 Ga. App. 758, 759 (1) (212 SE2d 875).
In the case sub judice, we are not shown where, in a voluminous record of over 6,000 pages spread over three separate appeals, the *18New York partnership amended its answer to withdraw the matters admitted by B. F. Goodrich. Consequently, the New York partnership must be deemed to have made a solemn admission in judicio when it substituted itself for B. F. Goodrich in all the pleadings. Specifically, the partnership’s answer admitted paragraph 5 of the complaint, namely that jurisdiction and venue were proper in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia. “By such admission, made in judicio, the [partnership] is estopped from asserting [that venue is improper in Fulton County].” Duke v. Ayers, 163 Ga. 444, 453 (2) (136 SE 410). Under this evidentiary posture, the trial court erred in concluding that venue in Fulton County was improper as to the partnership, regardless of the result under OCGA § 9-10-93 or any other venue provision.
Case No. A97A2506
2. Plaintiff Claudia Ford enumerates the transfer of her case to DeKalb County, where her injuries were sustained.
(a) The record is not clear whether the defendant Delaware corporation is also that entity identified as Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, Inc., one of the two partners in the defendant New York partnership. I assume, then, that the uncontradicted affidavit evidence of Frank Skorzewski establishes that the New York partnership is a nonresident of Georgia as defined in OCGA § 9-10-90. Consequently, I agree with defendants that venue is determined under the Long Arm Statute and hold that venue over the nonresident New York partnership is governed by OCGA § 9-10-93 as amended by Ga. L. 1997, p. 480, § 1. “[A] reviewing court should apply the law as it exists at the time of its judgment rather than the law prevailing at the rendition of the judgment under review, and may therefore reverse a judgment that [may have been] correct at the time it was rendered, . . . where the law has been changed in the meantime and where such application of the new law will impair no vested right. . . .” (Emphasis in original.) City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 206 (3), 208 (28 SE2d 759).
(b) “Venue in cases under this article [OCGA § 9-10-90 et seq.] shall lie in any county wherein a substantial part of the business was transacted, the tortious act, omission, or injury occurred, or the real property is located. Where an action is brought against a resident of this state, any nonresident of this state who is involved in the same transaction or occurrence and who is suable under the provisions of this article may be joined as a defendant in the county where a resident defendant is suable. Under such circumstances, jurisdiction and venue of the court of and over such nonresident defendant shall not be affected or lost if at trial a verdict or judgment is returned in favor *19of such resident defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-10-93, as amended.
Here, the defendant Delaware corporation is a Georgia resident, registered to do business in this State. In my view, the Delaware corporation is also estopped to deny that venue is proper in Fulton County, because it also admitted the allegations as to venue in its answer. Since the resident defendant is suable in Fulton County, Georgia, the nonresident New York partnership may be joined in an action against the resident defendant in Fulton County under the unambiguous terms of OCGA § 9-10-93 as amended. The transfer of Claudia Ford’s case from Fulton County to DeKalb County is erroneous under the facts of this particular case and should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this dissent.