The question is whether the two defendant farmers, who as a *288partnership both grew and sold their crops, were established by the undisputed facts as not being “merchants” as a matter of law, according to the definition in OCGA § 11-2-104 (1). We are not called upon here to consider the other side of the coin, whether farmers or these farmers in particular are “merchants” as a matter of law.1
In November 1983, Goldkist sued under OCGA § 11-2-712 for losses arising out of the necessity to cover a contract for soybeans. It produced a written confirmation dated July 22 for 5,000 bushels of soybeans to be delivered to it by defendants between August 22 and September 22 at $6.88 per bushel. A defense was that there was no writing signed by either of the Brownlees, as required by OCGA § 11-2-201 (1).
Affidavits were submitted on both sides, and Barney Brownlee’s deposition was taken. Based on the facts which were not in dispute, and favoring the plaintiff’s side of the contested facts, the court agreed with the Brownlees that the circumstances did not fit any of the exceptions provided for in Section 201 and granted summary judgment. On appeal, Goldkist asserts that defendants came within subsection (2), relating to dealings “between merchants.”
Appellees admit that their crops are “goods” as defined in OCGA § 11-2-105. The record establishes the following facts. The partnership had been operating the row crop farming business for 14 years, producing peanuts, soybeans, corn, milo, and wheat on 1,350 acres, and selling the crops.
It is also established without dispute that Barney Brownlee, whose deposition was taken, was familiar with the marketing procedure of “booking” crops, which sometimes occurred over the phone between the farmer and the buyer, rather than in person, and a written contract would be signed later. He periodically called plaintiff’s agent to check the price, which fluctuated. If the price met his approval, he sold soybeans. At this time the partnership still had some of its 1982 crop in storage, and the price was rising slowly. Mr. Brownlee received a written confirmation in the mail concerning a sale of soybeans and did not contact plaintiff to contest it but simply did nothing. In addition to the agricultural business, Brownlee operated a gasoline service station.
In dispute are the facts with respect to whether or not an oral contract was made between Barney Brownlee for the partnership and agent Harrell for the buyer in a July 22 telephone conversation. The plaintiff’s evidence was that it occurred and that it was discussed *289soon thereafter with Brownlee at the service station on two different occasions, when he acknowledged it, albeit reluctantly, because the market price of soybeans had risen. Mr. Brownlee denies booking the soybeans and denies the nature of the conversations at his service station with Harrell and the buyer’s manager.
In this posture, of course, the question of whether an oral contract was made would not yield to summary adjudication, as apparently recognized by the trial court, which based its decision on the preliminary question of whether the Brownlee partnership was a “merchant.”
Whether or not the farmers in this case are “merchants” as a matter of law, which is not before us, the evidence does not demand a conclusion that they are outside of that category which is excepted from the requirement of a signed writing to bind a buyer and seller of goods. Although it is not binding precedent, see Thunderbird Farms v. Abney, 178 Ga. App. 335 (343 SE2d 127) (1986), which is instructive on the same question. In so holding, we view all evidence, including reasonable inferences and deductions, in favor of respondent Goldkist. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Georgia Intl. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckabee, 175 Ga. App. 343, 345 (333 SE2d 618) (1985).
To allow a farmer who deals in crops of the kind at issue, or who otherwise comes within the definition of “merchant” in OCGA § 11-2-104 (1), to renege on a confirmed oral booking for the sale of crops would result in a fraud on the buyer. The farmer could abide by the booking if the price thereafter declined but reject it if the price rose; the buyer, on the other hand, would be forced to sell the crop following the booking at its peril, or wait until the farmer decides whether to honor the booking or not.
Defendants’ narrow construction of “merchant” would, given the booking procedure used for the sale of farm products, thus guarantee to the farmers the best of both possible worlds (fulfill booking if price goes down after booking and reject it if price improves) and to the buyers the worst of both possible worlds. On the other hand, construing “merchants” in OCGA § 11-2-104 (1) as not excluding as a matter of law farmers such as the ones in this case, protects them equally as well as the buyer. If the market price declines after the booking, they are assured of the higher booking price; the buyer cannot renege, as OCGA § 11-2-201 (2) would apply.
In giving this construction to the statute, we are persuaded by Thunderbird Farms, supra, and the analyses provided in the following cases from other states: Currituck Grain, Inc. v. Powell, 38 N. C. App. 7 (246 SE2d 853) (1978); Rush Johnson Farms v. Mo. Farmers Assn., 555 SW2d 61 (Mo. 1977); Nelson v. Union Equity Co-op. Exchange, 548 SW2d 352 (Tex. 1977); Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App. 3d 702 (313 NE2d 628) (1974); Barron v. Edwards, 45 Mich. App. 210 *290(206 NW2d 508) (1973). By the same token, we reject the narrow construction given in other states’ cases: Terminal Grain Corp. v. Freeman, 270 NW2d 806 (S. D. 1978); Sand Seed Svc. v. Poeckes, 249 NW2d 663) (Iowa 1977); Gerner v. Vasby, 75 Wis.2d 660 (250 NW2d 319) (1977); Decatur Co-op. Assn. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171 (547 P2d 323) (1976); Lish v. Compton, 547 P2d 223 (Utah 1976); Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722 (321 S2d 199) (1975); Cook Grains v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962 (395 SW2d 555) (1965).
We believe this is the proper construction to give the two statutes, OCGA §§ 11-2-104 (1) and 11-2-201 (2), as taken together they are thus further branches stemming from the centuries-old simple legal idea pacta servanda sunt — agreements are to be kept.2 So construed, they evince the legislative intent to enforce the accepted practices of the marketplace among those who frequent it.
Judgment reversed.
Birdsong, C. J., Sognier and Pope, JJ. concur. Carley, J., concurs in the judgment only. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.At least two Georgia cases recognize that the undisputed evidence may show that a party is a “merchant” as a matter of law: Greater Southern Distrib. Co. v. Usry, 124 Ga. App. 525 (2) (184 SE2d 486) (1971); Bicknell v. Joyce Sportswear Co., 173 Ga. App. 897 (2) (328 SE2d 564) (1985).
From the Commencement Address of Dean Rusk, University of Georgia School of Law, 1986.