concurring in result:
I concur in affirming the judgment and sentence in this case. However, as I have said before, I believe we should provide a meaningful answer to questions from the jury when they ask, as they often do, about the meaning of life without parole. See Smallwood v. State, 907 P.2d 217, 239 (Okl.Cr.1995) (Chapel, V.P.J., Specially Concurring). I am authorized to state that Vice Presiding Judge RETA STRUBHAR joins in this opinion.
LUMPKIN, Judge,concurring in result:
I agree that Appellant’s convictions and sentences should be affirmed. I write separately because I do not agree with the standard of review the Court uses here to determine the sufficiency of the evidence.
I have previously stated my belief this Court should adopt a unified Spuehler-type *16approach to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in all cases, whether they contain both direct and circumstantial evidence, or whether they contain entirely circumstantial evidence. See White v. State, 900 P.2d 982 (Okl.Cr.1995) (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring). I re-urge that here because this case presents a prime example why a unified approach would be clearer and more concise.
The opinion goes to great lengths showing its rationale as to why it should use the reasonable hypothesis test in this instance. Unfortunately, the evidence does not agree with the opinion’s categorization.
Appellant took the stand and testified in his behalf. He testified that he had met the victim before, and that they had been sexually intimate in the past. The night the victim was killed, he was in the victim’s apartment. They started kissing, and when “things started just escalating” they went to the bedroom, where they both got completely undressed and had consensual intercourse while lying on the corner of the bed. Appellant said he ejaculated in the victim. He also said he believed the victim may have been on her period. He offered this evidence to explain why his semen was found along with the victim’s blood on the bed. After they had finished intercourse, a man of Indonesian nationality entered the apartment. He appeared angry at the victim and had a knife, which he jabbed at the Appellant, cutting him on the chest and arm, and drawing blood. Appellant said he tried to calm the man down, but was unsuccessful in doing so. He also noticed that the victim seemed upset. Appellant heard the intruder talking to a second man. When the intruder resumed arguing with the victim and pushed her to the floor, Appellant left, believing that the others could work things out if he were not there.
This is certainly direct evidence as to the rape; and as the state’s theory was that he killed her to avoid prosecution for that rape, it should be direct evidence as to the murder. If the jury believed Appellant’s version, they would not find him guilty of murder, as he would have no reason to kill the victim and he was not present when the murder was committed.
My point is this: the opinion goes to great lengths to differentiate cases attempting to interpret what kind of evidence is present in a case; and having decided that, which test should be used to determine if that evidence is sufficient. That is an exercise better left to scholars. If this Court adopted a unified approach to examining the sufficiency of the evidence, it could focus solely on the issue which should be before it: whether there was sufficient evidence for any rationale trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed each element of a crime.
There is another minor point. In addressing Appellant’s complaint that search warrants were improperly issued, the opinion concludes that the magistrate “had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” I interpret the “substantial basis” language as being the same as saying the affidavit presented sufficient information to establish probable cause.
Accordingly, I concur in result.