ON REVIEW
SILAK, Justice.This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress methamphetamine evidence. Pursuant to a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of felony possession of methamphetamine, the appellant reserved the right to appeal the district court’s order. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. This Court granted the State’s petition for review. We affirm the district court’s order and judgment of conviction.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 6, 1994, Nampa police officer Edward Hofkins (Hofkins) approached a residence to serve a summons on a woman, “N.M.”, he believed lived there. Hofkins was dressed in civilian clothes but was wearing his badge and gun and was carrying a police radio. Hofkins’ knock on the door was answered by appellant Bradley Manthei (Man-thei), who was a frequent visitor at the home and who had been an overnight guest the previous evening. Manthei identified himself *238as Brad Martell and told Hofkins that N.M. had moved out two days before.
As Hofkins and Manthei spoke they were two and a half to three feet apart. The door was fully open and Manthei was standing in the threshold. Hofkins noticed the top of a syringe protruding from Manthei’s shirt pocket. The plunger end of the syringe was the end Hofkins could see and the plunger was up. Hofkins testified that he believed the syringe was possibly drug related and that he was observing possible drug paraphernalia. He then called for backup. Hof-kins thought that at this point Manthei became aware that the officer had seen the syringe. Hofkins then asked Manthei to step outside. Manthei did not respond but simply stared at the officer and turned his body in a position to try to shield the syringe. Hofkins then said, “Brad, step out.” Manthei then yelled a profanity and attempted to slam the door on the officer. Hofkins stopped the door from closing, and again called for backup. He then entered the house in pursuit of Manthei who had headed toward the kitchen. Hofkins drew his gun as he approached the kitchen.
As Hofkins entered the kitchen, he observed that Manthei had the syringe down in the sink, with the plunger down, and appeared to be squirting the contents of the syringe into the drain. Also in the kitchen was a man whom Hofkins knew named D.L. Hofkins told Manthei to stop and drop the syringe and told D.L. not to move. Both men complied. Hofkins then had Manthei lie on the floor, spread eagle style, until the backup unit arrived at which time Hofkins placed Manthei under arrest and handcuffed him. Hofkins then searched Manthei’s person and found another syringe, two plastic bags containing a white powdery substance and a marijuana pipe, and another plastic bag that Hofkins noticed between Manthei’s legs, the contents of which later tested positive for methamphetamine.
Manthei was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine, and misdemeanors of possession of drug paraphernalia and resisting and obstructing an officer. Manthei pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, alleging that the police had made a warrantless residential entry in the absence of exigent circumstances in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Hofkins had probable cause to arrest Manthei for possession of drug paraphernalia and resisting and obstructing, and that when Hofkins followed Manthei into the house, he was in hot pursuit and there was an exigency arising from the risk of destruction of evidence.
Manthei thereafter entered into a plea agreement whereby he conditionally pled guilty to the charge of possession of methamphetamine and the other charges were dropped. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Man-thei was sentenced to a fixed term of twenty months with credit for time already served.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court held that it did not believe “the existence of a partially hidden syringe is sufficient to constitute probable cause for an arrest under the circumstances of this case.” The court noted that prior to calling for backup assistance, the only information Hofkins possessed was that Manthei had a syringe in his shirt pocket and there was no evidence at that point to indicate that the syringe was being used or was intended to be used in connection with controlled substances. With respect to whether there was a valid Terry stop, the court further held that when Hofkins ordered Manthei to step out of the house, the facts did not provide Hofkins with sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Manthei for the purpose of investigating the possibility that a crime was being committed in his presence. Finally, the court held that no exigent circumstance existed to justify a war-rantless residential entry because the suspected offense was not one of violence, citing State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 869 P.2d 224 (1993).
The State petitioned for review. This Court granted review as to all issues.
II.
ISSUES ON REVIEW
The State raises the following issues on review:
*239(1) Whether the district court correctly held that the officer’s entry into the house to complete the arrest or Terry stop of Manthei was consistent with Manthei’s Fourth Amendment rights, in particular, (a) whether the officer initiated an arrest based on probable cause, or an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion, before Manthei fled into the house,' and (b) whether the officer acted properly in entering the house to complete the arrest or detention he had initiated.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard Of Review
This case is on review from the Court of Appeals. In such a case, this Court values the decision of the Court of Appeals for the insight it provides in addressing the issues on appeal. State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 923 P.2d 439, 442 (1996); Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 768, 890 P.2d 714, 719 (1996). While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, the Court reviews the opinion of the trial court directly. State v. Roberts, 923 P.2d at 442.
B. The District Court Correctly Denied Manthei’s Motion To Suppress The Methamphetamine Evidence.
1. The detention of Manthei was a valid Terry stop.
The district court denied the motion to suppress on the basis that Hofidns had probable cause to arrest Manthei and that once Manthei had fled into the residence, “there was sufficient hot pursuit to justify any war-rantless entry into the residence.” The court ruled that there was a realistic expectation that delay would result in the destruction of evidence.
On appeal, the State argues that even if Hofkins did not have probable cause to arrest Manthei, he had a reasonable, articula-ble suspicion to detain Manthei pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 829 P.2d 520 (1992), this Court explained the Terry detention standard as follows:
[N]ot all seizures of the person need be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime; a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Such a seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment if there is an artic-ulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.... Whether an officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances.
121 Idaho at 932, 829 P.2d at 522 (additional citations omitted).
In the present case, Hofidns observed a syringe protruding from Manthei’s shirt pocket. The needle was pointed down and the plunger was up. In his affidavit in support of the State’s opposition to the motion to suppress, Hofkins stated that he was a twenty-five year police veteran and had worked a number of drug cases, talked to hundreds of drug users and dealers over the years, and had experience in identifying drugs and drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, Hofkins testified that when he saw the syringe in Manthei’s pocket, he believed that it was “possibly dope related” and that he was observing “potential drug paraphernalia,” the possession of which is a misdemeanor under I.C. § 37-2734A. See State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 993, 783 P.2d 859, 860 (1989) (stating that “In determining whether there is probable cause for an arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has gained from his previous experience and training.”) We hold that based on these observations and because of his training and experience, Hofkins had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed or was about to be committed in his presence and that he had the authority to detain Manthei under Terry.
Additionally, after Hofkins called for backup on his radio and asked Manthei to step *240outside, Manthei stared at Hofkins and turned his body to shield the syringe. When Hofkins made his explicit command — “Brad, step out” — Manthei yelled a profanity and started to slam the door. Thus, based upon the totality of the circumstances, we hold that whether or not probable cause existed, Hofkins, at the very least, had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for an investigative detention of Manthei.
2. Officer Hofkins legally entered the residence to complete the detention of Manthei under Terry.
Having determined that Hofkins validly initiated the Terry stop, we must next determine whether the officer could follow Manthei into the residence to complete the detention without violating the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when an arrest has been initiated while a suspect is in a public place, such as a doorway, the suspect cannot thwart an otherwise proper arrest by retreating into a private place, such as a residence. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). In Santana, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant had just sold heroin at her residence. When they arrived at her house, the defendant was standing in the open doorway. The police identified themselves and displayed their badges. As they approached, the defendant retreated into her house and the officers followed her inside and arrested her.
In the present case, as in Santana, Hof-kins had a valid purpose for going to the residence, to serve the warrant on N.M. After he arrived, he developed a reasonable, articulable suspicion to warrant a Terry stop of Manthei. To permit Manthei to flee into the house at that point, when he knew he was being detained and was not free to go, would defeat the purpose of the Terry stop. See State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827, 839 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct.App.1992) (noting that “In a Terry stop, the officer communicates to the detainee, either orally or through a show of force or authority, that he is not free to go about his business.”) Further, we see no reason to distinguish between entry into a residence to complete a Terry stop and entry to complete a probable cause-based arrest. In both cases the police have properly asserted their authority, and the assertion of authority should not be thwarted by a person’s movement from the threshold into the house.
Manthei argues that entry into the residence was improper under State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 869 P.2d 224 (1993). In Curl, this Court held that a warrantless entry into a residence that has as its only purpose the prevention of destruction of evidence could not be validly made unless the crime under investigation was a violent offense. 125 Idaho at 227, 869 P.2d at 227. The present case is distinguishable from Curl because that ease did not involve a Terry stop at the threshold.
In Curl the police officer had not initiated a Terry stop prior to the warrantless entry into the apartment. There, the suspect exited an apartment and was walking down the hallway when he saw the police officer. Curl turned and ran back into the apartment. The police officer, present in the apartment building to serve a warrant on someone in another apartment, had seen a cloud of smoke emanating from the apartment Curl had just exited and had smelled the odor of marijuana. The officer followed Curl to the apartment, identified himself as a police officer, pushed the door open and entered. The officer never ordered Curl to stop and never let Curl know that he was under an investigative detention or that he was not free to run back into the apartment from where he had just come.
In the present case, Manthei was standing in the threshold of an open doorway when Hofkins developed the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to justify a Terry stop. He asked Manthei to step outside, at which point Manthei failed to comply and tried to shield the syringe from Hofkins’ view. When Hofkins then ordered Manthei to step outside, Manthei swore at Hofkins and tried to slam the door. At that point in time Manthei was not free to close the door and go about his business.
*241For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Hofkins’ entry into the residence did not violate Manthei’s Fourth Amendment rights, and that the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the methamphetamine seized in the residence.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The order of the district court denying Manthei’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine evidence, and the judgment of conviction, are affirmed.
TROUT, C.J., and SCHROEDER, J., concur.