dissenting and concurring: It is undisputed that the professional liability insurance policy purchased by Dr. David Wong from Missouri Medical Insurance Company does not cover the acts of malpractice involved here. That insurance policy covers only acts which occurred during the policy period. The effective date of the insurance policy is July 28,1980. Dr. Wong’s malpractice at issue occurred prior to that date. It thus results, though unintentionally, that the sole effect of the insurance contract is the triggering of the statute from which MoMedico’s liability flows. That statute, K.S.A. 40-3402(a), requires all Kansas professional liability insurers to provide “not less than one *828hundred thousand ($100,000) per occurrence, subject to not less than a three hundred thousand ($300,000) annual aggregate for all claims made during the policy period,” covering that period and the prior term of a similar policy. Thus it is clear MoMedico’s liability arises exclusively from the statute and not from its contract of insurance with Dr. Wong.
The majority opinion correctly holds K.S.A. 40-3402(a) imposes an obligation on MoMedico to provide liability coverage on a claims made basis as a condition precedent to its doing business in Kansas even though such is not a part of its contract with Dr. Wong. But, the majority opinion, after invoking the statute, mistakenly abandons the statutory source of the insurance coverage and selectively engrafts onto the statute the amount of insurance borrowed from the inapplicable insurance contract. Such judicial craftsmanship is improper for several reasons. Selective enforcement of the provisions of a statute, absent ambiguity, breaches established rules of law and is tantamount to amending a statute by the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers. The majority’s action also sets an improper precedent for statutory and contract construction which will affect a much broader area of the law than insurance contracts. Finally, the majority’s decision is grossly unjust. MoMedico issued its liability policy to Dr. Wong restricting its coverage to occurrences within the policy period. The premium for that policy was small because the risk was limited. Had MoMedico contemplated being required to furnish liability insurance coverage for all claims made under its policy against Dr. Wong for malpractice occurring during the prior policy period, it would not have contracted thusly with Dr. Wong. It was known St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company did not like the risk posed by Dr. Wong and had cancelled its policy. MoMedico’s liability here did not arise by choice but by operation of law. Where the law imposes the liability, the limit of that liability imposed by statute should also be applicable.
In drawing these conclusions I am aware of the tremendous damages resulting from Dr. Wong’s malpractice. But, I am also mindful MoMedico is not the wrongdoer and is only responsible for the liability it agreed to assume or that is imposed by law. Obviously for a premium of $73 it did not agree to take on the responsibility for Dr. Wong’s past wrongdoing. The source of *829MoMedico’s obligation is the statute which imposed liability of $100,000 per occurrence on it. Here there are two occurrences; one has been settled for $12,000 for which MoMedico is liable plus attorney fees. MoMedico’s liability for the other occurrence cannot exceed $100,000 plus attorney fees. I therefore dissent as to the amount of insurance and concur in all else.
McFarland, J., joins the foregoing dissenting and concurring opinion.