dissenting in part.
Considering the long established rule, unchanged by our new Evidence Codes, that evidence of “other acts” will be permitted *660only upon a showing of substantial similarity and identity of circumstances, see, e.g., Martin v. Amusements of America, Inc., 38 N.C. App. 130, 134, 247 S.E. 2d 639, 642 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E. 2d 804 (1978) and believing that Ms. King’s testimony was not relevant to the issues of fact tried in this case, I dissent. In my view, the dissimilar occurrence evidence admitted was not probative of defendant’s motive, intent, absence of mistake or possible bad faith in dealings with plaintiff. Rather, the challenged evidence simply portrayed an unrelated “bad act” by defendant. Because N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 8C-1, Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith,” I vote for a new trial on the breach of contract claim. However, believing that the inadmissible “bad act” evidence did not affect the malicious prosecution claim, I concur in the majority’s resolution of that claim.