dissenting.
Today, the Court has elevated the concept of “form over substance” to a new level of absurdity. Thelma King entered a guilty plea to two misdemeanor offenses, and the question presented for resolution is whether a sufficiently comprehensive “record” of that proceeding was “made and preserved” in accordance with the mandate of Uniform State Court Rule 33.11. The record of Ms. King’s guilty plea proceeding contains detailed forms, bearing her signatures and the trial court’s annotations, which the Court of Appeals found sufficient in a well-reasoned opinion. King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576 (486 SE2d 904) (1997). However, the majority now reverses that decision, applying in Division 1 the “new rule” which it creates and purports to make prospective only in Division 3. The issue here is not whether this Court should adopt a new rule. The Uniform State Court Rules provide a procedure for amending their provisions. The only question before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there was compliance with the requirements of Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 which presently is in effect. Because the Court of Appeals, relying upon applicable and relevant authority, correctly held that the record was sufficient to meet the requirements of Uniform State Court Rule 33.11,1 dissent to this Court’s reversal of the judgment in King v. State, supra.
The majority correctly notes that Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11 requires a “verbatim record” of a guilty plea proceeding in the superior court. However, even assuming that a verbatim record is synonymous with a “transcript,” its absence in this case is immaterial. The applicable authority is Uniform State Court Rule 33.11, not Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11. Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 does not require a verbatim record of a guilty plea proceeding in the state court, but provides only for a “record” which evidences that the specified inquiries were made and the requisite information was imparted. The absence in Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 of the additional requirement that the “record” be “verbatim” clearly indicates that a guilty plea proceeding in state court need not be reported or transcribed. See Coastal Ga. Regional Dev. Center v. Higdon, 263 Ga. 827, 829 (1) (439 SE2d 902) (1994).
*375Notwithstanding the express difference in the requirement imposed by Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11, the majority nevertheless opines in Division 3 that the same requirement should apply in state court when a guilty plea results in incarceration. If this subjective policy determination is to be made, then Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 should be amended in accordance with the applicable procedures, so as to impose in state courts the same “verbatim record” requirement that applies in superior courts. However, the majority’s imposition of that requirement in state courts through judicial fiat violates the provisions of Uniform State Court Rules 1.6 and 1.7. The proper way to amend Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 is through compliance with those applicable procedures and not by this Court’s judicial pronouncement that the Rule should be rewritten.
Although the majority uses only the term “record” when discussing Ms. King’s guilty plea hearing in Division 1, it is clear that the majority does impose on that existing record the “verbatim” requirement which it purports to adopt prospectively in Division 3. Nothing in the majority opinion supports a holding that the record of Ms. King’s guilty plea hearing is insufficient to meet the requirements of Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 as it now exists. At most, the majority opinion rests upon its conclusion that the State can more easily meet its burden of proving that a defendant entered an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea if the proceeding was transcribed. However, courts decide what is required and should not opine as to what is easier. Here, the State sought to meet its burden with a sufficient record. As the Court of Appeals noted, the record consists of detailed forms signed by Ms. King and, as the majority itself recognizes, such signed forms can satisfy even the requirement for a “verbatim record” of certain of the inquiries and notices specified in Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11. Thus, it is clear that the signed forms in this case are sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a “record” of those similar elements specified in Uniform State Court Rule 33.11. Moreover, the forms also include annotations by the trial court which set forth the factual bases for Ms. King’s pleas. See Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 264 (454 SE2d 466) (1995). Therefore, the requirement of Uniform State Court Rule 33.11 (C) for a “record” of the state court’s inquiry into the accuracy of the pleas has been satisfied. The majority’s conclusion that the signed forms do not constitute a sufficient record is based entirely upon the fact that they do not meet the requirements of a “verbatim” record as defined and ostensibly imposed prospectively in Division 3. Under these circumstances, I believe that the only “manifest injustice” is this Court’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial of Ms. King’s motion to withdraw her voluntary, valid and binding guilty pleas.
*376Decided December 4, 1998 — Reconsideration denied December 18,1998. Caprice J. Small, Dwight L. Thomas, for appellant. Keith C. Martin, Solicitor, Evelyn Proctor, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.