I dissent. Curiously, my esteemed colleagues of the majority would permit the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of the police examination of defendant’s Ford automobile but, on the other hand, would exclude the police tape recordings of the conversation between defendant and his wife at the Palm Springs jail. I respectfully suggest that they thus err twice. In my judgment the seizure and subsequent examination of defendant’s car was unlawful; the tape recording of the conversation, however, was constitutionally permissible.
As to the seizure of the car, I must emphasize at the outset that the majority erroneously rely upon our decision in People v. Teale (1969) 70 Cal.2d 497 [75 Cal.Rptr. 172, 450 P.2d 564] to support the action of the police. Crucial to our holding in Teale was the fact that the auto*315mobile there involved was seized incident to the lawful arrest of the defendant, who was placed under arrest while in the act of entering it. Although in the case at bench the majority note that defendant’s car was not seized incident to his arrest, as indeed the facts make unquestionably clear, I find confounding their attempt to extract from Teale authority to uphold the seizure on the basis that it was a seizure of evidence in plain view. That the automobile was in plain view when the defendant in Teale was arrested never became relevant to our determination that its seizure and subsequent examination for evidence of the crime were legal. Nor did we hold in Teale that, absent the circumstance of the defendant’s contemporaneous arrest, his automobile could have been seized anyhow on the mere ground that it was in plain view. All reference to Teale, it seems to me, is simply extraneous.
A brief reference to our unanimous holding in Teale demonstrates the error of the majority’s position on this issue. After referring to our unanimous opinions in People v. Webb (1967) 66 Cal.2d 107 [56 Cal.Rptr. 902, 424 P.2d 342, 19 A.L.R.3d 708] and People v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 226 [60 Cal.Rptr. 472, 430 P.2d 30], and to Johnson v. State (1965) 238 Md. 528 [209 A.2d 765], we said in Teale: “The principle which we distill from the foregoing cases, and which is applicable to the instant case, is simply this: When officers, incidental to a lawful arrest, [italics added] seize an automobile or other object in the reasonable belief that such object is itself evidence [fn. omitted; original italics] of the commission of the crime for which such arrest is made, any subsequent examination of said object undertaken for the purpose of determining its evidentiary value does not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (70 Cal.2d at p. 511.)
To embrace Teale, as do the majority, for a principle for which it does not stand, and thereafter to assert that the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022], rehearing denied 404 U.S. 874 [30 L.Ed.2d 120, 92 S.Ct. 26], does not detract from that principle, lends no assistance to the majority’s position. As I explain infra, the simple fact is that there is no support in Coolidge or other decisions of the high court for the seizure of the car on the mere basis that it is in plain view. I would respectfully suggest to the majority that they are using the unanimous holding of this court in Teale for a purpose which was neither expressed nor intended.
The People attempt to justify the seizure of the car on the ground that it was evidence of the crime1 which, was in plain sight. As I have said, the *316majority in essence state that Teale supports this proposition (it does not) and that Teale is in harmony with Coolidge. In plain fact there is no merit to the People’s claim, nor can the convoluted Teale-Coolidge approach of the majority provide any.
As is well stated by Mr. Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 468 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 584], “plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of' evidence.” (Original italics.) The “plain view” doctrine merely allows an officer with a prior justification for a search to seize evidence which he inadvertently discovers. (Id. at p. 466 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 583].) After all, “in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure.” (Id. at p. 465 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 582]; original italics.) Probable cause alone is not enough. If this exception to the requirement of a warrant were not so limited it would erode entirely the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.
Detective Neesan discovered the automobile in plain view and had probable cause to believe it was connected with the crime under investigation; what he lacked, however, was either a warrant or exigent circumstances.2 Since he had seen the car the day before he seized it, it cannot be argued that he found it inadvertently when he went to arrest defendant. The seizure is not lawful simply because the automobile was in plain view on the street.
Of course I recognize that there is some dispute whether the “plain view” section (II-C) of the Coolidge opinion is binding upon us, because it reflects the consensus of only a plurality of the Supreme Court. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, whose concurrence produced the fifth vote for the majority decision, specifically concurred with section II-D of Justice Stewart’s opinion. That section is addressed primarily to Mr. Justice White’s dissenting opinion, which “marshals the arguments that can be made against our interpretation of the ‘automobile’ and ‘plain view’ exceptions to the warrant requirement.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 473 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 587].) Such reference and several others to part II-C (id. at p. 482 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 592]) of the plurality opin*317ion suggest that Justice Harlan’s limited concurrence sweeps more broadly than the majority would allow.
But apart from these considerations, the ineluctable fact remains that seizure of evidence of the crime on the mere basis that it is in plain view has no support in our decisional law. Justice Stewart has made this clear, and the majority have not directed our attention to any precedent to the contrary. People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 739 [102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121], cited by the majority, does not rest upon such a ground, but upon exigent circumstances; People v. Block (1971) 6 Cal.3d 239, 243 [103 Cal.Rptr. 281, 499 P.2d 961], is actually in accord with Justice Stewart’s explanation.
I now turn to the issue of the recorded conversation between defendant and his wife. In concluding that it should have been suppressed, the majority import the law of privilege into the law of search and seizure. They fail to distinguish between the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in a particular place, here the detective’s office at the Palm Springs jail, and the “expectation” of privilege in marital communications.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s explanation that the test for the admission in evidence of the recording is whether or not the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy which was violated by governmental intrusion. (People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 84 [81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1104-1105 [80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713]; see Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 350-352 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 581-583, 88 S.Ct. 507].) However, I fail to see the logic of their reasoning that, because husbands and wives expect their communications to each other to be protected by a testimonial privilege (Evid. Code, § 980 et seq.), therefore wherever husbands and wives communicate with each other they must have a reasonable expectation of privacy from third party eavesdroppers. It is the place of the communication, not the relationship of the communicating parties which is relevant to our inquiry.
The majority’s result breaks sharply from a long line of accepted authority holding that persons in custody ordinarily have no reasonable expectation of privacy. (People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal.2d 223, 248 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16], cert. den. (1964) 375 U.S. 994 [11 L.Ed.2d 480, 84 S.Ct. 634], rehg. den. 376 U.S. 939 [11 L.Ed.2d 660, 84 S.Ct. 794]; People v. Jones (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 437, 449 [96 Cal.Rptr. 795]; People v. Califano (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 476, 481 [85 Cal.Rptr. 292]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 249, 256 [82 Cal.Rptr. 673]; People v. Hiser (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 47, 60-61 [72 Cal.Rptr. 906, 41 A.L.R.3d *3181353]; People v. Ashford (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 673, 686 [71 Cal.Rptr. 619]; People v. Chandler (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 350, 355-356 [68 Cal.Rptr. 645], cert. den. (1969) 393 U.S. 1043 [21 L.Ed.2d 591, 89 S.Ct. 670]; People v. Petker (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 652, 654 [62 Cal.Rptr. 215]; People v. Miller (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 877, 881, fn. 2 [60 Cal.Rptr. 791]; People v. Apodaca (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 656, 659 [60 Cal.Rptr. 782]; People v. Dinkins (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 892, 903 [52 Cal.Rptr. 134]; People v. Ross (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 364, 376-377 [46 Cal.Rptr. 41]; People v. Boulad (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 118, 126 [45 Cal.Rptr. 104], cert. den. (1966) 383 U.S. 915 [15 L.Ed.2d 669, 86 S.Ct. 905]; People v. Bazaure (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 21, 34 [44 Cal.Rptr. 831], cert. den. (1966) 384 U.S. 1026 [16 L.Ed.2d 1032, 86 S.Ct. 1951], rehg. den. 385 U.S. 892 [17 L.Ed.2d 125, 87 S.Ct. 21]; People v. Hernandez (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 149-150 [40 Cal.Rptr. 100], cert. den. (1965) 381 U.S. 953 [14 L.Ed.2d 725, 85 S.Ct. 1810]; People v. Stadnick (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 767, 773-774 [25 Cal.Rptr. 30, 99 A.L.R.2d 766]; People v. Morgan (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 90, 93 [16 Cal.Rptr. 838], cert. den. (1962) 370 U.S. 965 [8 L.Ed.2d 830, 82 S.Ct. 1606].) The United States Supreme Court has stated, “it is obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day. [Fn. omitted.]” (Lanza v. New York (1962) 370 U.S. 139, 143 [8 L.Ed.2d 384, 387-388, 82 S.Ct. 1218].)
The majority seem to argue that because conversations between prisoners and their attorneys, religious advisors, or licensed physicians are both protected by Renal Code section 636 and are afforded a testimonial privilege (see Evid. Code, § § 911 et seq., 950 et seq., 990 et seq., 1030 et seq.), the Legislature thereby intended to protect all privileged relationships from the intrusion of prison eavesdropping. But the argument answers itself. By affording the additional protection of a criminal penalty for eavesdropping upon, or recording, a conversation between a prisoner and his attorney, religious advisor, or licensed physician, the Legislature has specifically excluded from the coverage of this statute the prisoner-spouse relationship.
That the recordings were of the prisoner’s conversation with his wife, rather than with another relative or a friend, is therefore of no moment. The sole question w?e must face is whether, on the facts before us, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Measured against an objective standard, I conclude that no reasonable person in defendant’s position could have had such an expectation. At the time of the conversation defendant was in custody, charged with the *319serious crimes of kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon. He was held in the jail and upon the visit of his wife was brought to the police area in the same building where he spoke with her in a detective’s office. Under such circumstances only a fatuous or naive defendant would close his eyes to the realities and assume that he was no longer in custody or under surveillance and that his jail, like his home, had in some unaccountable way become his castle.
In sum, I would hold that the tape recording of defendant’s conversation with his wife was admissible as evidence. No unreasonable search occurred, because defendant, as a prisoner, had no right to expect privacy. The testimonial privilege afforded spouses by section 980 of the Evidence Code does not cast a protective net of privacy over communication between married persons where no such privacy in fact exists.
I would issue the writ of mandate but only to suppress the evidence resulting from the unlawful seizure of defendant’s automobile.
“[T]he very instrumentality used to commit the kidnapping.” (Ante, p. 306.)
The day of the incident Detective Neesan, investigating the complaint, spotted a car matching the description provided by the victim in front of defendant’s residence. Later that day the victim picked out the same make and model vehicle from a police “mug book.” But not until the next evening at 8:30 p.m. did Neesan return to defendant’s house to effect an arrest and seize the automobile. From the full-day delay between finding the suspect vehicle and its seizure, we may reasonably assume the absence of any exigent circumstances.