OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.This appeal, pursuant to HRS § 386-88 (Supp. 1971)1 *67arises out of a workmen’s compensation claim by the dependents of Wilma P. Pacheco, deceased, against her employer, Orchids of Hawaii. The claim was denied by the Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations. On appeal, the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board made an award of compensation.
The facts are not in dispute having been stipulated by the parties.
Mrs. Pacheco was employed by Orchids of Hawaii (hereinafter “Employer”) on and prior to July 7, 1967. She worked as a member of a production team in an “assembly line” operation.
It was employer’s policy to allow a 15-minute coffee break each morning and afternoon during regular working hours. Employees customarily used refreshment facilities on the premises, however, they were free to leave the premises during coffee breaks.
On July 7, 1967 Mrs. Pacheco was given her paycheck after lunch and before the afternoon coffee break. Since it was anticipated that she would work late, the afternoon coffee break afforded Mrs. Pacheco the only opportunity to cash her check before the banks closed. Once previously during her coffee break, Mrs. Pacheco had gone to a bank to cash her paycheck.
At 2:48 P.M. on July 7th, Mrs. Pacheco punched out on her time card to take her afternoon break. With one of three other women employees driving, Mrs. Pacheco left employer’s premises intending to cash her paycheck at the nearest bank. Mrs. Yamamoto, Mrs. Pacheco’s supervisor, observed the departure and cautioned the group to hurry back.
While the ladies were on their way to the Waiakea branch of the Bank of Hawaii, some three blocks away, their automobile was struck broadside resulting in Mrs. Pacheco’s death.
*68The major issue in this case is whether Mrs. Pacheco’s death is compensable under section 386-3 o£ the Hawaii Revised Statutes. The relevant provision of that section reads “[i]f an employee suffers personal injury ... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment” he or his dependents are entitled to recover under workmen’s compensation. (Emphasis added.)
This court has not fully considered the extent of that critical phrase in our workmen’s compensation plan, but we are not inclined to unduly restrict its scope.
The stipulated facts present a borderline case which is not adequately covered by existing law.2 Professor Larson states:
Now that the coffee break has become a fixture of many kinds of employment, close questions continue to arise on the compensability of injuries occurring off the premises during rest periods or coffee breaks of various durations. It is clear that one cannot announce an all-purpose “coffee break rule,” since there are too many variables that could affect the result.3
Compensation for off-premises, rest period injuries is appropriate in Professor Larson’s view when the employer “can be deemed to have retained authority over the employee.”4 Authority is said to be retained where, measured by the duration of the break and the distance from the employee’s desk, the employment itself was not interrupted.5
Bodensky v. Royaltone, Inc., 5 A.D. 2d 733, 168 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1957) relies on the reasoning in Caporale and is persuasive on the issue of whether off-premises, *69“coffee-break” injuries should be compensable. Royal-tone permitted its employees a 15-minute coffee break each day. Claimant’s practice of leaving the building during this time was known to her employer and allowed. On returning from a coffee shop about a block away, claimant injured herself. The court based its award of compensation on a finding that the employment was not interrupted because the break was an approved one of limited duration and restricted in scope.
We reject appellant’s notion that Balsam v. New York State Division of Employment, 24 A.D.2d 802, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 849 (1965) is controlling in the present case.
In Balsam claimant was injured when she went to a bank to cash a personal check prior to having coffee, but during her rest period. Since employees were free to leave the premises only for coffee at a designated shop, claimant’s injury occurred during the course of a “purely personal mission.”6 This deviation from a “prescribed sphere of recreational endeavor”7 resulted in the dismissal of the claim.
The case at hand does not involve an employee who strayed from an authorized activity, therefore, we find Balsam inapposite.
We adopt as a general rule the proposition that an employee, who is allowed to venture off-premises during an authorized work break, and who is injured in the course of reasonable and necessary activity incidental to such break, should be compensated.
A scheduled coffee break serves the dual function of providing an employee á brief respite from his job as well as affording him an opportunity to tend to matters of a personal nature. The former objective has been viewed as a benefit to the employer, because a refreshed employee is often a more productive one. The latter type *70of activity may or may not directly benefit the employer, but is allowed as a convenience to the employee. An employer may derive substantial benefits from an employee who is allowed time away from the job to accomplish pressing personal business. Injuries occasioned by employees pursuing necessary personal matters off employer’s premises are compensable in our view as work-connected, especially if the employer acquiesces in such practices.
Wilbur K. Watkins, Jr., for employer-appellant. Stanley H. Roehrig for claimants-appellees.Applying the above principles to the present case we find, that there is substantial evidence to support a claim for compensation.
Deceased was observing her regular afternoon coffee break when the fatal accident occurred. It was her employer’s policy to allow ex premises departures during the break for the convenience of the employees. Once previously, deceased had ventured out to cash her paycheck without censure. On the day of the accident, deceased was among a group of employees which was observed departing for the bank by a supervisor. Since late work beyond banking hours was anticipated, it was necessary for deceased to use her free time to cash her paycheck. A substantial benefit accrued to the employer because his production line closed down simultaneously rather than sporadically throughout the workday. The regularly scheduled break promoted a smooth-running, efficient operation.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board, and find it unnecessary to consider whether the Board abused the authority vested in it by HRS § 91-10 (1).8
Judicial Review. The decision or order of the appellate board shall be final and conclusive, except as provided in section 386-89, unless *67within thirty days after mailing of a certified copy of the decision or order, the director or any other party appeals to the supreme court by filing a written notice of appeal with the appellate board. . . .
See Jordan v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 1 Or. App. 441, 463 P.2d 598, 600 (1970) n. 1 for a representative listing of those cases which allow and those which disallow recovery for injuries occasioned during break time.
1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law 245, § 15.54 (1968).
Id., p. 247.
Caporale v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 2 A.D.2d 91, 153 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1956), aff’d., 2 N.Y.2d 946, 142 N.E.2d 213, 162 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1957).
Balsam v. New York State Division of Employment, 24 A.D.2d 802, 263 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (1965).
Id.
In relevant part HRS § 91-10 (1) states that “no . . . order [shall] be issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.”