concurring.
I concur in the reasoning and the result of the majority opinion. However, were it not for the holding of this court and the Supreme Court in State v. Wolfe, 75 Adv Sh 2237, 21 Or App 717, 536 P2d 555, aff’d 75 Adv Sh 3787, 273 Or 518, 542 P2d 482 (1975), substantial *657arguments would support a ruling that violation of the discovery statutes should not result in the Draconian remedy of suppression absent some showing of prejudice. But under Wolfe we cannot so hold.
In Wolfe the defendant failed to give timely notice to the prosecution of the name of a witness he intended to call to rebut state’s evidence. As the Supreme Court opinion points out, defendant contended that "* * * to impose the extreme sanction of 'refus(ing) to permit the witness to testify’was improper * * * because the state made no showing that it would be prejudiced by permitting defendant to call * * * [the] witness * * *.” 75 Adv Sh at 3790. The defendant further contended:
" '* * * Refusal to allow a witness to testify is the ultimate penalty for failure to comply with the discovery provisions and should be invoked only when a continuance or right of inspection would be prejudicial to the other party. Defendant was denied the right to present an effective defense, and the court abused its discretion by sustaining the state’s objections upon no rational basis.’ ” 75 Adv Sh at 3790-91.
The Supreme Court, in affirming this court, which had in turn affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the defendant’s witness could not testify, held:
"The presence or absence of prejudice is a most important factor to be considered by the trial court in exercising the discretion conferred upon it by ORS 135.865 in the choice of sanctions, particularly in imposing the extreme sanction of refusing to receive in evidence the material not disclosed. The terms of the statute, however, do not appear to make the presence or absence of prejudice a necessary factor in the exercise of the discretion conferred by the statute in the choice of any of the sanctions to be imposed by its terms.” 75 Adv Sh at 3792.
The Wolfe doctrine must cut both ways. If suppression was not an abuse of discretion in Wolfe where a continuance, a remedy envisaged by statute, ORS 135.865, could have solved the problem, suppression cannot be an abuse of discretion in a case such as the *658one at bar. A witness can be interviewed during a continuance. A destroyed document cannot be recreated.
As a separate matter I would also note that what we are here dealing with are not fragmentary notes which became the basis of a written statement, nor stenographer’s notes, nor notes which have been transcribed, or things of that ilk, but, rather, a report of a crime adequate in itself to form the basis for initiating prosecution.