dissenting:
I agree that the Act of the Legislature is constitutional as construed by the majority of the Court, “in so far as it authorizes the board, as in its discretion it may see fit, to pay to the employee the amount designated * * * ;” but I cannot bring myself to the view of the majority in holding the Act unconstitutional “in so far as the Act purports to direct and require the board to make such payment.” I would award the writ as prayed for.
It is said that the Act is “special” within the meaning of the provisions of Section 39 of Article VI of the Constitution. That section prohibits the Legislature from enacting “special laws” in eighteen different classes or subjects of legislation, each listed and specifically defined. If the present Act falls within any of such subjects it is the one defined as “Regulating or changing county or district affairs; * * *.”
Does the Act regulate the affairs of the county or district? I am of the opinion that it does not, for the reason that the board of education is not a county or a district, and for the further reason that the Act does not regulate the affairs of the board of education.
*756A board of education is a corporation, created by the Legislature, Code, 18-5-5, as amended. Bradford v. Board of Education of Pleasants County, 128 W. Va. 228, 36 S. E. 2d 512. It has only such powers as are vested in it by the Legislature. Constitution, Article XII, Section 1. “* * * School districts are mere governmental subdivisions of the state, which, subject to constitutional limitations, may be created, amended, consolidated or abolished at the will of the legislature.” Leonhart v. Board of Education, 114 W. Va. 9, page 15, 170 S. E. 418. (Emphasis supplied.) The fact that its jurisdiction extends throughout the county does not make its affairs county or district affairs. It necessarily follows that it cannot be a county or a district within the meaning of Section 39.
Neither can I believe that the Act regulates the affairs of the board. It merely directs the payment of the sum found to be morally owing the petitioner because of the negligence of employees of the board. It does not purport to regulate affairs. Can there be any material difference in directing and requiring payment of such a moral obligation as here, where the moral obligation arose out of the negligence of an employee of a governmental corporation, and where the moral obligation arose out of the negligent actions of employees of the State Road Commissioner, for illustration? This Court has on numerous occasions awarded mandamus requiring payment of sums appropriated for satisfying moral obligation arising out of negligence of governmental employees. See State ex rel. Carton v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 543, 57 S. E. (2d) 465, decided at this term, and Davis Trust Company, Administrator v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 46 S. E. 2d 90.
Is this a special act within the meaning of Section 39? I can see no difference in the act here and the numerous acts passed by the Legislature making appropriations for payment of moral obligations found to be owing certain individuals and, as before stated, this Court has required payment of such appropriations in all cases where it was convinced of the existence of a moral obligation. Davis *757Trust Company, Administrator v. Sims, supra. Acts are not special within the meaning of Section 39 merely because they are not of uniform application. Dillon v. County Court, 60 W. Va. 339, 55 S. E. 382. I cannot see force in the argument that an act merely directing payment of an obligation is an act regulating affairs of a board of education. Why say an act is special when it commands, yet general when it merely authorizes?
The majority fears that if the regulation were to be held valid the “instant appropriation would be a stepping stone toward legislative direction of the fiscal affairs of boards of education and other governmental agencies of the State.” I have no such fear. The present appropriation is proof to me that the Legislature has carefully considered the interests of the State, in that it has allowed the petitioner only the sum of $2,029.00 where, in all probability, had there been available to the petitioner a legal remedy, the recovery would have been for a much larger sum, for it is not denied that the injuries of petitioner were very severe and that he expended large sums of money in an effort to rehabilitate himself. Is not the Legislature protecting the interests of the State in considering such claims individually, rather than by general laws subjecting the boards of education to large expenses and harassment in defending many actions at law? At least this would seem to be a policy for Legislative determination.
In determining whether an act of the Legislature is constitutional courts will apply the act to the particular facts of the case in order to determine whether the act is valid. State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000, 17 L. R. A. 385. The constitutionality of an act is presumed, and any doubt as to its constitutionality should be resolved in favor of its validity. Road Commission v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 98, 163 S. E. 815; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 128.' An act is not unconstitutional merely because it does not have state wide application. Casto v. High School Board, 94 W. Va. 513, 119 S. E. 470. “Courts will not hold an act of the legislature to be *758contrary to the Constitution without great caution and unless it be manifestly and beyond doubt unconstitutional.” South Morgantown v. Morgantown, 49 W. Va. 729 (Syllabus, Point 3), 40 S. E. 15.
Being forced to the above conclusions I must necessarily, but respectfully, dissent.