(concurring). I concur in the result but write separately to emphasize my concern that the "other acts" exception has overwhelmed the general rule that other bad acts are not admissible in evidence. We have greatly relaxed the standards of admissibility for other bad acts in sexual assault cases, especially those involving young children. See State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 257, 378 N.W.2d 272, 277-78 (1985). This determination was based upon the perceived necessity of permitting such evidence because of the private nature surrounding the commission of most sexual crimes. See State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 30-31, 398 N.W.2d 763, 777 (1987). Because children are *651particularly vulnerable, it was felt this type of evidence was appropriate and necessary to protect children from these sexual assaults. See id.
However, we must be mindful that balance in this rule is required lest innocent defendants be convicted not because they are guilty of the offense charged, but because they have committed other crimes in the past. We strike this balance by providing a general rule of exclusion with limited exceptions permitting the admission of other bad acts evidence. In my experience, however, other bad acts evidence is rarely rejected by the trial court, and the evidence irrespective of its remoteness and probative value inevitably finds its way before the jury. I think it is time we restrain the introduction of this evidence as a matter of course and reaffirm our commitment to the fairness of a trial so as to protect innocent defendants from unjust convictions.
In this case there is no confusion as to why the State offered the prior homosexual act as proof of identity. The State's theory is that because Rushing is a homosexual, he is likely to have committed this homosexual act. This evidence is inadmissible because it is character evidence demonstrating the character trait of homosexuality, which the State attempts to use to prove Rushing committed a specific homosexual act. This is impermissible and under § 904.04, STATS., should have been excluded without hesitation or equivocation. Its admission was certainly prejudicial because the jury may well have adopted the prosecution's reasoning by finding the defendant guilty, not because he committed the crime, but because he was a homosexual predisposed to engage in the conduct of which he was accused. A subsequent jury will have to determine the guilt or innocence of this defendant, but *652it should do so without the stigma of homosexuality tainting the entire proceeding.