dissenting.
In Beranek v. Mulcare, 269 Or 324, 327, 524 P2d 1214 (1974), I finally became convinced that adhering to the rule that special damages could not be awarded unless general damages were also awarded was poor policy. Mr. Chief Justice O’Connell stated the reasons for that belief in his dissent in Flansberg v. Paulson, 239 Or 610, 618, 399 P2d 356 (1965).
Our constant, continual occupation with this problem, in my opinion, fortifies this position. In July we decided Eisele v. Rood, 275 Or 461, 551 P2d 441 (1976), which had this same problem. This month we heard arguments in Kriner v. Weaver involving the same problem. Our desire for efficient judicial administration should dissuade us from spending inordinate *188amounts of time attempting to force upon juries a distinction which has no basis "in the nature of things.” Flansberg v. Paulson, supra (239 Or at 619).