{concurring). I write separately to address the defendant's claim that "Wisconsin law does not impose a duty upon one person to actively assist or preserve a person from a risk of injury created by another." Brief for Petitioner at 23. This argument frames the issue incorrectly under Wisconsin tort law. A person is negligent who "does something or fails to do something under circumstances in which a reasonable person would foresee that by his or her action or failure to act, he or she will subject a person or property to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage." Wis JI — Civil 1005 (1993).1 "Wisconsin law considers conduct to be negligent if it involves a foreseeable risk of harm to anyone." Bowen *430v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994).
As the majority notes, majority op. at 419-20, Wisconsin has long followed the view of duty advanced by Judge Andrews in his Palsgraf dissent: "Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 350, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Duty, therefore, is no more than "an ingredient in the determination of negligence." A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974). See also Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 644 ("[i]n Wisconsin, the doctrine of public policy, not the doctrine of duty, limits the scope of the defendant's liability"); Ollerman v. ORourke, 94 Wis. 2d 17, 28, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
On careful review, the cases the defendant cites for the proposition that she owed the plaintiff no duty of care, Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, do not support her position. The defendant relies upon Fitzgerald v. Ludwig, 41 Wis. 2d 635, 165 N.W.2d 158 (1969), which states that "[o]ne person does not owe to all other persons a general duty of care unattached to some other conduct." Id. at 638. But Fitzgerald addresses the attractive nuisance doctrine. As the court explained in A.E. Investment, Fitzgerald is "concerned with special types of legal relationships" and therefore "out of the mainstream of negligence law in Wisconsin." A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 486; see also Ceplina v. South Milwaukee School Board, 73 Wis. 2d 338, 343, 243 N.W.2d 183 (1976). Therefore, reliance upon Fitzgerald is "inappropriate in describing the general duty that an alleged tortfeasor has in the ordinary negligence case." A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 486.
*431The defendant also relies on language in De Bauche v. Knott, 69 Wis. 2d 119, 230 N.W.2d 158 (1975), which states that "[a]s a general rule, the law imposes no duty on one person actively to assist in the preservation of the person or property of another from injury, even though the means by which harm can be averted are in his possession." Id. at 122-23. But in this passage, the De Bauche court was merely recapitulating the argument of the tortfeasor in that case. Finding the tortfeasor liable, the De Bauche court expressly refused to adopt the tortfeasor's proposed statement of law discussed above, noting instead that under Wisconsin law the tortfeasor owed the plaintiff a duty whenever "it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone." Id. at 123-24.
Given the De Bauche court's refutation of the "no duty" standard, the defendant's reliance on Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 371 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985) to bolster her "no duty" argument is infirm. In stating that "generally no duty exists to protect others from hazardous situations," Id. at 331, the Winslow court cited the same language from De Bauche which the De Bauche court itself had discredited. Furthermore, Winslow was a summary judgment case in which the complaint was dismissed because the complainants' affidavits neither stated nor allowed a reasonable inference that the alleged tortfeasors were negligent. Winslow, 125 Wis. 2d at 329-330.2
*432Paradoxically, then, the cases cited by the defendant in advocating a different interpretation of Wisconsin negligence law confirm the extent to which that law nevertheless has remained the same: it imposes a general duty of care on all persons to the world at large. Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 644 n.12 (quoting Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 350 (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
Citing McNeese v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 497 N.W.2d 124 (1993), the defendant also argues that "a person does not breach a duty of exercising reasonable care simply by being present." Brief for Petitioner at 23. The McNeese court, applying the customary standard of review, see Weiss v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995), merely determined that there was no credible evidence supporting the jury finding that the alleged tortfeasor had breached her duty of care to the plaintiff. McNeese, 174 Wis. 2d at 631. In contrast, the record in the case before us demonstrates that (1) the defendant failed to extinguish the embers in the firepit, even though she admitted knowing that they could still be hot in the morning; (2) as an experienced camper, the defendant knew that it was a good safety practice to extinguish embers before retiring to bed; (3) the water necessary to douse the embers was readily available and the *433defendant conceded that it would have been easy to do so; and (4) the defendant had no expectation that her two companions would do so. The defendant also admitted knowing that these dangers were exacerbated by both the presence of little children in the camping party and the fact that the firepit was flush with the ground.
These facts constitute credible evidence allowing a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant breached her duty of care. Although the court nevertheless concludes that the defendant is not liable, it is not because she had no duty of care but rather because of public policy. Majority op. at 426. The two concepts — duty and public policy — should not be confused. In Wisconsin, one always owes a duty of care to the world at large, which is why "[t]he consistent analyses of this court reveal that the question of duty is not an element of the court's policy determination." A.E. Investment, 62 Wis. 2d at 484.
For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this opinion.
See also Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 532, 464 N.W.2d 518 (1991) (quoting Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 235, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988) and applying the same standard); LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 330 N.W.2d 555 (1983) (collecting cases); A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) (collecting cases).
Further compounding the Winslow court's misplaced reliance on De Bauche, subsequent decisions relied upon by the defendant, Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, 34-35, and by the majority, majority op. at 421-22, demonstrate an equally misplaced reliance upon Winslow and its progeny. In Erickson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 479 N.W.2d 552 (1991), *432the court of appeals cited Winslow and echoed the discredited language from De Bauche, stating that "Wisconsin does not generally impose a duty upon persons to protect others from hazardous situations." Zelco v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 74, 527 N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1994) also quotes the same sentence from De Bauche, citing Erickson. Zelco, 190 Wis. 2d at 79. Finally, McNeese v. Pier, 174 Wis. 2d 624, 497 N.W.2d 124 (1993), quotes the same discredited sentence fromDe Bauche as well, citing both Winslow and Erickson. McNeese, 174 Wis. 2d at 632.