dissenting. 1. The general demurrers of all of the defendants to the three counts of the petition should have been sustained. The ruling by the majority that the facts allege that the Midland Properties Company, the Savannah & *34Atlanta Railway Company and The Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah occupied the status of an owner and occupier of the premises involved in this action is based on a false premise. It is true that these defendants in granting the spoil disposal easement agreed to construct dikes and other improvements on the land for purposes of the spoilage operation and reserved all rights and privileges in the land as could be enjoyed without abridging the rights granted to the grantees, but the majority opinion overlooks the fact that, at the time these spoilage easements were granted, the Savannah Electric & Power Company already had an easement over the land for electric distribution purposes to which the rights of the other defendants were subject, and the other three defendants could not grant any right inconsistent with or superior to those of the power company nor could they reserve any rights inconsistent with or repugnant to those of the power company without its consent. It therefore follows that the dredging contractor and its employees were not the invitees of the defendants, for the reason that only the power company had the right to invite anyone to use its power line easement for purposes repugnant to and inconsistent with the power line easement. It stands to reason that the spoil disposal easements which had for their goal the raising of the ground level underneath the electric wires were inconsistent with and repugnant to the power line easement. The grantors of the spoil disposal easements had no authority to extend an invitation to anyone to violate the rights of the power company. It is well settled that the owner of a servient estate cannot use property in a manner or for purposes inconsistent with a granted easement. Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga. 608 (1 S. E. 2d 579), and cases and authorities cited; 17A Am. Jur. 718-720, Easements, § 112.
2. As to the power company the petition did not allege any reason why it should have anticipated pedestrians. It alleged that the presence of hunters was likely but not that the power company had reason to anticipate their presence.
3. The petition alleges that the United States was granted the spoil disposal easement and made a contract with an independent contractor to do the filling in of the land. All of the *35defendants, and especially the power company, had the right to expect that neither the United States nor a contractor employed by it would commit a trespass upon the power company’s rights under its superior power line easement, and they had a right to presume and expect not only that permission would be obtained from the power company to encroach on its easement but that the United States or whoever did the filling in would furnish its employees with a safe place to work, even as to static dangerous conditions existing even through negligence. It is clear to me, under the facts alleged in the petition, that unless some reason is alleged why the defendants did not have reason to indulge in the presumptions above enumerated or why the defendants had some reason to anticipate that the, United States or its contractor would trespass or would fail to safeguard its employees against injury even from dangerous conditions on the land, conceded for the sake of argument due to the negligence of the defendants, the petition is fatally defective. This case would also fall, assuming that the defendants were negligent, under the principle of superseding cause, and I think that under the facts alleged the negligence of any or all of the defendants, if any, is too remote to be considered the proximate cause of the most unfortunate injuries in these cases. Southern Ry. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152 (42 S. E. 395, 59 L.R.A. 109) and cases and authorities cited-in Blunt v. Spears, 93 Ga. App. 623 (92 S. E. 2d 573).
The first special demurrer of the Savannah Electric & Power Company should have been sustained because the plats were a part of the description of the 378 acres upon which the spoilage easements were granted.
4. It is the duty of the plaintiff to allege facts showing that alleged negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the injuries sued for. The power company demurred to paragraph 11 of the petition because it failed to allege whether the contract between the United States and the contractor was oral or in writing and failed to show the substance of the contract. The other defendant’s demurrers were on the sole ground that it was not alleged whether the contract was oral or in writing. I think that these demurrers should have been sustained. It is true that the action is in tort and not on that contract, but the *36petition is seeking to allege facts showing that the proximate cause of the injuries was the negligence of the named defendants. The petition shows that the burden was on the United States or the contractor to get permission from the power company to use the land underneath the power line. The terms of the contract should be alleged to show what the duties and the responsibilities of the parties were. The contract is as available to the plaintiff as to the defendants and could be vital to plaintiff’s case.
5. The Savannah Electric & Power Company’s special demurrer to paragraph 25 of the petition should have been sustained.
6. The special demurrers of the three defendants other than the City of Savannah to paragraph 26 of the petition should have been sustained.
7. The defendants’ special demurrers to paragraphs 30, 32 and 45 of the petition should have been sustained.