(dissenting).
The judgment of the trial court should be sustained, because it follows the statute; the opinion as circulated does not. Further, the judgment of the trial court is supported by all of the decisional law of this court dealing with child support; and the decision as circulated is not. Several such cases are cited in respondents’ brief.
Chapters 45 and 45b, Title 78, are alluded to in the opinion, but these two chapters require an opposite result to that reached in the opinion. For example, 78-45-7 is as follows:
When determining the amount due for support the court shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to:
(1) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(2) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(4) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(5) the need of the obligee;
(6) the age of the parties; and
(7) the responsibility of the obligor for the, support of others.
Although the instant matter was brought under 78-45, had it been a 78-45b case a, hearing to determine financial responsibility would have been required. See 78-45b-5 and 6.
The appeal has nothing whatever to do with the duty of support intrinsic to parenthood. The only question raised is whether the state can take judgment without a determination of, at least, the seven factors set out in 78-45-7. It should' be obvious it cannot. And this is so whether one considers Chapter 45, before or after its amendment in 1973.
To say respondents’ argument fails to distinguish between the right of one to reimbursement for child support furnished, and an adjudication of support, is to state a distinction without a difference.
A cursory analysis of the two statutes, as well as our case law, can lead to no other conclusion than that the trial court was correct in its ruling.
TUCKETT, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice MAUGHAN.