concurring specially.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that we do not need to presently answer the question addressed to the parties on certiorari of “[wjhether the State must demonstrate ‘reasonable grounds’ to justify a search or seizure despite the existence of a validly imposed condition of probation or parole that prospectively waived the probationer or parolee’s Fourth Amendment rights.” In this case, the facts make it difficult to determine whether there was adequate independent consent at the time of the search as opposed to mere acquiescence. There is no showing that the police asked for and received consent to search. There is a showing that the police represented Brooks’ probation agreement as authority to search and that Brooks accommodated them. The majority equates the act of accommodation as consent. Rather than rule on this basis, I would reach the question presented on certiorari and find that reasonable grounds are not necessary to justify a probation search like the one in this case.
As a special condition of probation, Jerry Matthew Brooks knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fourth Amendment rights with regard to future searches. Under these circumstances, I would hold that, because Brooks agreed to this special condition, he consented to a search like the one in this case. See Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843, 857 (IV) (126 SC 2193, 165 LE2d 250) (2006) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee” where parole conditions include parolee’s consent to such searches); Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163, 166 (2) (527 SE2d 847) (2000) (“when a probationer has not consented to a search, a warrantless search of a probationer’s home must be based upon reasonable grounds”) (emphasis supplied); People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789, 795 (2000) (“[A] person may validly consent in advance to warrantless searches and seizures in exchange for the opportunity to avoid serving a state prison term”) (emphasis supplied). As a result of his conviction, Brooks chose to pay this price for his freedom, and the State has the right to the full benefit of that bargain.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins me in this special concurrence.
*428Garry T Moss, District Attorney, Lawton W. Scott, Sara A. Thompson, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.