(Dissenting).
I dissént. I believe it is fruitless and erroneous to rely on dictionary definitions of a “chemical,” or to pursue expert testimony as to whether barite goes through chemical processes. The Commission in granting certificates of convenience and necessity has the right to make its own classifications of products and employ its own definitions, so long as they are reasonable and not misleading. That right was exercised by the Commission here. In June of 1977, the Commission authorized Uintah to transport well-servicing equipment and supplies, including barite, subject to certain restrictions. Years later, the Commission authorized Savage to transport dry chemicals in bulk. Because barite is used for its high gravity properties as a drilling mud, the Commission, in its discretion and very logically, placed the hauling of barite when used for that purpose within the authority of those carriers who transport well-servicing supplies. It thereby excluded such bar-ite from the definition of dry chemicals which it authorized other carriers to haul. The Commission in its report and order held that because Uintah already had specific authority to transport barite under its certificate, neither Savage nor any other carrier could do so under a generally descriptive term. The administrative law judge concluded that “while granting dry chemical authority to Savage, there was no intention [on the part of the Commission] into putting it into the business of carrying well-servicing supplies.”
In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590 (1962), we recognized this principle that the Commission may devise and employ its own system of nomenclature. In that case, the carrier had been granted a certificate which authorized it to transport “commodities generally.” It later claimed that this certificate gave it authority to haul commodities of any type and in any vehicle, including petroleum and petroleum products in tank vehicles. We affirmed the Commission’s refusal to allow the carrier that right, relying upon evidence that neither the Commission nor the carriers operating in this area have ever assumed that the term “commodities generally” included petroleum products in bulk in tank vehicles. We pointed out that the annual reports which all carriers are required to file with the Commission consistently made a distinction between general commodities and petroleum products. We acknowledged the argument of the carrier that “commodities generally” literally meant any commodity of any type and in any vehicle, but rejected that literal interpretation and restricted the term to its meaning under the classifications and system of nomenclature used by the Commission when granting certificates.
“A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning ... and it may take on values from words and ideas with which it is associated.” Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board, 54 Cal.2d 184, 195, 5 Cal.Rptr. 553, 559, 353 P.2d 33, 39 (1960). “Words are used in an endless variety of contexts. Their meaning is not subsequently attached to them by the reader but is formulated by the writer and can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words.” Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Manufacturing Co., 20 Cal.2d 751, 776, 128 P.2d 665, 679 (1942) (Traynor, J., concurring).
In the instant case, the Commission should be granted the same flexibility that we accorded it in Milne Truck Lines. We should not deprive it of that privilege because of semantic differences we can find. *1092It is not claimed by Savage that it obtained its certificate to haul dry chemicals on any representation by the Commission that its certificate would include authority to transport barite. Savage is chargeable with knowing that the Commission classified barite as a well-drilling supply and not as a chemical. Indeed, Uintah had been given specific authority to transport barite, thereby putting Savage on notice of the limitation on its certificate. I would agree that the Commission could not after granting a certificate manipulate its definitions and classifications so as to deprive a carrier of a valuable hauling right which had been represented that the carrier was acquiring. But Savage does not make that contention here.
I would affirm the Commission’s order as being reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.
HALL, C.J., does not participate herein.