Defendants appeal from the April 21, 1982, decision and order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, awarding benefits in the amount of $69 per week to plaintiff for a work-related silicosis disability.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry from 1946 through September 16, 1968. Throughout his employment plaintiff worked in the foundry’s core room where the air was constantly filled with fine sand particles and iron dust. On several occasions from and after 1954, plaintiff sought treatment for work-related back injuries, and he was off work several times due to those injuries. On August 14, 1967, he filed a petition with the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation seeking benefits for work-related injuries to his back. Plaintiff was awarded benefits which were paid until May 7, 1973, when plaintiff and defendants entered into a redemption agreement. The redemption agreement provided for payment of $24,000 to plaintiff and referred to an injury date of "5-8-67 and all other dates of employment”.
On April 25, 1977, plaintiff filed a new petition alleging a new disability due to the onset of a pulmonary condition allegedly resulting from exposure to the dust and sand in the foundry. The hearing officer ruled that the redemption agreement of May 7, 1973, was a settlement of all claims, existing and future, arising out of plaintifFs employment with defendant Campbell, and *366therefore dismissed the petition. The WCAB, in an opinion and order dated April 21, 1982, reversed the hearing officer and ordered payment of benefits to plaintiff in the amount of $69 per week from April 25, 1975, to the date of the hearing and until further order of the bureau. The WCAB concluded that the parties to the May 7, 1973, redemption agreement intended to settle only the defendants’ liability as to plaintiff’s back condition. After this Court denied defendants’ application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, on August 2, 1983, remanded the matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted. 417 Mich 1072 (1983).
The dispositive issue is whether the WCAB erred in holding that the 1973 redemption does not bar plaintiff’s petition. We hold that the WCAB did so err, and accordingly reverse the award of benefits.
The redemption agreement contains the following provision:
"The employee recognized and hereby agrees that this settlement releases the employer and its insurance carrier from any and all liability from the above-mentioned injury, and any other injuries, known or unknown, organic or functional, which may have occurred during this employment with the employer.”
The WCAB recognized that, by this language, plaintiff agreed "to settle for any and all physical conditions which might have arisen out of his employment”. Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unambiguous language, the board ruled that the parties intended to redeem only the previously adjudicated back injuries and not conditions which could arise in the future. This was error.
In Beardslee v Michigan Claim Services, Inc, 103 Mich App 480, 485; 302 NW2d 896 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 872 (1981), the Court stated:
*367"[A]s a general rule, the construction of redemption agreements is governed by the same rules as other settlements. Miller v City Ice & Fuel Co, 279 Mich 592; 277 NW 196 (1937). Further, the intent of the parties to a release, expressed in the terms of the agreement, governs the scope of the release. Grzebik v Kerr, 91 Mich App. 482, 486; 283 NW2d 654 (1979).” (Emphasis added.)
It is well-settled that, where the language of an agreement is unambiguous, the meaning of the language is a question of law, Craib v Presbyterian Church, 62 Mich App 617, 620; 233 NW2d 674 (1975), and the intent of the parties must be discerned from the words used in the instrument. This principle was discussed in Michigan Chandelier Co v Morse, 297 Mich 41, 49; 297 NW 64 (1941):
" 'Whatever may be the inaccuracy of expression or the inaptness of the words used in an instrument in a legal view, if the intention of the parties can be clearly discovered, the court will give effect to it and construe the words accordingly. It must not be supposed, however, that an attempt is made to ascertain the actual mental processes of the parties to a particular contract. The law presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention which its terms manifest. It is not within the function of the judiciary to look outside of the instrument to get at the intention of the parties and then carry out that intention regardless of whether the instrument contains language sufficient to express it; but their sole duty is to find out what was meant by the language of the instrument.’ 12 Am Jur pp 746-748.
"* * * -\ye must look for the intent of the parties in the words used in the instrument. This court does not have the right to make a different contract for the parties or to look to extrinsic testimony to determine their intent when the words used by them are clear and unambiguous and have a definite meaning.”
*368In the present case the language of the agreement evidences a clear intent to settle liability for all injuries, "known or unknown, organic or functional”, which may have occurred during the course of plaintiffs employment with defendant Campbell. The WCAB expressly recognized the import of this language, but nonetheless considered extrinsic evidence and concluded that the parties’ true intent was to settle liability only for plaintiffs back condition. The effect of the WCAB’s ruling was to render meaningless the express words of the written agreement. We hold as a matter of law that the 1973 redemption was intended to settle all liability arising out of plaintiffs employment with Campbell. The agreement therefore bars plaintiffs 1977 petition.
Reversed.
R. M. Maher, J., concurred.