dissenting.
In my view, the majority opinion, declaring unconstitutional certain provisions of Code § 55-154, represents an unjustified abandonment of the doctrine of stare decisis to which we have often expressed our devotion. The effect may be to replace order with confusion, certainty with doubt, assurance with insecurity. A brief review of the history of the statute reveals a sound underlying legislative intent.
*223The first law establishing a prima facie presumption of nonexistence of “minerals, coals, oils, or ores” was enacted in 1924. Acts 1924, c. 472. The Act applied only to “non-mountainous” land having an elevation not in excess of 600 feet; as to such land, the presumption operated after 50 years had elapsed. In other respects, the substantive provisions and procedural safeguards of the original Act were repeated in subsequent amendments.
In 1930, the Act was amended to provide that the presumption should apply to all land except that located west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Acts 1930, c. 472. In 1944, the Act, codified as Code § 6239a, was amended tó reduce to 35 years the 50-year'period required to activate the presumption. Acts 1944, c. 49. In 1956, the General Assembly for the first time exempted certain counties by population from the general exception applying to land lying west of the Blue Ridge. Acts 1956, c. 642. Additional population categories were added by later amendments. Acts 1964, c. 377; Acts 1968, c. 319; Acts 1970, c. 350; Acts 1981, c. 518. In recent years, the General Assembly has exempted by name certain counties from the geographical exception to the statutory presumption. Acts 1972, c. 306; Acts 1973, c. 123; Acts 1974, c. 238; Acts 1977, c. 309; Acts 1980, c. 310; Acts 1981, c. 518; Acts 1984, c. 452.
In Love v. National Bank, 205 Va. 860, 140 S.E.2d 650 (1965), we upheld the constitutionality of Code § 55-154 as it existed in 1963, after several counties had been excluded from the general exception by population but before any were excluded by name. We observed that the Act was a statute of repose providing a “rule of evidence for setting at rest titles to land when its value is reduced because of a reservation of non-existent values therein.” 205 Va. at 864, 140 S.E.2d at 653. Noting that no evidence or authority to the contrary had been presented, we held that the statute was “general and impartial in its operation on all persons and lands similarly situated” and was not violative of the constitutional prohibition against special, local, or private legislation. 205 Va. at 865, 140 S.E.2d at 653.
It is apparent that the legislative intent in enacting the law was to settle land titles throughout the state where mineral rights, once reserved, were no longer exercised; excepted from the statutory presumption, however, was the area where marketable minerals were most prevalent. It is likewise apparent that the legislative *224intent has remained constant through the numerous statutory amendments.
The majority relies on the location east of the Blue Ridge of the mineral rights in Love as distinguishing that case from the present case. Nevertheless, in Love, we held the statute constitutional when it contained exceptions based on population classifications. Therefore, the following well-established principle is relevant:
Even if it be said that the same constitutional questions raised here have not been previously passed upon, we have repeatedly held that a decree or judgment of this Court upholding the constitutionality of a statute conclusively settles the question of its validity and the statute is then free from all constitutional objections, whether assigned or not.
Myers v. Moore, 204 Va. 409, 412, 131 S.E.2d 414, 417 (1963).
Thus, it is immaterial that the earlier attack on the statute may have relied on different grounds. Id., 131 S.E.2d at 417; City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 103, 133 S.E. 781, 784 (1926). The doctrine of stare decisis requires that we adhere to our prior determinations in order to promote an orderly society in which men may rely on judicial precedents. Myers, 204 Va. at 413, 131 S.E.2d at 417. As we noted in Myers, application of stare decisis is especially compelling where property rights are at stake. Id., 131 S.E.2d at 417. In the 20 years since Love was decided, property owners have reasonably relied on the presumption granted to those excluded from the geographical exception. To invalidate this statute, which in substantially similar form we validated in Love, would work an injustice on such property owners and upset the stability of land titles throughout the designated regions. Moreover, the General Assembly was entitled to rely on Love as validation of the statutory scheme employed in drafting the amendments. There has been no change in the legislative intent and that intent has been manifested in valid classifications. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, therefore, the challenge to § 55-154 should be rejected.
The majority’s position is infirm for two additional reasons. First, the majority invalidates the statute insofar as it creates exceptions to the general provision that there is no presumption west *225of the Blue Ridge. But this holding misconstrues the statute. The general provision is that a presumption exists throughout most of the state. The exception applies to lands west of the Blue Ridge. By exempting certain counties from the exception, the designated counties merely fall within the general provision establishing the presumption. The landowners in this case, entitled to the presumption because their property is in Augusta County, are treated under § 55-154 identically with landowners in the overwhelming majority of counties in the state. As to these property owners, therefore, the statute is not “special” or “local”. A law is special because of what it excludes, not because of what it includes. Martin’s Ex’rs v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 603, 612, 102 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1920). As to these landowners, entitled to the presumption afforded by § 55-154, the statute can only be deemed general.
Second, laws which apply only to certain geographical areas or population categories are not per se invalid. Where the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary, laws may apply to the members of one class and not another. Martin’s Ex’rs, 126 Va. at 612, 102 S.E. at 80; Ex Parte Settle, 114 Va. 715, 718-19, 77 S.E. 496, 497 (1913). If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain a challenged statute, that state of facts must be assumed to have existed when the statute was adopted. Love, 205 Va. at 865, 140 S.E.2d at 653; Martin’s Ex’rs, 126 Va. at 612-13, 102 S.E. at 80.
The legislative intent to lessen the burden on property owners throughout the state seeking to extinguish valueless mineral rights furnishes a reasonable justification for the statute. But the General Assembly prudently sought to protect dormant mineral rights in areas known to be rich in coal, minerals, oil, and other subsurface deposits. As specific counties initially excepted from the statutory presumption demonstrated the appropriateness and advisability of such a presumption within their territorial limits, the legislature properly brought those lands within the ambit of the general provision, thereby steadily contracting the area within which the presumption is inapplicable. Since a classification’s reasonableness is primarily a matter for the legislature, Love, 205 Va. at 865, 140 S.E.2d at 653, we should not disturb the legislature’s classification of the counties designated in § 55-154. Here, as in Love, there is no evidence that the classification is arbitrary.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to *226the provisions of the statute. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion.
CARRICO, C.J., and STEPHENSON, J., join in this dissent.