dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I believe that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry into the defendant’s home. Furthermore, since the officers were legitimately on the premises when they made their observations, the suppressed evidence should have been admitted under the plain view doctrine.
The record reveals that the officers went to the defendant’s home for the purpose of having him accompany them to the police station to receive service of a summons in connection with the violation of a municipal *333ordinance. While it is true that the police did not have an arrest warrant and could not have compelled the defendant’s cooperation, I see no reason, under Fourth Amendment principles, why the police could not seek to obtain the defendant’s consent to go to the police station and receive service of the summons. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Thus, the police did not act improperly in going to the defendant’s home.
Once at the defendant’s door, the actions of the defendant, along with facts within the knowledge of the officers, provided sufficient exigencies to allow the officers to cross the threshold into defendant’s home without a warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968 (Colo.1982); People v. Williams, 613 P.2d 879 (Colo.1980).
Prior to going to the defendant’s residence, the police officers knew that the defendant had a criminal record involving violent offenses, and they had information that the defendant might have a weapon in his home. Further, one of the officers had seen a photograph of the defendant in a police bulletin and knew what he looked like.
Upon confronting the defendant, the officers asked him his name. He falsely identified himself as Rodney Barringer. At that time, he was asked to produce identification and, in response, he stated that he would get his wallet and turned back into his dimly lit residence.
I conclude that under these circumstances it was permissible for the officers to step inside the house in order to protect themselves and to maintain control of a potentially dangerous situation. The premises were dimly lit, the defendant had falsely identified himself, the officers knew of defendant’s prior record for violence and had information that he may have had a weapon inside his home. Constant observation of the defendant was essential to ensure the officers’ safety and self-protection. Further, the entry was a limited response tailored to the exigencies presented. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
Once inside the house, the officers’ observations were permissible under the plain view doctrine. Plain view requires a prior valid entry, the inadvertent discovery of evidence, and probable cause to believe the articles observed are connected to criminal behavior. People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302 (Colo.1982); People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226 (Colo.1982).
Here the entry was a permissible limited response to the situation presented. Thus, the valid entry requirement was fulfilled.
The observation of the illegal drugs in the ashtray in the room was inadvertent. The fact that the officers used their flashlights does not change the result since the room was dark, and the officers were attempting to survey the surroundings in order to ensure their safety. See People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978); People v. Haggart, 188 Colo. 164, 533 P.2d 488 (1975).
Finally, the requirement that the items observed be connected with criminal activity is clearly met when the item is illegal drugs. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); see also People v. Franklin, supra.
Since the requirements of the plain view doctrine have been met, the officers’ observations plus the information conveyed to the police by Rodney Barringer could serve as the basis for the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant for the objects described therein: the dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, the rifle, the articles stolen from Rodney Barringer, and documents establishing the identity of the person in control of the premises.
In my view, the majority has unduly constricted the exigent circumstances exception so clearly set out in Payton v. New York, supra. Seen from afar, the perception of danger which a police officer acts upon becomes dimmer, and it is all too easy *334to conclude that the danger was not of such magnitude that a warrantless entry was justified.
Moreover, even if one accepts the majority’s conclusion that exigent circumstances did not exist, the evidence should not be suppressed. The result of the majority opinion is that evidence relating to five aggravated robbery cases and a crime of violence involving this same defendant has been suppressed and will not be available at trial. This loss of probative evidence is too great a social price to pay, under the facts of this case, for what is at most, in hindsight, a good faith mistake in judgment by the police as to whether exigent circumstances existed which warranted their stepping across the threshold of the defendant’s home to protect themselves.
Here the police officers had to make a quick decision. They acted as reasonably prudent officers in the good faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and they had a reasonable basis for this belief.
The facts of this case present the court an opportunity to consider the rationale for the exclusionary rule. It is “a judge-made rule crafted to enforce constitutional requirements, justified in the illegal search context only by its deterrence of future police misconduct.” United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1980).
The majority opinion applies a rule of exclusion which will have little or no effect on police conduct. For when, as here, police believe themselves in a dangerous or precarious position, they will act to prevent harm to themselves. If at a later time their judgment is called into question and evidence excluded, I do not believe this will deter a similar response in the future. A good faith mistake about the dangerousness and exigencies which existed at a moment of time should not require exclusion of the evidence found in the search.
I am persuaded that the views expressed by a majority of the court in United States v. Williams, supra, concerning the exclusionary rule and the reasonable good faith exception thereto are sound and should be applied in this case. There the court said:
“Where the reason for a rule ceases, the rule should also cease — a familiar maxim carrying special force here. For here the cost of applying the rule is one paid in coin minted from the very core of our factfinding process, the cost of holding trials at which the truth is deliberately and knowingly suppressed and witnesses, in contravention of their oaths, are forbidden to tell the whole truth and censured if they do. This is a high price indeed and one that ought never be paid where, in reason, no deterrence is called for and none can in fact be had. Such a continued wooden application of the rule beyond its proper ambit to situations that its purposes cannot serve bids fair to destroy the rule entirely in the long run.”
622 F.2d at 847.
I would reverse the ruling of the trial court.
HODGES, C. J., joins in this dissent.