specially concurring, with whom RAPER, Justice, joins.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion inasmuch as appellee Barber (hereinafter referred to as “Barber”) did not meet the “three (3) years of teaching experience in a recognized school (K-12) setting” requirement for the requested certification. However, I disagree with the majority holding that appellant Wyoming State Board of Education (hereinafter referred to as “Board”), rather than appellant Wyoming State Superintendent of Public Instruction (hereinafter referred to as “Superintendent”) was the proper agency1 to administer and enforce the laws and rules relative to certification of teachers and school administrators. The potential of corrective legislation requires comment on some of the issues presented in this case and not fully addressed by the majority opinion, such as the appeal having become moot, the constitutionality of § 21-2— 304(a)(iii), W.S.1977, and the lawfulness of the rules and regulations vis-a-vis the enabling statute.
MOOT
Ordinarily, this case would be subject to dismissal as moot. Barber has left the state of Wyoming since this action was instituted. He is in the state of Indiana where he accepted employment as Director of the Center for Evaluation, Development and Research for Phi Delta Kappa. Another individual has been appointed to the position of superintendent involved in this appeal, and it is no longer available for Barber. An action involving the same parties and the same issues has been started in the United States District Court by Barber, who seeks damages resulting from the failure of appellant to certify him for the superintendent’s position. In it, the unemployment attributed to appellant is limited to a time certain and past. It would seem that the issues in this case no longer exist as far as the parties are concerned and the relief here because of a change in factual circumstances.
“2. When pending appeal an event occurs which makes a determination of the question involved unnecessary the appeal should be dismissed. [Citations.]” Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 620 P.2d 139, 140 (1980).
*691The change in circumstances would make certification of Barber improper. Although there is no residence requirement for certification, the statutory and rule provisions relative thereto are premised on the intention of the applicant to teach or administer in the public schools of the state of Wyoming. Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations provides that:
“An initial applicant for a Wyoming certificate shall provide a recommendation for certification from the preparing institution, signed by the designated official of that institution.”
The “preparing institution” is not defined but logically refers to the institution by which applicant is to be employed. There is no longer an institution preparing to employ Barber, and the recommendation is not possible.
Nonetheless, I believe we should address the merits of this case for the reason that the decision will be pertinent to the proceeding in the United States District Court. That court could refer the issues there involved to this court for determination. Rule 11, W.R.A.P. We would then be addressing the same issues involved in this case. I believe these facts are sufficient for resolving the issues at this time. However, such action should not be considered precedent in cases involving the issue of mootness absent the United States District Court factor.
CERTIFYING AUTHORITY
Whether the authority for certification of teachers and administrators is that of the Superintendent or of the Board is academic insofar as this case is concerned inasmuch as both denied certification to Barber for the same reasons. Should the issue become important in the United States District Court case or with reference to future legislation, my reasons to believe the authority is that of the Superintendent are as follows:
Section 21-2-202(a), W.S.1977, provides in part:
“(a) In addition to any other duties assigned to him by law, the state superintendent shall:
* * * * * *
“(v) Except as otherwise provided by law, decide controversies arising from or concerned with the administration of the state school system, involving rules, regulations, orders, or directives promulgated by the state superintendent or the state department of education or the state board of education and in all such cases, his decision shall be and constitute the final administrative determination;” (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized portion of this statute reflects the imposition on the Superintendent of the duty to administer the certification rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
The introductory language of the quoted subsection, i.e., “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” does not effect a change. Not only are there no exceptions provided by law, but the statutes reinforce the requirement that the Superintendent administer and enforce the certification rules. Section 21-2-304, W.S.1977, gives the Board the authority and duty to “[prescribe rules and regulations for administering the laws governing * * * certification.” (Emphasis added.) It does not bestow the certification or administrative tasks themselves to the Board.2 In fact, such is bestowed upon the Superintendent by § 21-2-202(a)(iv), W.S. 1977. The Superintendent is there authorized and mandated to:
“Enforce the provisions of this code and the administrative rules and regulations *692provided for in this code, in accordance with procedures provided by law;” (Emphasis added.)
The rules and regulations provided for in the code are those relative to certification. It is also noted that the legislature gave the Board the duty to prescribe minimum standards for public schools relative to general education programs, site selection on construction of schools and evaluation and accreditation of the schools. See subsection (a)(i) of § 21-2-304, W.S.1977. In the following subsection (a)(ii), the legislature gave the Board authority to “enforce the rules and regulations adopted under the preceding subsection.” However, similar authority was not given with reference to the next subsection concerning the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Board “for administering the laws governing the certification of school administrators, teachers and other personnel.” See § 21-2-304(a)(iii) quoted infra. Had the legislature intended the Board to both prescribe and enforce3 the rules relative to certification, it would have said so in the same fashion as it did with reference to the rules on minimum standards for public school education, etc.
It must be remembered that the Board is statutorily created, whereas the office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction is a constitutional one. The constitution gives to the Superintendent “[t]he general supervision of the public schools,” Art. 7, § 14, Wyoming Constitution. Statutorily, the Board was given the authority and duty to prescribe rules and regulations for certification of teachers and administrators, but the Superintendent was given the authority and duty to administer and enforce such rules and regulations.
The majority opinion disregards the plain language of the statutes which directs the Superintendent’s decision to be “the final administrative determination” in controversies arising from rules and regulations promulgated by the Board of Education (see § 21-2-202(a)(v), supra), and encroaches on the power of the legislature to hold that the Board is the “final arbiter” in such controversies. Contrary to that said in the majority opinion, it is not only a common procedure to direct administration and enforcement of rules and regulations on officers and agencies having no part in the creating of such rules and regulations, but such is often the only practical method of operation. The present situation is an example. The Board of Education consists of nine members who serve on a part-time basis. It has no staff except as provided by the Superintendent through the Department of Education. There is no possible way for the Board to administer the rules and regulations promulgated by it. The Superintendent, with her staff, receives, reviews, processes and makes decisions relative to every application presented for certification — all pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board. The Board simply cannot undertake the tasks assigned to it by the majority opinion. We have here an energetically contested case, but there are hundreds of routine cases. Each year the Superintendent handles hundreds of certification matters — rejecting, accepting, conditioning, and modifying the acceptance of applications therefor. Must these activities be turned over to the Board as a result of this decision?
HEARING OFFICER
I agree with that said in the majority opinion with reference to the propriety of the use of a hearing officer in this case and with reference to the necessity for a consideration and appraisement of the evidence by the officer or agency making the determination. With reference to this obligation of such officer or agency, the court said in Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481—482, 56 S.Ct. 906, 912, 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936), one of the cases cited in the majority opinion:
*693“ * * * And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them. That duty undoubtedly may be an onerous one, but the performance of it in a substantial manner is inseparable from the exercise of the important authority conferred.”
Section 9-4-109, W.S.1977, directs the agency in making a decision in a contested case to “consider the whole record or any portion stipulated to by the parties.” The Superintendent was thus obligated to review the entire record and to base her determination on that reflected therein.
It was suggested that the voluminous record in this case and the span between the time the Superintendent was directed to make a determination and the time she made the determination raise a question as to whether or not the Superintendent actually considered the record and evidence. Since this question was not resolved (as it was in Morgan v. United States, supra), it must be assumed that the Superintendent afforded proper consideration to the evidence. However, emphasis should be given to the necessity for the decision to be made by the responsible officer or agency and not by the hearing officer.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 21 — 2—304(a)(iii), W.S.1977
Section 21-2-304 provides in part: “(a) In addition to any other duties assigned to it by law, the state board shall:
* * * * * *
“(Hi) Prescribe rules and regulations for administering the laws governing the certification of school administrators, teachers and other personnel to require either examination in specified subjects, or the completion of courses in approved institutions, or both. The board shall provide for certification of teachers of the Arapahoe and Shoshoni languages. Rules and regulations shall require the following minimum qualifications, and such additional qualifications for professional training and a broad general education as the board may designate:
“(A) For teachers: a degree from an accredited college or university;
“(B) For administrators: qualification as a teacher, as provided in the preceding subsection plus appropriate experience as such teacher and additional training in educational administration;
“(C) Provided, further that the board may in its discretion make such exceptions as to both teachers and administrators as it deems necessary and proper in special circumstances;”
The district court found, and appellees contend, the statute to be overbroad, thus denying Barber due process of law. In a special concurrence, such as this, it is not useful to review all of the ramifications involved in the delegation of legislative powers to administrative agencies. 1 Am. Jur.2d Administrative Law, §§ 92 through 137 (1962); Davis Administrative Law, Delegation of Power, §§ 2.01 through 2.16 (1958). For the purposes of this special concurrence, the following observations are sufficient:
If subparagraph (C) of § 21 — 2—304(a)(iii) were given a liberal interpretation, it would conflict with the direction in (a)(iii) that certain minimum qualifications are required. The legislature cannot set up minimum requirements and then authorize an administrative agency to make exceptions to them. The minimum requirements would no longer be minimum. It is thus necessary to interpret the provisions of (a)(iii)(C) to be applicable only to those requirements set forth in the rules and regulations which are in addition to the minimum requirements set by statute.
Subsection (a)(iii) of the statute is not as artfully or precisely drawn as might be desired. A delegation of power is not clearly defined by setting forth minimum requirements of “appropriate experience” and of “additional training.” A less vague and more ascertainable base for the minimum would be preferable. Minimum requirements for administrators without reference *694to teacher requirements would avoid some of the problems found by the district court. See Seyfang v. Board of Trustees of Washakie County School District No. 1, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1376 (1977), which held a superintendent not to be a teacher under the teacher tenure law.
Nevertheless, the complexities of the certification area require flexibility in fashioning rules; and if the same are fashioned reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously, the power cannot be said to have been improperly delegated.
“ * * * It is * * * a fundamental postulate of administrative law that * * * [an agency] is possessed of only those powers expressly delegated by the Legislature, together with those powers required by necessary implication [citations]. Nevertheless, the absence of explicit statutory authorization need not be fatal to a given assertion of regulatory power by the * * * [agency]. For, as we have recognized previously, the Legislature on occasion broadly declares its will, specifying only the goals to be achieved and policies to be promoted, while leaving the implementation of a program to be worked out by an administrative body [citations]. In such cases, the sheer breadth of delegated authority precludes a precise demarcation of the line beyond which the agency may not tread. What is called for, rather, is a realistic appraisal of the particular situation to determine whether the administrative action reasonably promotes or transgresses the pronounced legislative judgment [citation].” Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 102, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 33-34, 390 N.E.2d 749 (1979), reversed on other grounds 447 U.S. 530, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980), and 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).
Although it has shortcomings, the statute does sufficiently indicate the standards and policy within which the Board could act. Whether or not the Board exceeded the standards and policy is another question.
PROPRIETY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
The district court found, and appellees contend, that the rules and regulations were improper in several respects. The district court considered the rules and regulations to have added “so much as amounts to a change of the minimum requirements” set forth in the statute.
That which I said with reference to the constitutionality of the statute, supra, should be in mind when analyzing the propriety of the rules and regulations. If they are reasonably fashioned, are not arbitrary or capricious, and do not conflict with the minimum standards contained in the statute, they are proper.
The district court directed reciprocity to be granted to Barber on the basis of his Oregon certification. The rules and regulations do not provide for reciprocity although § 21-2-304(a) provides in part:
“(a) In addition to any other duties assigned to it by law, the state board shall: * * * * % *
“(iv) Prepare and maintain a list of approved institutions whose graduates may receive certificates and provide for the issuance of Wyoming certificates based upon certificates granted on other states;”
The Board has not complied with the legislative direction, but the evidence reflects that such would not be pertinent under the circumstances of this case. The certification program for Wyoming is founded on a different philosophy than that of Oregon, and reciprocity with Oregon would have been improbable if not impossible. Barber was denied certification in Illinois and he could not qualify in Kentucky as a superintendent.
It is also contended that the rules should have afforded Barber an opportunity to qualify through examination. Such, however, is not consistent with that specified in the statute. It requires certification by:
“ * * * either examination in specified subjects, or the completion of courses in *695approved institutions, or both. * * * ” Section 21 — 2—304(a)(iii), W.S.1977.
The statutory direction is in the alternative.
The district court ruled that the Board could not use a private entity to design program standards and criteria in determining the adequacy of “an accredited teacher preparation program.” The National Council of Accreditation of Teacher Education (hereinafter referred to as “NCATE”) performs this service for Wyoming and many other states. The NCATE performs its function whether or not the state of Wyoming makes use of it. The state only adopts the criteria and standards together with the inspection apparatus relative thereto instead of undertaking the extensive task of inspection and review of the programs of the numerous colleges and universities. Similar use of the National Board of Fire Underwriters by the State Fire Marshal was approved in Brinegar v. Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62 (1962).
The district court found, and appellees contend, that § 10b of the rules and regulations regarding certification went beyond that authorized by the statute and was unreasonable. Section 10b sets forth that necessary for superintendent certification. It requires satisfaction of general requirements for teacher certification, for education specialist and for principal. The majority opinion has set forth the specific § 10b requirements and has noted wherein he was found deficient. Although § 10b is duplication in some respects (e.g., master’s degree and 60 graduate hours), as long as the minimum statutory requirements are not violated (e.g., “accredited teacher preparation program” comes from an “accredited college or university”), and as long as the standards relative to “appropriate experience” and “additional training in educational administration” are reasonable and not arbitrary, § 10b cannot be said to be improper.
In reviewing the whole record (Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427 (1980); § 9 — 1-114, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. 1982), I do not find substantial evidence that Barber met the three-year teaching requirement of § 10b of the rules and regulations. A careful compilation of his teaching experience results in a conclusion that he had less than three years of such in a K-12 setting. The district court found, and appellees contend, that the requirement of at least three years’ experience in a K-12 setting is unreasonable. To the contrary, experience in the classroom with resulting student and parent contact, with the practical classroom application of administrative directives, and with the attendant curricula and disciplinary problems is sufficient to find reasonable the three-year teaching requirement.
This being so, it is immaterial whether or not Barber met the other requirements. The Superintendent was justified in refusing to certify him.
. “Agency” is defined in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to include a state board and a state officer. Section 9-4-101(a)(i), W.S. 1977.
. The majority opinion states that the “statute declares that the State Board of Education shall administer the laws ‘governing the certification of school administrators * * ” (Emphasis in original.) It does not so declare. It directs the Board to “[prescribe rules and regulations for administering" (emphasis added) such laws. The difference is determinative. If the legislature had intended the Board to administer such laws, it would have worded the subsection as inaccurately stated by the majority opinion. The actual wording used reflects the intent' to have the rules administered by the Superintendent — as stated in so many words in § 2 l-2-202(a)(v), W.S.1977.
. “Prescribe” means “[t]o lay down authoritatively as a guide, direction, or rule; to impose as a peremptory order; to dictate; to point, to direct; to give as a guide, direction, or rule of action; to give law,” and “enforce” means “[t]o put into execution; to cause to take effect; to make effective; as, to enforce a particular law * * *Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 1979.