(dissenting). I am forced to dissent in this matter. As the majority states, there is ample evidence *471in the record to sustain the finding of the jury that the defendant was operating his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The majority decision sets out only part of the testimony which sustains that finding.
Plaintiff and defendant were in the same party at Bachun’s from 2 or 2:30 a. m. to 5:30 or 6, during most of which time both were drinking at the bar and they danced together. From 5:30 or 6 until 7 they drank together alone at Obluck’s. At 7 they left Obluck’s in defendant’s car on the ride that culminated in the accident.
In my opinion the case is governed by Erickson v. Pugh (1954), 268 Wis. 53, 66 N. W. (2d) 691. A reasonable person in command of her mental faculties cannot associate with a person as intoxicated as the defendant without knowing he is intoxicated, and the jury should have so found.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Brown and Mr. Justice Hallows join in this dissent.