dissenting:
The majority finds no constitutional flaw in Colorado’s statutorily-created system of financing public elementary and secondary education, and reverses the judgment of the trial court. My analysis of the relevant statutes leads me to the conclusion that they fail to accord equal protection of the laws to all Colorado schoolchildren, contrary to Colo.Const. Art. II, § 25, and do not establish a “thorough and uniform” system of public schools throughout Colorado, as mandated by Colo.Const. Art. IX, § 2. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Colorado’s school finance system, as relevant here, is comprised of the Public School Finance Act of 1973 (PSFA), section 22-50-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum.Supp., and those provisions relating to the capital reserve fund, sections 22-40-102(4) and 22-45-103(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum. Supp., and to the bond redemption fund, sections 22-42-104(l)(a) and 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum.Supp. An analysis of those statutes and of their effect in operation persuades me that, collectively, they violate the requirement of equal protection of the laws under Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25. An inquiry into the appropriate equal protection standard to be applied, followed by a summary of the statutory framework for Colorado’s school financing system and of the practical operation of that system will demonstrate the reasons for this conclusion.
A.
The United States Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental right for the purpose of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri*1033guez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959. 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973) (Rodriguez). In Rodriguez the Court went on to hold that Texas’ plan for financing public education satisfies equal protection standards because it rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest.
As the majority recognizes, Rodriguez does not establish the degree of importance to be attached to education in an equal protection analysis under the Colorado Constitution. The ultimate responsibility for that determination rests with this Court. See, e.g., People v. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968). In exercising that responsibility, however, the majority holds that laws impinging on the right to education require no more attentive scrutiny under Colo.Const. Art. II, § 25 than Rodriguez accorded them for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection purposes. In reaching that conclusion the majority rejects the test for constitutional fundamentality that led the United States Supreme Court to conclude that education is not a fundamental right for federal constitutional purposes, but does not tell us what test is to be applied for this purpose in Colorado.1 As a result we cannot determine how it arrived at its conclusion that a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose is sufficient to justify disparate treatment of educational rights of different classes of schoolchildren in Colorado. I disagree with the majority’s analysis and with its conclusion.
Justice Powell’s opinion for the five-justice majority in Rodriguez focuses on the importance of adoption of a principled and constitutionally-based test for determination of the importance of rights for equal protection purposes. The opinion states:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is “fundamental” is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. [Citations omitted.]2
411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d at 43. Noting that education is not among the rights explicitly protected by the United States Constitution, and finding no basis for saying it is implicitly guaranteed, the Court was led to the conclusion that under the federal constitution the right to education is not fundamental. Thus, scrutiny of the Texas plan was limited to determining whether it rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. A review of the Colorado Constitution reflects the more favored status explicitly accorded to education in this state and leads to the conclusion that legislation not according equal rights to education to all classes must be tested by a heightened standard of review.3
*1034The framers of our constitution were acutely aware of the importance of education in a democratic society, as evidenced by the inclusion of Article IX, § 2 in our original state constitution. That section, which remains unchanged to this day, provides in pertinent part:
The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.
The balance of Article IX is devoted to various aspects of the establishment of a public school system in Colorado, including creation of a state board of education (§ 1), administration of the public school fund (§§ 3, 5), compulsory school attendance (§ 11), creation of school districts (§ 15), and denial of any power to the general assembly and the state board of education to prescribe textbooks (§ 16). In a sense, a recognition of the importance of public school was implicit in Colorado’s birth as a state of the federal union, for in § 7 of the Enabling Act authorizing the formation of a state government in Colorado the United States Congress granted two sections in every township to the state “for the support of common schools.” Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 139, 18 pt. 3 Stat. 474, 475 (1875). A framework for administration of these properties and funds resulting from their sale is established by Colo.Const. Art. IX, §§ 5, 9, and 10. Only three years ago this court explicitly acknowledged the importance which the Colorado Constitution assigns to education in an opinion upholding a compulsory school attendance statute. People in the Interest of Y.D.M., 197 Colo. 403, 593 P.2d 1356 (1979).
Notwithstanding the Colorado constitutional provisions establishing the importance of education, the majority assigns the right to education no enhanced status for equal protection purposes. Thus, it holds that the right to education may be subjected to differential legislative treatment on a showing of only a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. I disagree. While we must exercise caution in characterizing rights as “fundamental,” and so triggering examination by strict scrutiny, a test most difficult to satisfy, in my view the majority fails to give the effect due to the language of the Colorado Constitution by not according this right a degree of importance greater than an ordinary interest for equal protection purposes.4
Equal protection analysis is not so rigid as to establish only two categories of rights — those that are fundamental, and those that are not — and to bring to bear only two tests — strict scrutiny, and minimum scrutiny — to determine the constitutionality of laws impinging unequally on exercise of those rights by different classes of citizens. In dealing with suspect classifications, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that legislative classification on the basis of gender, while not mandating *1035strict scrutiny, requires a test more exacting than “rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.” Thus, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), that Court held that a gender-based classification can survive an equal protection challenge only if it serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 1124, 97 S.Ct. 1161, 51 L.Ed.2d 574 (1977). Intermediate review standards have also been employed by the United States Supreme Court in other contexts. See Justice Marshall’s dissent in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70, 93 S.Ct. at 1315, 36 L.Ed.2d at 64;5 see generally, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-31 (1978). We, too, have tested gender-based distinctions by the intermediate standard employed in Caban v. Mohammed, supra. R. McG. v. J.W., Colo., 615 P.2d 666 (1980). In recognition of the substantiality and importance with which the Colorado Constitution invests the right to education, any disparate legislative treatment of that right should be tested for equal protection sufficiency by no less demanding a standard. Applying this test, the Colorado school finance laws cannot withstand critical examination.
B.
The trial court found that one measure of the quality of an educational program is “the amount of money per pupil spent by a school district on’ educational offerings to pupils within the district.” More specifically, it found:
The level of expenditures per pupil is directly related to the ability of a school district to provide a measure of educational quality in its curricula and overall program. The quality of educational opportunity provided by school districts to pupils is significantly improved by an increase in per pupil expenditures.. . Because of [the] disparities [in educational expenditures among the 181 school districts in Colorado], students in low-wealth, low-spending districts receive an educational opportunity significantly below that offered to students in high-wealth, high-spending districts.
The disparities in educational opportunity resulting from corresponding disparities in per pupil expenditures generally are related to such fiscally partisan factors as: (1) class size; (2) teacher quality, especially the teacher’s verbal ability to communicate the operative principles of a course of study and their interrelationships; (3) curricular offerings; (4) supportive services, such as counselors and teachers’ aides; (5) teaching materials and equipment, including textbooks, libraries, laboratory facilities, media centers, health facilities; and (6) the condition of capital facilities. (Emphasis added.)
Although the majority fails to note these findings and appears to deny the truth of their content, it abandons its legitimate appellate function in doing so. It may be, as the majority asserts, that a “fundamental *1036disagreement exists concerning the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education.” However, in this case any such disagreement was resolved by the above-quoted factual findings. The evidence supports these findings, and we are bound by them. E.g., Petersen v. Ground Water Commission, 195 Colo. 508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978).
C.
The majority describes the school finance laws in some detail but neglects to outline the factual findings of the trial court detailing how the financing system operates in practice. When this information is supplied, the failure of the laws to accord equal protection to Colorado schoolchildren becomes apparent. I shall first summarize the structure established by the statutes and then turn to the trial court’s findings.
In order to finance Colorado’s public school system, the Colorado legislature has adopted a statutory scheme which utilizes funds from both local property taxes and state taxes. Each school district must raise a substantial portion of needed monies for general purposes from local property taxes. These revenues are then supplemented by a state contribution. A maximum amount of revenue per pupil from both sources is prescribed. This maximum limit is called the authorized revenue base. Not limited by this maximum are federal and state contributions, known as “categorical aids,” for certain special purposes,6 and monies raised from local property taxes for capital expenditures. However, separate statutory criteria limit the amount of capital expenditures.
The year 1977 will serve to illustrate the manner in which educational costs are shared. In that year $950,338,000 was spent on public primary and secondary education in Colorado. Local property taxes made up 47% of that amount; state tax revenues provided 43%; federal contributions accounted for 6%; and the other 4% came from miscellaneous sources.
A useful starting point for understanding the school financing system is the authorized revenue base (ARB), the upper limit of per pupil expenditures for general operating expenses.7 This had its inception in the PSFA, in section 22-50-106, C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Supp. For the 1973 budget year each district was assigned an ARB founded on the 1973 revenues from local property taxes, the 1973 state equalization support under prior legislation, and the 1973 attendance entitlement. These ARBs varied widely among school districts and essentially reflected historical spending levels. Since ARBs limit the operational expenses for each schoolchild, disparities in ARBs are at the heart of the differentials in educational opportunity of which the plaintiff schoolchildren complain.
Complex statutory adjustments have resulted in increases in ARBs over the years but have not erased the disparities, as will be seen. Unless new legislation is enacted, ARBs will increase at a rate of 7% annually in 1983 and subsequent years. Section 22-50-106(2)(f), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.). Since ARBs vary among school districts now, the flat percentage increases will cause further divergence of ARBs in the future. (J.e., 7% of a higher number yields a greater absolute increase than 7% of a lower number.)
A school district may increase its prescribed ARB in one of two ways. First, an increase based on need may be requested of the state school district budget review board. Section 22-50-107, C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Supp. In the alternative, or in the event of budget review board denial, a special school district election may be called to obtain approval of the requested increase. Section 22-50-108, C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Supp. For the first year of any increase *1037authorized by either of these two methods, the funding for the increase must be provided through property taxes within the district, without any state supplemental aid. Sections 22-50-107(2)(b), 22-50-108(4), C.R. S.1973. As will be seen, this first-year financial hurdle substantially inhibits school districts with low assessed property valuations from availing themselves of the procedure to increase their ARBs.
The first source of school district monies is “from levies against the valuation for assessment of all taxable property located within the boundaries of [each] school district.” Section 22-40-102(1), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.). In order to accomplish the levy, every year the board of education of each school district must certify to the board of county commissioners of the county in which the school district is located the amount necessary in its judgment to be raised for general funds to defray operating costs for education during the next fiscal year.
The assessed valuations of property and the assessed valuations of property per pupil vary greatly among school districts. In recognition of the difficulty this presents to property-poor school districts in trying to raise necessary funds for public schools, the state has provided two forms of aid: state equalization aid, and a minimum guarantee.
State equalization aid is a method to equalize among districts the power of a one mill tax levy to raise revenue per pupil up to a guaranteed level. In 1977 the state guarantee was $31.92 per mill per pupil. Section 22-50-105(l)(a)(IV), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.). Thus, if a one mill levy on assessed valuation in a school district would not produce $31.92 per pupil in 1977, the state provided equalization aid necessary to supplement the amount which the one mill levy would produce up to the $31.92 guaranteed amount. The total equalization aid to a school district was dependent on the mill levy necessary for that district to generate its assigned ARB for each pupil.
A minimum state contribution, the minimum guarantee, completes the state aid picture. Every year the state pays each district a prescribed amount per mill per pupil without regard to need. In 1977 this was $10.85 per mill per pupil. This amount applies toward the state equalization aid obligation, but is payable in full even if a school district does not need all or any part of it to achieve the state guaranteed level per mill per pupil. For example, in 1977 in a school district where a one mill levy would produce $32.00 per pupil (i.e., more than the $31.92 state guaranteed level) the state would still pay $10.85 per mill per pupil in aid to the district. This contribution operates within the ARB limit and effects a reduction in the mill levy to be imposed in high assessed valuation districts to generate their ARBs.
In addition to the plan for financing school district operational expenses, the Colorado statutes impose limitations on the ability of school districts to spend for capital improvements. Capital expenditures are not limited by the ARB but are considered separately. They are funded entirely through taxation on property within each respective district, without supplementation by state aid. Capital expenditures are financed through capital reserve funds, section 22-45-103(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Supp., and bond redemption funds, section 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973. The levy for capital reserve funds is limited to four mills per year. Section 22-40-102(4). The bond redemption funds are financed from local property tax revenues. Sections 22-42-118, 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973. Bonded indebtedness is limited to 20% of the latest valuation for assessment of the taxable property in the district. Section 22-42-104(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.). As the trial court found, these limitations severely curtail the ability of property-poor districts to raise money for necessary school improvements.
The complexities and interrelationships of school financing components are such that only when the effects of the system are studied can the great disparities in per pupil spending for public school education in Colorado be brought into focus. The trial court made findings of fact which expose *1038these disparities in harsh relief, and I now turn to those findings.
D.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact with respect to the manner in which the Colorado public school finance system has operated. Those findings are attached in substantial part as an appendix. They detail the large disparities among school districts in the ability to finance education because of the correspondingly large variations in assessed valuation per pupil. The trial court also points out the large variations in ARBs which have been produced by the statutory formulas and shows that they are rooted, at least in substantial part, in historical spending levels in each district. Historical district spending in turn was influenced by the widely varying assessed valuations per pupil within the districts. In sum, the trial court found that:
The statutory scheme of public school finance has permitted districts with relatively high assessed valuations per pupil to generate relatively high authorized revenue bases and expenditure levels. On the other hand, districts with relatively low assessed valuations per pupil have relatively low authorized revenue bases and low per pupil expenditure levels.
It also found that the relative ranking of school districts by ARBs has not changed significantly since 1973.
The district court then explored the effect of state equalization aid and minimum guarantee money on a school district’s fiscal ability. It found that state equalization aid, with its prescribed maximum per pupil per mill levels, “is simply incapable of equalizing the revenue raising potential of low-wealth [i.e., low assessed valuation per pupil] districts with high-wealth districts.” Moreover, it found that the minimum guarantee money increases the disparity in the fiscal ability of school districts to raise revenue for educational purposes because it is awarded to districts without regard to need. Thus, the true measure of the state’s equalization efforts is the difference between the state equalization aid limit and the minimum guarantee (e.g., in 1977, $31.92 per pupil per mill minus $10.85 per pupil per mill, a difference of $21.07 per pupil per mill).
Property-poor school districts are inhibited from increasing their ARBs through state school district budget review board authorization or voter approval by the need to finance the total authorized increase in the first year without the assistance of state aid. As the trial court found,
Although the amount of money raised locally is to some extent the product of the willingness of local residents to tax themselves, as a practical matter school districts with a small tax base simply cannot raise their mill rates to the level necessary to match the authorized revenue bases attainable by the more wealthy districts with less onerous tax efforts on the part of these wealthy districts.... The practical consequence of requiring a low-wealth district to pay for an increase in its authorized revenue base solely out of local tax revenue in the first year of such increase is that the low-wealth district is curtailed, if not outrightly prevented, from pursuing a higher quality educational program for its students and from making significant choices in its curriculum and total educational program.
Likewise, property-poor districts are severely limited in their ability to construct capital improvements by reason of the four mill levy limitation on capital reserve fund accumulations and the 20% of assessed valuation limitation on bonded indebtedness. In 1977, for example, Frisco School District, with a tax levy of 4 mills, raised $386.52 per pupil for its capital reserve fund, while South Conejos School District, for the same 4 mill levy, raised only $23.60 per pupil. The appendix gives other examples and statistics vividly illustrating the differences in the abilities of school districts to construct capital improvements as a result of disparities in the assessed valuation of property within the districts.
Finally, the trial court reviewed the 1977 and 1978 amendments to the Public School Finance Act of 1973 and found that the *1039authorized revenue base disparities will not be erased or substantially mitigated by the new legislation.
E.
The trial court found as a matter of fact that “[t]he level of expenditures per pupil is directly related to the ability of a school district to provide a measure of educational quality in its curricula and overall program.” It went on to find that “[t]he disparities in educational expenditures among the 181 school districts in Colorado are to a great extent the product of the random historical fortuity of local taxable wealth.” This establishes the fact that Colorado’s school finance laws do not treat schoolchildren in the various school districts throughout the state equally in the exercise of their right to education. Under the heightened scrutiny standard which I consider appropriate, this differential treatment can survive an equal protection challenge only if it serves important governmental objectives and is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Whether it does so is the next inquiry.
The governmental interest which the majority finds sufficient to justify the unequal educational opportunities accorded Colorado schoolchildren is local control.8 Local control refers to control at the school district level. As the trial court observed, local control has two components: (1) local administrative control, i.e., control over the educational program within the school district, and (2) local fiscal control, i.e., control over the amount of money that will be spent for educational purposes within the school district. Local administrative control is indisputably an important governmental objective — so much so that it finds recognition in Colo.Const. Art. IX, §§15 and 16.9 The assertion that local fiscal control is an important governmental objective also must be given some credence, particularly in view of its relationship to local administrative control.
The equal protection defect in the PSFA and associated capital expenditure limitation statutes is apparent, however, -when those statutes are tested to determine whether they are substantially related to the achievement of local control objectives. The trial court found as a fact that in operation the ARBs in low assessed valuation school districts are so low as to make local control an empty concept. It stated:
In many low-wealth districts, including the sixteen districts of plaintiff schoolchildren, there is a lack of any meaningful degree of local fiscal control, with a concomitant lack of local administrative control. The practical consequence of requiring a district lacking in local taxable wealth to pay for an increase in its authorized revenue base solely out of local tax revenue in the first year of such increase is that the low-wealth district is hindered, if not forestalled, in its choice of curricu*1040lum and in its pursuit of a qualitative educational program.
Local control as it relates to capital expenditures is operative within a narrow range. A local school district is limited to a four mill assessment per year to contribute to its capital reserve fund and cannot exceed a bonded indebtedness limit of 20% of assessed valuation of property in the district. While these limitations may reflect sound governmental policies limiting burdens on landowner-taxpayers, they create great inequality in moneys per student which may be spent for capital construction. For example, the trial court found that in 1977:
the districts at the second decile levied at an average capital reserve rate of 3.01 for an average yield of $117.76 per pupil, which is $39.12 per pupil per mill. The districts at the ninth decile levied at an average capital reserve tax rate of 3.67 for an average yield of $40.16 per pupil, which is $10.95 per pupil per mill.
The General Assembly has done nothing to address the inequality in capital facilities funding capabilities that is created by the ceilings on capital reserve fund assessments and bonded indebtedness. In the capital facilities area “local control” is merely a euphemism masking gross inequalities in the abilities of school districts to meet their needs.10
The majority holds that the bonded indebtedness ceiling and the limitation on assessments for the capital reserve fund further an additional legitimate state purpose of controlling the public debt. Although the capital reserve fund assessment limitation relates to current assessments and not to debt, the bonded indebtedness ceiling is substantially related to containment of the public debt. I do not dispute that protection of the credit of a school district from improvidently incurring public debt is a legitimate state purpose. See City of Trinidad v. Haxby, 136 Colo. 168, 315 P.2d 204 (1957). I would hold, however, that even if these limitations on revenue collection and debt may properly be isolated from the remainder of the public school financing scheme, they are not supported by governmental objectives so important that their attainment can be permitted to override the right to education, which has enjoyed an important place among the rights of Colorado citizens since statehood. See People in the Interest of Y.D.M., supra. Although I might not go quite so far, Justice Dubofsky persuasively argues in her dissent in this case that “the levy and bond limitations in Colorado’s statutes, together with the failure to provide any mechanism for correcting the resulting disparities among school districts, in effect constitute an absolute deprivation of educational opportunity to students in poorer school districts, ...” (Emphasis added.) Certainly they create egregious inequality in capital facilities financing capacity among the school districts. I would hold that the asserted governmental objective of debt limitation is not sufficiently important to sustain the challenged statutes against that heightened level of equal protection scrutiny that I consider applicable here. See generally the quotation from Justice Marshall’s dissent in Rodriguez at n.5, supra.
Concluding that Colorado’s public school financing statutes are not substantially related to the achievement of the asserted local control objectives, and that control of the public debt is not a governmental interest of sufficient weight to justify the serious impairment of the educational rights of Colorado schoolchildren effected by the capital reserve fund assessment and bonded indebtedness limitations, I would hold that *1041these statutes, considered together, deny equal protection of the laws to Colorado schoolchildren.
II.
There is yet another respect in which Colorado’s public school finance laws are constitutionally deficient. Under Colo. Const. Art. IX, § 2, the General Assembly has a constitutional duty to establish a school system meeting specified standards:
The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.
As the majority notes, we have never before been called upon to determine what is meant by a “thorough and uniform” system of public schools.11
The majority appears to hold that the constitutional standard is satisfied if the state insures that some unspecified minimum of educational opportunities is available in each school district.12 Even overlooking the fact that, as the trial court found, the General Assembly has not addressed the question of the nature of those educational opportunities which would comprise a constitutionally sufficient minimum, I believe more content should be given to the “thorough and uniform” clause.
In construing thé word “uniform,” recognition must be given to Colo.Const. Art. IX, §§ 15 and 16, placing control of instruction in local school boards and forbidding the General Assembly and state board of education from prescribing textbooks for use in the public schools. These provisions dispel any notion that in establishing a “uniform” system of free public schools the General Assembly must, or even may, prescribe a set curriculum to be implemented in all school districts in the state. Against this background, I agree with the trial court that “[wjhatever might be said of possible constructions of ‘thorough’ and ‘uniform,’ it seems evident that the education clause was intended for the benefit of schoolchildren and addresses notions underlying the basic concept of equal educational opportunity.” Uniformity requires parity of educational opportunity, not, as the majority indicates, simply an assurance that some bare minimum opportunity is available in each school district.
The assessment of uniformity of educational opportunity in a setting where each school district has a constitutional right to control instruction in its own schools is difficult at best. It is not at all necessary, however, to determine the appropriate constitutional limits on. legislative and local school district powers for present purposes. It is enough to note the constitutional implications of the trial court’s finding, quoted earlier, but bearing repetition here, that:
In many low wealth districts, including the sixteen districts of plaintiff schoolchildren, there is a lack of any meaningful degree of local fiscal control, with a concomitant lack of local administrative control. The practical consequence of requiring a district lacking in local taxable wealth to pay for an increase in its authorized revenue base solely out of local tax revenue in the first year of such increase is that the low-wealth district is hindered, if not forestalled, in its choice of curriculum and in its pursuit of a qualitative educational program.
The trial court has found as a fact that the result of the state school financing scheme *1042is to furnish low assessed valuation school districts with funding so inadequate that they havé no meaningful ability to exercise their constitutional right and obligation to control instruction in their own' schools. The constitutional mandate of uniformity, whatever its full contours may be, requires more than this.13
Accordingly, I would hold that the statutory school financing scheme in Colorado violates the requirements of Colo. Const. Art. IX, § 2.
III.
The majority, concluding as it does that the trial court erred in its constitutional interpretations and so reversing its judgment, finds no need to address the appropriateness of the remedies adopted by tjie trial court. Similarly, I conclude that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address them in this dissent.
IV.
I join that portion of Justice Dubofsky’s dissenting opinion in which she concludes that the 20% of assessed valuation limit on school district bonded indebtedness and the 4 mill capital reserve fund ceiling offend against Colo.Const. Art. IX, § 2.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court that the Colorado public school financing scheme violates the Constitution of the state of Colorado.
APPENDIX TO JUSTICE LOHR’S DISSENT — Excerpts from the findings of fact made by Honorable Joseph R. Quinn in the trial court.
II. The Colorado Public School Finance System in Operation
A. The Relationship Between Assessed Valuation and a School District’s Fiscal Ability
Colorado school districts vary widely in the amount of taxable property wealth per pupil within their boundaries. In 1977, the assessed valuation per pupil among Colorado school districts ranged from a high of $326,269 per pupil to a low of $4,197 per pupil, a ratio of almost 78 to 1. Eliminating the extremely high and low districts, the range between the 90th and 10th percentile of districts in assessed valuation per pupil in 1977 still remained at a ratio of 5.3 to 1. The state average of assessed valuation per pupil in 1977 was $29,165. The average assessed valuation per pupil for 1977 in the sixteen districts in which the plaintiff schoolchildren reside was only $10,-563, about one-third of the state average. As a result of variations in assessed valuations per pupil, school districts with high assessed valuations per pupil have a greater fiscal ability to raise revenue for educational purposes from local taxes than do many other school districts in the state, including the sixteen districts in which the plaintiff schoolchildren reside. In South Conejos School District a one mill levy on the assessed valuation of property per pupil raised $5.90 per pupil in 1977, while the same one mill levy in Rangely School District raised $326.27 per pupil.
B. The Relationship Between Local Taxable Wealth and a School District’s Authorized Revenue Base
When the Public School Finance Act of 1973 was enacted, the historical variations then existing among school districts in local fiscal ability accounted for substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil among the districts, regardless of pupil size. The Public School Finance Act of 1973 assigned each district an authorized revenue base determined on the basis of the district’s 1973 revenues per pupil from state and local sources.
In 1977, authorized revenue bases ranged from a high of $3,101 per pupil to a low of *1043$1,004 per pupil, a ratio of three to one. Eliminating the extremes at both ends, the range in authorized revenue bases between school districts at the'90th percentile and the 10th percentile still remained at a ratio of almost two to one. The state average was $1,446. The sixteen districts in which plaintiff schoolchildren reside were below the state average, and among themselves averaged $1,138 per pupil, which was more than $300 per pupil lower than the state average.
In 1977, school district total expenditures ranged from a high of $4,888 per pupil to a low of $1,212 per pupil, a ratio of about four to one. Eliminating the terminal extremes, the range in total expenditures per pupil for districts at the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile was still over two to one. The state average was $2,020 per pupil. The sixteen districts in which the plaintiff schoolchildren reside were below the state average, and among themselves averaged $1,597, which was more than $400 per pupil below the state average.
The statutory scheme of public school finance has permitted districts with relatively high assessed valuations per pupil to generate relatively high authorized revenue bases and expenditure levels. On the other hand, districts with relatively low assessed valuations per pupil have relatively low authorized revenue bases and low per pupil expenditure levels. In 1977, South Conejos School District taxed itself 35 mills to spend $1,057 per pupil, while Summit School District taxed itself only 18 mills to spend $1,896 per pupil. Of the 45 districts with the highest authorized revenue bases in 1977, all were above the state median in assessed wealth per pupil. Of the 45 districts with the lowest authorized revenue bases in 1977, all but six were below the state median in assessed valuation per pupil. Only two of the 45 wealthiest districts in the state in 1977 had authorized revenue bases below the state median. On the other hand, only five of the 45 poorest districts in the state in 1977 had authorized revenue bases above the state median.
The measure of the strength of the relationship between the variables of authorized revenue bases and assessed valuations per pupil is indicated by the correlation coefficient.1 The correlation coefficient between authorized revenue bases per pupil in 1977 and assessed valuations per pupil in 1977 was + .5548. The correlation coefficient between total expenditures per pupil in 1977 and assessed valuations per pupil in 1977 was + .4959. With few exceptions, this positive relationship between local wealth and school district authorized spending levels permeates school districts of varying pupil size.
The relative ranking of school districts by authorized revenue bases has not significantly changed since 1973. The correlation coefficient for 1973 and 1977 authorized revenue bases is + .9. Districts which had low authorized revenue bases in 1973, relative to other districts, had equally low authorized revenue bases in 1977, relative to other districts. In the case of the sixteen districts of plaintiff schoolchildren, their relatively unchanged low ranking carries over into 1978, as is apparent from the following table:
Plaintiff 1973 1973 1974 1974 1977 1977 1978 1978
School District ARB Rank ARB Rank ARB Rank ARB Rank
Alamosa 727.00 158 814.95 159 1163.04 148 1347.50 132
Center 743.00 150 831.25 151 1111.54 163 1234.69 163
Del Norte 745.00 147 835.18 148 1117.14 160 1239.92 162
Delta 726.00 160 812.29 161 1087.05 166 1216.83 165
*1044Plaintiff 1973 1973 1974 1974 1977 1977 1978 1978
School District ARB Rank ARB Rank ARB Rank ' ARB Rank
East Otero 734.00 157 821.93 157 1161.63 149 1285.57 151
Granada 790.00 128 883.96 129 1159.51 150 1284.86 152
Ignacio 552.00 181 750.00 171* 1042.66 180 1168.00 179
Johnstown 849.00 108 941.81 109 1211.06 131 1399.37 114
Manzanola 751.00 144 841.50 145 1124.78 159 1252.54 159
Monte Vista 694.00 164 778.06 164 1100.93 164 1246.55 160
Montezuma Cortez 655.00 170 750.00 168* 1042.71 179 1168.23 178
Montrose 749.00 146 839.14 147 1219.95 129 1351.11 131
Pueblo 738.00 153 827.29 154 1259.74 115 1381.60 121
Rocky Ford 694.00 165 821.93 158 1165.69 146 1287.74 150
South Conejos 614.00 178 750.00 174* 1057.44 172 1181.08 173
Trinidad 740.00 151 828.43 153 1184.44 137 1308.13 142
In many cases the authorized revenue bases of wealthy districts have increased more, in terms of actual dollar amounts, than the authorized revenue bases of property-poor districts, thereby resulting in a greater net dollar disparity in 1977 and thereafter than existed in 1973. Furthermore, tax mill rates in several property-poor districts have increased at a greater rate than in property-rich districts, in spite of the fact that in many cases the authorized revenue bases in overall dollar amounts have increased in property-rich districts at a pace greater than dollar increases in property-poor districts.
A factor which is persuasively explanatory of disparities in school districts’ authorized revenue bases in 1977 is the assessed valuation per pupil in these districts in 1973. The correlation coefficient between 1977 authorized revenue bases and 1973 assessed valuations per pupil is + .7630. This correlation coefficient indicates that local taxable wealth and wealth-related spending disparities, as they existed prior to and including 1973, continued to exert an influence on authorized spending levels for public education in the state of Colorado as late as 1977.
C. The Effect of State Equalization Aid and Minimum Guarantee Money on a School District’s Fiscal Ability
State equalization aid does increase a school district’s fiscal capacity by raising the revenue producing potential of a one mill levy. However, state equalization aid, which is limited to the per pupil-per mill levels of $31.92 in 1977, $35.00 in 1978, $42.25 in 1979, and $45.85 in 1980, is simply incapable of equalizing the revenue raising potential of low-wealth districts with high-wealth districts.
Furthermore, the statutory minimum guarantee per pupil per mill actually increases the disparity in the fiscal ability of school districts to raise revenue for educational purposes due to the fact that the money is given to districts fully capable of raising more than the guaranteed level of state equalization aid from their own local taxable wealth. The minimum guarantee per pupil per mill was $10.85 in 1977, $11.35 for 1978, and will be $11.35 for 1979 through 1983. In 1977, the true measure of the state’s efforts to equalize school districts’ fiscal abilities was not the state equalization level of $31.92, but rather was $21.07 per pupil per mill — the result of subtracting the minimum guarantee per pupil per mill ($10.85) from the level of state equalization aid per pupil per mill ($31.92). Only those school districts incapable of raising $21.07 or more per pupil per mill in 1977 were “equalized” with other districts fully capable of raising that amount or more, and the extent of “equalization” was only up to the level of $21.07. Districts fully capable *1045of raising $21.07 or more per pupil per mill nevertheless received the minimum guarantee money of $10.85 per pupil per mill and, to that extent, inter-district fiscal disparity was exacerbated in inverse proportion to actual need. Likewise, in 1978 the true measure of the state’s equalization effort was $23.65 per pupil per mill — the result of subtracting the minimum guarantee per pupil per mill in 1978 ($11.35) from the level of state equalization aid per pupil per mill in 1978 ($35.00).
Colorado school districts vary widely in the amount of revenue per pupil per mill generated by the same mill rate, even with state assistance, and this variation is positively related to district wealth or assessed valuation per pupil. While state financial assistance to property-poor school districts to some extent alleviates the disparities which result from wide variations in assessed wealth per pupil among the school districts, substantial differentials remain in the revenue available in districts and, consequently, in the level of educational expenditures. State financial assistance is simply inadequate to offset inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases. Variations in local assessable property wealth have caused, and are continuing to cause, substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil among school districts, including the sixteen school districts in which the plaintiff schoolchildren reside. In fact, the sixteen school districts of the plaintiff schoolchildren spend substantially less money per pupil than many other school districts in the state.
D. The Relationship Between School District Ability to Increase Expenditures and Local Taxable Wealth
Some school districts in the state, including the sixteen school districts of plaintiff schoolchildren, lack the fiscal ability significantly to exceed their authorized revenue bases even if the State School District Budget Review Board might authorize an increase. Under the statutory system of public school finance, an increase in an authorized revenue base must be funded in the first year solely out of local revenue sources. To the extent that school districts vary widely in their local taxable wealth per pupil, to that same extent they vary in their fiscal ability to fund increases in authorized revenue bases. For example, in 1977 the amount of revenue per pupil per mill obtained from tax levies on local property varied among school districts from $4.20 in Fountain School District to $326.27 in Rangely School District. A high-wealth district such as Rangely, with an assessed valuation of $326,269 per pupil in 1977 and $339,677 per pupil in 1978, is able to fund a $100 per pupil increase in its authorized revenue base with an additional mill levy of only 0.3 mills, while a low-wealth district, such as South Conejos with an assessed valuation of $5,898 per pupil in 1977 and $6,012 in 1978, would be required to increase its mill levy by approximately 17 mills to raise the same $100 per pupil.
Subsequent to 1973 high-wealth districts have received larger increases in dollar amounts in authorized revenue bases from the State School District Budget Review Board than low-wealth districts. Additionally, high-wealth districts have experienced equally greater success in obtaining electorate approval of increases in authorized revenue bases. Although the amount of money raised locally is to some extent the product of the willingness of local residents to tax themselves, as a practical matter school districts with a small tax base simply cannot raise their mill rates to the level necessary to match the authorized revenue bases attainable by the more wealthy districts with less onerous tax efforts on the part of these wealthy districts. South Conejos School District, for example, in the first year of an increase would have had to raise its mill rate of 35 mills by 142 additional mills in order to raise its 1977 authorized revenue base of $1,057 to the $1,897 level enjoyed by Summit School District at a mill rate of only 18 mills. The practical consequence of requiring a low-wealth district to pay for an increase in its authorized revenue base solely out of local tax revenue in the first year of such increase is that the low-wealth district is curtailed, if not out-*1046rightly prevented, from pursuing a higher quality educational program for its students and from making significant choices in its curriculum and total educational program.
Local district wealth also significantly impacts on the two primary methods of funding capital outlay, the capital reserve and bond redemption funds. Both funds are financed entirely out of local tax revenues. The capital reserve fund is subject to a statutory maximum tax levy of 4 mills. High-wealth districts can raise more revenue for the statutory maximum of 4 mills than can low-wealth districts, even with the same capital reserve tax rate. In 1977, Frisco School District, with a tax levy of 4 mills, raised $386.52 per pupil for its capital reserve fund, while South Conejos School District, for the same 4 mill levy, raised only $23.60 per pupil. In 1977, the top ten percent of the school districts, in terms of assessed valuation per pupil, levied at an average capital reserve tax rate of 3.51, which yielded an average of $254.79 per pupil or $72.59 per pupil per mill. By contrast, the bottom ten percent of the districts, in terms of assessed valuation per pupil, levied at an average capital reserve tax rate of 3.50 and raised an average of $28.68 per pupil, which is $8.01 per pupil per mill. Eliminating the extremely high and extremely low districts in terms of assessed valuation per pupil, the districts at the second decile levied at an average capital reserve rate of 3.01 for an average yield of $117.76 per pupil, which is $39.12 per pupil per mill. The districts at the ninth decile levied at an average capital reserve tax rate of 3.67 for an average yield of $40.16 per pupil, which is $10.95 per pupil per mill.
The bond redemption fund is utilized to pay off a districts bonded indebtedness for long-term capital needs. Bonded indebtedness must be approved by the electorate in each district and is limited by statute to twenty percent of a district’s assessed valuation. Under the statutory structure, high-wealth districts are more capable than low-wealth districts of assuming and financing a greater level of indebtedness for capital improvements. For example, South Cone-jos School District with 782 students had a debt ceiling of $935,020 for 1977 and $954,-452 for 1978, while Granby School District with 838 students had a debt ceiling of $8,173,380 for 1977 and $8,833,818 for 1978 —a ratio of approximately one to nine.
Generally, low-wealth districts have higher bond redemption tax rates than high-wealth districts but produce far less revenue per pupil for each mill levy. In 1977, the school districts at the highest decile in terms of assessed valuation per pupil levied at an average bond redemption rate of 3.33 for an average yield of $206.81 per pupil, or $62.11 per pupil per mill. By contrast, school districts at the lowest decile in terms of assessed valuation per pupil levied at an average rate of 8.04 for a yield of $61.62 per pupil, or $7.66 per pupil per mill. Eliminating the high and low extremes, those districts in the second decile levied at an average bond redemption tax rate of 3.53 for a yield of $130.41 per pupil, or $36.94 per pupil per mill. Those districts in the ninth decile levied at an average bond redemption tax rate of 8.44 for a yield of $91.96 per pupil, or $10.90 per pupil per mill.
F. The Effect of Subsequent Amendments to the Public School Finance Act (Senate Bills 138 and 25) on the System of Educational Finance for Colorado’s Schoolchildren
Senate Bill 138, Colo.Sess.Laws 1977, Vol. I, ch. 264 at 1063-69, was enacted in 1977 and was directed to school district funding for 1978. It increased state equalization aid per pupil per mill to $35.00 in 1978, and increased the minimum guarantee to $11.35 per pupil per mill in 1978. The bill also granted districts with high concentrations of children from low-income families additional aid of $125.00 for every low-income child in excess of fifteen percent of the total district attendance entitlement, and to this extent implicitly recognized the negative effect of personal poverty on educational achievement. However, since the bill primarily addressed educational funding for 1978, it is a stopgap only and does not significantly affect the overall framework of public school finance.
*1047Senate Bill 25, Colo.Sess.Laws 1978, ch. 69 at 369-74, is much broader in scope than Senate Bill 138. It raises state equalization aid to $42.25 per pupil per mill in 1979, and to $45.85 in 1980. The minimum guarantee is raised to $12.35 in 1979 and $13.35 thereafter, except for districts with mill rates at twenty or less, in which case the minimum guarantee remains at $11.35 per pupil per mill. With respect to authorized revenue bases, Senate Bill 25 permits, but does not require, each district to attain specified levels for 1979 through 1981: $1400 in 1979, with a permitted increase of at least $130 to all districts including those with authorized revenue bases in excess of $1400; $1600 in 1980, with an increase of at least $140 for all districts including those with authorized revenue bases in excess of $1600; and $1800 in 1981, with an increase of at least $150 for all districts including those with authorized revenue bases in excess of $1800. In 1982 all districts will be permitted to increase their authorized revenue base by $160 per pupil, and after 1982 an annual increase of seven percent is authorized, unless the law is changed in the interim by the General Assembly.
Assuming no increases in authorized revenue bases are permitted by the State School District Budget Review Board or by the local electorate, and further assuming that all low-wealth districts choose to spend at the levels authorized by Senate Bill 25, the application of the bill to current funding patterns will result in a reduction in spending disparities between districts with high and low authorized revenue bases of $246 per pupil from 1979 to 1982. Under present funding conditions the range of increase in authorized revenue bases in 1979 varies under Senate Bill 25 from $130 per pupil for high-spending districts to $266 per pupil for the lowest-spending district in 1978. This range of increase results in a net reduction in disparity of $136 per pupil. In 1980, Senate Bill 25 will permit an increase from $140 to $200 per pupil, a net reduction in disparity of $60 per pupil. In 1981, increases in authorized revenue bases under Senate Bill 25 will range from $150 to $200, a further net reduction in disparity of $50 per pupil. In 1982, all districts will receive the same increase, so that no reduction in absolute spending disparities will occur in that year. Beginning in 1983 and thereafter, Senate Bill 25 permits authorized revenue bases for all districts to increase by seven percent. At this point of implementation authorized revenue bases actually will become more disparate for the obvious reason that a seven percent increase will result in a larger dollar increase for a high-spending district than for a lower-spending district. For example, a district with an authorized revenue base of $3000 in 1983 would receive a $210 increase, while a district with an authorized revenue base of $2000 would receive only a $140 increase. Thus, beginning in 1983, it can reasonably be expected that, absent countervailing legislation, spending disparities will once again increase and thereby vitiate the disparity reduction wrought by Senate Bill 25 in the preceding years.
Furthermore, Senate Bill 25 does not require school districts to spend at the authorized revenue base levels established for the years 1979 through 1983. School districts are free to spend at a lower level and consequently enjoy a lower mill rate than would be required for the permitted statutory level. If low-wealth districts choose to spend at levels lower than those authorized by Senate Bill 25, then any reduction in current spending disparities achieved by Senate Bill 25 will be neutralized, at least to the extent of the difference between the spending level authorized by statute and the lower spending level selected by the district.
While Senate Bill 25 will reduce current spending disparities by a maximum of $246 per pupil from 1979 tc 1983, one cannot accurately predict authorized revenue bases after 1980. Under the present statutory scheme, funding for state equalization aid will remain constant after 1980, at least in the absence of any further legislation. If funding for state equalization aid does remain constant, then low-wealth districts will be required to raise their mill rates substantially in order to receive permitted *1048authorized revenue base increases. If low-wealth districts do not raise their mill rates to the level necessary to reach the permitted authorized revenue bases, then the maximum possible reduction in current spending disparities of $246 per pupil will not occur under Senate Bill 25.
Assessment of the extent to which Senate Bill 25 reduces current spending disparities can be more accurately gauged when the period of assessment is limited to the years 1979 and 1980. During these years the maximum possible reduction in current spending disparities between the highest and lowest spending districts in the state will be $196 per pupil ($136 in 1979 and $60 in 1980). This calculation assumes that no increases in authorized revenue bases are approved by the State School District Budget Review Board or by the local electorate, and further assumes that all low-wealth districts choose to spend at the authorized revenue base levels permitted by Senate Bill 25 in 1979 and 1980. However, while Senate Bill 25 might well achieve a reduction of $196 in current spending disparities during the period of 1979-80, nevertheless significant differences in actual spending will continue to exist among school districts. For in spite of the ameliorative effects of Senate Bill 25 in reducing disparity, local district taxable wealth will remain unaffected and will continue to be strongly correlative to school district fiscal potential and spending ability.
In 1977, school districts at the highest decile in terms of assessed valuation per pupil had an average authorized revenue base of $1950. On the other hand, school districts at the lowest decile in terms of assessed valuation per pupil had an average authorized revenue base of $1153. The difference between these two levels of districts was $797 per pupil. In 1980, the difference in authorized revenue bases between the highest and lowest deciles of districts will be $750 per pupil, a net reduction of only $47 per pupil. Thus, considered by themselves, increases in minimum authorized revenue bases under Senate Bill 25 will not eliminate the wealth-related spending disparities which presently exist among districts.
Additionally, Senate Bill 25 does not change the requirement that a school district must pay for any authorized revenue base increase solely out of local property tax revenues in the first year of such increases. The maximum reduction in current spending disparities affected by Senate Bill 25 for the years 1979 to 1980 — $196 per pupil — may never occur if high-wealth, high-spending districts increase their authorized revenue bases at a faster rate than low-wealth districts. Senate Bill 25 does not prohibit high-wealth districts from increasing their authorized revenue bases, and if wealthy districts increase their authorized revenue bases, the spending disparities currently existing between high-wealth and low-wealth districts will be further widened.
On a practical level a formidable incentive exists for wealthy districts to seek increases in their authorized revenue bases for the next few years. The increases provided in Senate Bill 25 most probably will fall below threadbare inflationary increases as gauged by current economic trends. For example, in 1980 the $140 per pupil increase in authorized revenue bases will amount to a seven percent increase for a district spending at $2,000 per pupil. However, for a district spending at the level of $2,500 per pupil, the $140 per pupil increase will amount only to a 5.6 percent increase, thereby forcing that district either to cut back programs or to seek an increase in its authorized revenue base from the State School District Budget Review Board or its local electorate.
The long and short of the matter of school district funding under Senate Bill 25 is that the spending patterns of school districts after 1980 are conjectural at best. Those patterns are dependent on legislative action or inaction with respect to state equalization aid, the rate of increase in assessed valuation, the chosen response of districts to the post-1980 status of statutory equalization aid, and the continuation or cessation of present inflationary trends.
. In n.7 of its opinion the majority says “(Fundamental rights are essentially those rights which have been recognized as having a value essential to individual liberty in our society.” The majority does not make explicit whether this test is meant to state a Colorado constitutional standard. In any event it makes no use of this test in the analysis leading to its conclusion that the right to education is non-fundamental.
. Justice Marshall, in dissent, makes the point that this formulation of the test is too narrow to explain the United States Supreme Court’s holdings that the right to procreate, the right to vote in state elections, and the right to appeal from a criminal conviction enjoy protection against discriminatory state treatment. 411 U.S. at 100, 93 S.Ct. at 1331, 36 L.Ed.2d at 82. Others have criticized the test as too broad. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973).
.The majority notes, and correctly so, that the Colorado Constitution “is not a grant of power to the legislature, but that the legislature is invested with plenary power for all the purposes of civil government, and that the constitution is but a limitation upon that power.” People ex rel. Rhodes v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553, 563, 16 P. 298, 303 (1887). Accord, e.g., People in the Interest of Y. D. M., 197 Colo. 403, 593 P.2d 1356 (1979). While the United States *1034Constitution is the source of federal governmental powers, which the majority apparently concludes is the basis for characterizing rights explicitly or implicitly recognized in that document as fundamental, the Colorado Constitution extends to matters not deemed fundamental. For that reason, the majority rejects the “Rodriguez test” of fundamentality. It does not follow, however, that the degree of importance assigned to a right by Colorado constitutional provisions is irrelevant to fundamentality for equal protection purposes simply because mention of the right in the constitution is not conclusive that it is fundamental. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a more reliable indicator of a right’s importance than the dignity assigned to it by the State Constitution.
. Some state courts have found the right to education to be fundamental for the purpose of considering the protections to be accorded this right under their own constitutions. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va.1979); Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Hot Springs School District No. One v. Washakie County School District No. One, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980). Additional cases, some holding education to be a fundamental right under a state constitution and others holding to be contrary, are collected at n. 11 of the majority opinion.
. In his dissent in Rodriguez Justice Marshall argues convincingly that the United States Supreme Court’s approach has been even more flexible: “A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.” 411 U.S. at 98-99, 93 S.Ct. at 1330, 36 L.Ed.2d at 81. Justice White’s dissent in Rodriguez, ostensibly applying a test of mere rationality, introduces an unaccustomed rigor into that test and serves as an exhibit to support Justice Marshall’s “spectrum of standards” reading of the Court’s decisions.
Oregon has adopted an approach similar to that suggested by Justice Marshall in evaluating impairment of educational rights under the equal protection clause of its constitution. Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976); see generally, Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 62 N.J. at 491-92, 303 A.2d at 282 (expressing disapproval of a mechanical approach to the delicate balancing of interests necessary in this context).
. Under Colorado law, “categorical programs” include the education of handicapped children, vocational educational aid, small attendance center aid, and transportation aid. Section 22-50-101.5, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.).
. The number of pupils is determined by a prescribed counting method, the result of which is the “attendance entitlement.” See section 22-50-104, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.).
. The appellants also urge that educational needs vary among the districts. The majority does not justify the school financing plan on this basis. Nor could it reasonably do so in view of the following findings of the trial court: The educational needs of schoolchildren vary to some degree among school districts because of geographical, ecological, social, and economic factors. However, prior to and since the enactment of the Public School Finance Act of 1973, neither the General Assembly nor the Colorado Department of Education has undertaken to formulate the ingredients of a thorough and uniform education for all students throughout the state, either as related to or independent of local needs. Nor has there been undertaken any analysis of what are the variant educational needs of school children throughout the state. Consequently, gross uncertainty exists with respect to the relationship between educational cost differentials among school districts and the satisfaction of variant educational needs. Both the Public School Finance Act of 1973 and the related statutory structure pertaining to the capital reserve and bond redemption funding fail to define or formulate any overt program substantially related to the satisfaction of the variant needs of school children throughout the state.
. Colo.Const. Art. IX, § 15 provides in pertinent part, “[The local boards of education] shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.” By negative implication, Colo.Const. Art. IX, § 16 also treats one aspect of local administrative control: “Neither the general assembly nor the state board of education shall have power to prescribe textbooks to be used in the public schools.”
. The majority’s statements about the beneficent results of local control could have been made only by ignoring or casting aside the trial court’s findings of fact. The majority states, e.g., “The use of local taxes affords a school district the freedom to devote more money toward educating its children than is otherwise available in the state-guaranteed minimum amount.” And, “local control provides each district with the opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.” The freedom and opportunity so extolled are denied to school districts with low assessed valuations by reason of the lack of funds necessary for their enjoyment, as the trial court so clearly found. The majority’s only allusion to this deprivation is to dismiss it as an unimportant deviation from perfection.
. The constitutionality of school finance schemes under state constitutional requirements of various degrees of similarity to Colo. Const. Art. IX, § 2 has been tested in numerous state courts with differing results. See Pauley v. Kelly, 225 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va.1979). For a summary of the state constitutional provisions and the courts’ interpretations of them, see generally, Developments in the Law — The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1444-1463 (1982).
. The majority states:
. .. Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution is satisfied if thorough and uniform educational opportunities are available through state action in each school district. ... this constitutional provision does not prevent a local school district from providing additional educational opportunities beyond this standard. (Emphasis added.)
. A possible partial formulation of the right that would give effect to both state and local responsibilities is “the right to require that the school district in which the child lives have the power to obtain revenues per pupil equal to those obtainable in other local school districts.” This standard might be refined to reflect differences in costs among districts.
. A correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of the degree of association between two variables. Correlations may range from -1.0, a perfect negative correlation (meaning that as one variable increases, the other decreases), to + 1.0, a perfect positive correlation (meaning as one variable increases, so does the other). A zero correlation would imply no relationship at all between the two variables. Generally speaking, positive correlations ranging from 0.0 to 0.3 are considered low, 0.3 to 0.6 moderate, and 0.6 to 0.9 high. (This footnote is not part of the trial court’s findings.)
In the 1974 ARB ranking, several school districts which had identical ARBs of $750.00 are ranked from 166-181 in alphabetical sequence by the Colorado Department of Education.