concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the court’s conclusion that the statutory bar should not be invoked against Western Modular (WM). I do not agree, however, that Industrial Power & Light (IPL) should be barred. I address the latter issue first.
I. Application of the Statutory Bar to Industrial Power & Light
In view of the court’s pronouncement that the statutory bar is not to be given an expansive reading, or a broad and liberal construction, I think its application to IPL is incorrect.
The statutory provision which imposes the bar reads as follows:
Sec. 08.18.151. Legal actions by contractor. No person acting in the capacity of a contractor may bring an action in a court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of work or for breach of a contract for which registration is required under this *300chapter without alleging and proving that he was a registered contractor at the time he contracted for the performance of the work.
Thus, to avoid the bar, registration must be effected, not at “the beginning of [the contractor’s] undertaking to accomplish the project it had planned,” as the majority apparently rules, but rather “at the time he contracted for the performance of the work,” with “the work” referring back to the clause “work ... for which registration is required under this chapter.”1
This specification of the point as of which registration must be accomplished is important, since the statute creates a severe forfeiture and as such “should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to exact statutory penalties and in favor of persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed.” 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 59.02, 59.03 (4th ed. 1974). It lets potential or incipient contractors know when they must obtain registration — i. e., before they can execute any contract for the performance of work covered by the chapter. This leaves them free to engage in any preliminary planning and/or exploratory work, up until the point at which they execute with another party a contract for the performance of work covered by the chapter. This makes sense in terms of the statutory purpose, in that it is these other parties to the contract whom the statute seeks to protect against unscrupulous or incompetent contractors. Thus, the question is whether IPL contracted for the performance of work for which registration is required under the statute, prior to September 30, 1975 (at which point IPL obtained a license).2
To find that IPL did contract for the performance of work, work for which registration would be required under the chapter, prior to September 30,1975, the superi- or court would have to find either that (1) IPL contracted for the performance of work for which registration is required in the contract of August 1, 1975, between itself and WM; or (2) IPL contracted for the performance of such work in some other contract, presumably with its own customers, prior to September 30, 1975. There does not appear to be sufficient support in the record to warrant summary judgment based upon this second option (i.e., there is a genuine issue as to this material fact); and the majority specifically adopts the first option.
Thus, the bar imposed against IPL because it could not prove that “[it] was a registered contractor at the time [it] contracted for the performance of the work” must be based on the August 1, 1975, contract. Although this contract clearly involves construction-type activities, they are all obligations imposed on WM. It strikes me as meaningless to require one party to a contract to register based on the other party’s contractual obligations; in my view such an interpretation would require any purchaser of contractors’ services (e. g., a *301private home-buyer) to register.3 Thus, IPL’s registration requirement must be based on IPL’s contractual obligations.4
It is clear that no registration requirement was imposed on IPL by virtue of the provisions of the August 1, 1975, contract. As IPL points out, had it decided to place the units in Oregon rather than Alaska, WM would have had no cause of action against IPL for breach of contract; and, in such a case, registration in Alaska would have been entirely unnecessary. Thus, the August 1, 1975, contract did not require IPL to render any performance or do any contractor s work in Alaska for which registration would be a prerequisite.5
The superior court did not make any findings to the contrary.6 Its ruling was apparently based on the theory that, regardless of whether IPL entered into any contractual commitment to perform work for which registration would be required, registration *302was required because of IPL’s plan or “purpose.” This is implicitly accepted by the treatment given the issue in the majority opinion. I think it is an overbroad statement that the contract between WM and IPL required IPL to register merely because it “was certainly the beginning of Industrial Power’s undertaking to accomplish the project it had planned.” Unless there was some reason, in the contract itself, why, in the event registration was denied, IPL could not modify or abort the project without breaching its contractual commitments, then such a statement seriously impinges on the flexibility of business decision-makers. It is reasonable to require registration prior to a contractor’s making any contractual commitments to do the type of work for which registration is required; it is not reasonable to impose such a requirement, without any contractual commitment to do such work having been made, on the basis of an out-of-state purchase or a plan for a particular project. Such a rule is too vague for practicable enforcement. To be on the safe side, prospective out-of-state contractors would have to register prior to doing any preliminary planning, and this would unduly discourage commerce with Alaska. The requirement of a contractual commitment provides a much more definite and concrete point for the imposition of the registration requirement, and thus makes sense in terms of policy and enforceability considerations, as well as being in accordance with the language of the statute.
II. Application of the Statutory Bar to Western Modular
Although I concur in the majority’s conclusion as to the eighth exception to AS 08.18.161 as applied to WM, I wish to add a few observations which I think compel the result reached by the court.
I do not think that the result can be explained on the basis of case law alone. There is, I think, a significant difference between the products involved in the Stein-brenner7 and Achttien8 cases cited in the majority opinion (doors, trim, plywood, and cabinets in Steinbrenner, and doors, door jambs, valances, handrails, and cabinets in Achttien) and an entire prefabricated house. As the superior court found, “Western Modular did not supply just windows, doors, lumber, and things of that nature .... It supplied a complete house .... ”
Similarly, there are significant differences between the statutes in the cases relied upon by the court and the one involved here. For example, the new Arizona statute (noted in footnote 8 of the majority opinion) exempts from registration materi-almen or manufacturers of finished products, materials, or articles of merchandise who do not install them. The Alaska statute exempts a person “who only furnished materials, supplies or equipment without fabricating them into, or consuming them in the performance of, the work of the contractor.” I think a prefabricated house is easily classified as a “finished product” under the Arizona statute, but I have more problems classifying it as “materials, supplies or equipment” under the Alaska statute. And I can accept the proposition that WM did not “install” the house under the Arizona statute, but it is less explainable how WM prefabricated the houses “without fabricating them” under the wording of the Alaska statute.
Last, I think that the usefulness of similar statutes and prior case law is limited by the imprecision in the use of the word “prefabricate.” My reading of the word’s definition is that it can refer either to a house completely assembled prior to transport or a house transported in component sections and assembled on-site.9
*303Especially in light of the lower court’s findings of fact,10 under which WM would seem to be required to register, I think a fuller explanation should be forthcoming as to why we find on these facts that it was not required to do so.
I think that neither the case law nor the wording of the statute compels a conclusion either way in this case. I can only reach a conclusion by examining the policy tensions underlying this case.
The policy to be served by bringing WM within the scope of the statutory bar — i. e., excluding WM from the exemption — is fairly clear from prior case law. The policy of the statute is to protect the public by ensuring competence and financial responsibility in contractors. Sumner Development Corp. v. Shivers, 517 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1974). That the public should be protected from on-site incompetent or irresponsible electricians installing wiring, plumbers installing faucets, carpenters installing wallboard, etc., but not be protected from the same professionals performing the same work off-site, is a distinction without merit as far as protection of the public goes.
On the other hand, the distinction may be given merit by policies apparent from the perspective of firms in WM’s position. If such a firm enters into a contract for the sale of a “prefabricated” product like the one involved here, it may not be a good policy to impose a requirement that the firm be registered as a contractor in every state to which the product may be shipped by its buyer. The unduly burdensome nature of such a requirement, and drastic nature of the sanction for non-compliance (forfeiture of claims and defenses), would place an unwarranted damper on technological development and growth in this area.
My suggestion is that resolution of these conflicting policies be made by resort to the particular contract. If the contract specifies that the prefabricated products are to be used in a particular area, and the selling firm’s warranty or other contractual provisions clearly contemplate on-site work, then the firm may reasonably be expected to ascertain and comply with the applicable requirements and regulations for conducting such operations in that area. If, on the *304other hand, the contract does not specify a particular location for the placement of the prefabricated product, or no contractual provision reasonably contemplates on-site work by the seller, then no duty to ascertain and comply would attach to the seller.
In this case, the contract did not specify that the homes were to be located in Fairbanks, and additionally a provision put the onus of compliance with local building codes on IPL. As such, I think the court’s conclusion is correct.
Thus, I concur in the court’s conclusion that the statutory bar should not be invoked against Western Modular, but I dissent from the conclusion that the statutory bar is to be invoked against Industrial Power & Light. I would bar neither party and let the litigation proceed accordingly.
. The “work” which brings a person within the definition of contractor, i. e., for which registration is required, is “a project to construct, alter, repair, move or demolish a building, highway, road, railroad, or any type of fixed structure, including excavation and site development and erection of scaffolding,” according to the definition of “contractor” in AS 08.18.171(2).
. Because of the wording of the statute, and because of the statutory interpretation principles noted above, these two requirements should be read in the conjunctive — i. e., the court must find both that there was a contract for the performance of work executed prior to September 30, 1975, and that the work under the contract was such that registration would be required under the chapter. Under this interpretation, if construction work is being done, but there is as of yet no contract, express or implied, between two parties covering the performance of this work, then no registration is required. Indeed, this is made explicit in AS 08.18.161(11), which exempts from the registration requirement “a person working on his own property, whether occupied by him or not, and a person working on his own residence, whether owned by him or not.” Conversely, if there is a contract between two parties, but it does not require a party to perform work of the type covered by the chapter, then again registration is not required. This latter situation is presented here.
. Again, this policy is manifested by an explicit exemption from the registration requirement for “an owner who contracts for a project with a registered contractor.” AS 08.18.161(10).
. The majority states, it cannot be argued that a builder who buys supplies without incurring any contractual obligations to the supplier to perform work is exempt from the duty of registration. This conclusion only flows, I think, if one assumes that there is some other reason why the builder should have registered under AS 08.18.151 — i. e., that the builder has entered into some contract, presumably with a consumer, to perform some sort of construction work in Alaska for which registration is required. If that were the case, then the builder would be required to register, and as such, would not be able to bring an action against a supplier on a contract entered into during that period when registration was required, since the statute is to protect suppliers as well as consumers.
However, without some independent reason why the builder should register under AS 08.-18.151, there is in my view no basis to assert that “It cannot be argued that such a builder is exempt from the duty of registration.” If an Argentinian builder had bought the homes from WM for placement in Argentina, he would have bought construction materials without incurring a contractual obligation to his supplier to perform work, and he would argue quite persuasively that he did not have to register under AS 08.18.151.
The hypothetical the majority uses to support its position contains several flaws in reasoning. Initially, if the builder intends to do all the installation work and utilize no subcontractors, then why is not that builder exempt under AS 08.18.161(11) (“a person working on his own property, whether occupied by him or not”)? In such a case IPL will suffer from its own shoddy or irresponsible workmanship.
The exemption noted by the majority [AS 08.18.161(13)] exempts “an owner who acts as his own subcontractor and in doing so ... hires subcontractors.” Thus, by the majority’s own suppositions, if the builder hired no subcontractors, then that exemption would, by its terms, be inapplicable. That being the case, it is inaccurate to say that this hypothetical would, under the rule 1 would adopt, exceed the limitations of this exemption; it is not subject to the exemption. Even if the hypothetical is modified so that the builder does hire subcontractors, the rule I would adopt would not remove the registration requirement. I think that a contract between a contractor and a subcontractor for work in Alaska commits both parties to a contract for which registration is required; and if one of the parties could not prove it was registered at the time it so contracted, it would be barred, assuming that more than one building per year is involved.
. I can envision at least one circumstance under which the August 1, 1975, contract might have required registration by IPL. WM gave, under the contract, a warranty for its materials and workmanship. If IPL used the homes in some way not contemplated by the contract, then this might afford WM a defense to IPL’s claim under the warranty. As such, if the contract specified that the homes were for use in Fairbanks, and it was clear that WM needed to rely on this location in its agreement to repair under the warranty, but IPL subsequently shipped the homes to Micronesia where WM did not have sufficient facilities and personnel to back up its warranty, then I think it is clear that WM would have a good defense to a warranty claim by IPL. Under such circumstances, the August 1, 1975, contract could be read as one in which IPL contracted for the performance of work for which registration is required — i. e., placement of the homes in Fairbanks, Alaska. However, the August 1, 1975, contract does not specify the eventual destination of the homes, and the warranty is not linked to any particular location.
. The superior court did find that IPL had undertaken construction of footings and basements as well as site preparation prior to the time it became a registered contractor. There is no indication that IPL was contractually committed to perform this work. If it were, then registration was required; but if it were not, then it was performing its own work on its own land, and thus, registration was not required under AS 08.18.161(11).
. Steinbrenner v. J. A. Waterbury Constr. Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 661, 28 Cal.Rptr. 204 (1963).
. Harbor Millwork, Inc. v. Achttien, 6 Wash. App. 808, 496 P.2d 978 (1972).
.Webster’s New World Dictionary (College Ed. 1966) gives two definitions to the word “prefabricate”:
(1) to fabricate beforehand. [“Fabricate” is defined in the same dictionary as “(1) to make; build; construct; manufacture. (2) to *303make or build by assembling parts: as, we fabricate engines.”]
(2) to make or build in standardized sections for shipment and quick assembly, as a house.
The first definition would indicate that the assembly was accomplished by WM prior to transfer to IPL; the second would indicate that the component parts of the houses were given to IPL, for on-site assembly.
. The superior court’s opinion stated it was: convinced that Western Modular cannot fit within the [AS 08.18.161(8)] exceptions. Western Modular did not supply just windows, doors, lumber, and things of that nature, which might qualify it as a material-man. It supplied a complete house, knowing full well that the house furnished would be affixed to a foundation in Fairbanks, Alaska, and become a permanent structure.
In addition, Western Modular performed design services for the houses, prepared plat plans showing the setting of a particular house on a particular lot. In connection with other sales of their modular houses within the State of Alaska, Western Modular provided their own employees to assist in the erection of the houses. The original contract between the parties required Western Modular to perform warranty services and it obligated itself to making repairs for any aspect of the unit which was defective. Leonard Bray, an employee of Western Modular, actually did work on the foundations, shimming them up so that they would be ready to receive the house at the actual site in Fairbanks. George Sullivan ... verified that Western Modular was obligated to do “on-site warranty work.” Employees of Western Modular made specific recommendations regarding modifications of the subject units, particularly with reference to the split-entry and the amount of insulation to be installed. Furthermore, he prepared plans for the erection of a basement to go into these particular units, i. e., the foundations.
The foregoing considerations, although they tend to strengthen the defendant’s position that Western Modular was in fact a contractor, are essentially immaterial to the Court’s decision. The thing that is material is that Western Modular built the entire home; it did not provide lumber, nails, electrical equipment, heating and plumbing to be installed in a structure by someone else— they fabricated the entire home themselves, and it makes little difference that Industrial Power & Light actually took the completed home and placed it on the permanent foundation.