concurring specially. The second division of this opinion deals with two exceptions to the charge of the court by plaintiff, the gist of the complaints being that the trial court was in effect instructing the jury that a verdict for defendant might be rendered if the custodian of the minor child (baby-sitter), or the minor child (plaintiff) created a condition which became the sole proximate cause of the injuries. It is urged that the minor plaintiff was too young to be liable for negligence; and the custodian’s negligence was not chargeable to the minor plaintiff. However, defendant’s answer specially pleads "accident” as a defense, and there was evidence to support same. My view of the case is that the language used by the trial judge in his charge is equivalent to charging that plaintiff could not recover if the injuries were the result of an accident. See Code § 102-103; Savannah Electric Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559 (4a) (64 SE 680); He-Po Gas Incorporated v. Roath, 87 Ga. App. 827 (6) (75 SE2d 451); Young Men’s Christian Assn. v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 701 (146 SE2d 324).