(dissenting) — The majority frames the issue as "whether the city ordinance conflicts with a general state law and is thus unconstitutional as applied under Const, art. 11, § 11." It finds it does. Therefore, the City loses. I do not, however, think it is that easy. As we have observed on numerous occasions, a statute will not be construed as taking away the power of a municipality to legislate unless this intent is clearly, expressly and unambiguously stated. State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett District Justice Court, 92 Wn.2d 106, 594 P.2d 448 (1979). Any seeming conflict must be harmonized, if possible. Ayers v. Tacoma, 6 Wn.2d 545, 554, 108 P.2d 348 (1940).
It is conceded the City has the power to preserve landmarks. The question is whether RCW 28B.20.392(2)(b)(ii), enacted in 1969, takes this power away from the City as it relates to buildings in the Metropolitan Tract, and if there appears to be a conflict between the City and State whether it can be harmonized. Clearly, the statute does not expressly deprive the City of its power, nor can the power granted to the Board of Regents be said to be unambiguous. While the power to deal with the Metropolitan Tract is *168given to the Board of Regents, this does not necessarily mean that the Board of Regents is free from the requirements of local government any more than other proprietors in downtown Seattle. The exercise of the police power by Seattle does not conflict with the power of the Board of Regents. See Seattle v. Long, 61 Wn.2d 737, 380 P.2d 472 (1963). Furthermore, even if it is contended, as does the majority, that RCW 28B.20.392(2)(b)(ii) standing alone gives full power to the Board of Regents "to raze, reconstruct, alter, remodel or add to existing buildings", and thus deprives the City of any power, the statute cannot be read in isolation.
Since enacting RCW 28B.20.392(2)(b)(ii), the legislature in specific and unambiguous terms has passed legislation relative to historic preservation. In 1977 the legislature declared:
The legislature hereby finds that the promotion, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of structures,.sites, districts, buildings, and objects of historic, archaeological, architectural, and cultural significance is desirable in the interest of the public pride and general welfare of the people of the state; and the legislature further finds that the economic, cultural, and aesthetic standing of the state can be maintained and enhanced by protecting the heritage of the state and by preventing the destruction or defacement of these assets; therefore, it is hereby declared by the legislature to be the public policy and in the public interest of the state to designate, preserve, protect, enhance, and perpetuate those structures, sites, districts, buildings, and objects which reflect outstanding elements of the state's historic, archaeological, architectural, or cultural heritage, for the inspiration and enrichment of the citizens of the state.
RCW 43.51A.010. In 1971 the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) became law. It has as one of its goals the " Preservation of] important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage". RCW 43.21C-.020(2)(d). SEPA further .directs that the "laws of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter" *169(RCW 43.21C.030(1)), and for all public bodies, including municipal corporations, to review their regulations and ordinances to ensure full compliance with the purposes and provisions of SEPA. RCW 43.21C.040. The legislature further provided in RCW 43.21C.060 that "The policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of all branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties". (Italics mine.) See Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn.2d 271, 276, 525 P.2d 774 (1974).
Read together with the specific policy declaration of the legislature in RCW 43.51A.010 and RCW 43.21C.020, .030, .040 and .060, it is apparent that the claimed legislative grant to the Board of Regents of absolute power is illusory. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the legislature not only did not bar the exercise of the police power of the City of Seattle as it related to the buildings in the Metropolitan Tract, but actually gave authorization and encouragement for the kind of action taken by the City.
By this analysis, the court can harmonize the statutes and give full meaning both to the 1969 statute and to subsequent environmental legislation. See Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, supra; Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).
In addition to the numerous opinions of this court, scholarly opinion also concurs that, unless there is an express limitation on the power of municipal corporations, it is better policy for this court not to preclude action by a city simply because there is a prior statute relating to the subject matter.
Such an approach in favor of the municipality does not unfairly treat the private parties regulated or the interests of the state. So far as private persons are concerned, it is to be remembered that all other attacks upon municipal ordinances, whether of a constitutional or statutory nature, are still available. The only thing being *170said is that a conflict should not be found unless it truly exists.
The purpose of the constitutional provision precluding local regulations in conflict with statutes is to assure the supremacy of the legislature. That supremacy is maintained even though the approach is in favor of the municipality on the conflict issue. The legislature can expressly make its wishes known if it does not want the municipality to act in a particular manner or if the court misconstrues the legislative intent. A construction against the municipality which is erroneous is less likely to be rectified. It would have the effect of interfering with the functioning of local government without any equivalent benefit to private parties or the state.
Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 781 (1963).
The City has chosen to exercise its police powers so as to provide for the preservation of historic buildings. There is no express legislation which exempts the Board of Regents from Seattle's landmarks ordinance; rather, the legislature has expressly encouraged such municipal action.
I dissent.