concurring specially.
I agree that this case must be transferred, but do so by taking what I consider to be a more conservative approach to the question at hand. Specifically, I choose to give appellant the benefit of every legal doubt.
*6I assume, without deciding, that the juvenile court has inherent authority as a court of record to grant new trials, and that no statutory provision is necessary to give effect to this constitutionally derived authority. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV. OCGA § 15-11-65 (b). Since appellant has sought review in this court rather than the Supreme Court, I likewise assume that the constitutional provision in question is plainly worded and not subject to construction. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1). With these assumptions made, it becomes clear that our holdings in the cases cited by the dissent must be overruled or, in the alternative, that the statutes referenced in those cases must be declared unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV. However, in my view only the Supreme Court may properly decide between these alternatives.
The dissent’s position appears to be that giving effect to the former alternative is somehow within our jurisdiction based on the common sense notion that this court should have plenary power to correct its own errors in prior opinions, regardless of their nature. However, giving appellant the benefit of every doubt serves only to demonstrate that the constitutionality of OCGA §§ 5-5-1 and 15-11-42, as those statutes have been interpreted by this court, has “been drawn into question.” Such cases are clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1). It is for this reason that I conclude this case must be transferred to the Supreme Court. It is for the same reason that I see no need to raise the much thornier question whether this is even a case requiring “constitutional construction.” See Spires v. Kim, 203 Ga. App. 302 (416 SE2d 780) (1992); Oswell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 35 (351 SE2d 221) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.