dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from Division 2 of the majority opinion. Agent Ector testified that defendant sold him cocaine in the Maple Street Park in Rome, Georgia; that a housing authority or project is located directly behind the park; and that he calculated the housing project as being within 600 to 800 feet of the area of the park where the sale occurred. He further testified that he was certain the housing project was within 1,000 feet of where the sale occurred. The agent’s testimony based on his own observations as to the existence and loca*82tion of the housing project and its distance from the park was proper and admissible. See Powell v. Jackson, 142 Ga. App. 34, 35 (234 SE2d 837) (1977); Massee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 439, 441 (1) (197 SE2d 459) (1973). I find this evidence was sufficient to allow rational jurors to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sold cocaine within 1,000 feet of the real property of the Maple Street housing project as alleged in the indictment. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). I also disagree with the majority’s implication that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the prosecution did not employ the statutorily authorized method of establishing the location of the housing project. While OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (e) provides that a certified map shall constitute prima facie evidence of the location and boundaries of a housing project, that section also provides that it “shall not preclude the prosecution from introducing or relying upon any other evidence or testimony to establish any element of this offense.” (Emphasis supplied.) Because I find the agent’s testimony was sufficient to allow rational jurors to find defendant guilty of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a housing project, I also find defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to move for a directed verdict of acquittal as to that count to be without merit.
Decided June 29, 1994 Reconsideration denied July 18, 1994 William F. Sparks, for appellant. Stephen F. Lanier, District Attorney, C. Stephen Cox, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.