dissenting: I agree with McFarland, J., that the statement of Presley that appellant “was dealing dope” was not *725admissible under K.S.A. 60-455. It was not evidence of the commission of a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion; it was not offered for the purpose of proving any of the eight factors enumerated in the statute, none of which were in substantial dispute; and there was no good, sound reason for receiving the statement into evidence under 60-455.
The statement does, however, tend to show the appellant’s disposition or inclination to violate the law; but that is a prohibited reason for admitting it under 60-455. If the statement is viewed as evidence of appellant’s character under K.S.A. 60-446 it is inadmissible since appellant did not first offer evidence of his good character and thus put it in issue. K.S.A. 60-447.
It is obvious that the statement was offered solely for impeachment. I do not find it admissible for that purpose. The statement that appellant “was dealing dope” is not contradictory to Presley’s prior testimony that the two balloons of heroin found underneath some women’s clothing in her dresser belonged to her. She said nothing in her direct testimony about appellant being or not being a dealer. Presley was a user, and thus she herself had reason to possess heroin.
Nevertheless, I do not regard the admission in evidence of this one statement as substantially prejudicing appellant’s right to a fair trial. There was no contemporaneous objection, and the trial court was given no opportunity to consider and rule on the admissibility of the statement.
The judgment should be affirmed.