The superior court judges of the Augusta Judicial Circuit on June 26,1974, delivered the following letter to the district attorney of that circuit:
"We would like to have a list of all cases pending in your office that were made since January 1, 1972.
"What we need from you is the person’s name, the charge or charges, and the date the indictment was returned or the date the case was made if the same has not been indicted.
*265"We need this information in order that we can determine our court schedule in the future.”
The district attorney did not furnish the information and by letter dated September 18,1974, the superior court requested compliance. The information was not forthcoming and on October 18, 1974, a rule nisi was issued directing the district attorney to show cause why he should not be ordered to comply. After hearing the district attorney on November 21, 1974, was ordered to furnish not later than January 17, 1975, ". . . for the organization and functioning of the court a list of all cases pending in his office made since January 1, 1972, setting forth the person’s name, the charge or charges, the date indictment was returned or the date the case was made absent indictment.” This appeal followed.
The district attorney contends the order is repugnant to the provisions of the Georgia Constitution providing for the separation of the judicial and executive functions and powers. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII (Code Ann. § 2-123).
He states, "The issue of law in this appeal is whether the superior court judges have the authority to order the district attorney of that respective judicial circuit to prepare and provide the court with a list of all cases pending in his office, indicted or otherwise, in such form as they may desire.” We do not perceive this to be the precise issue. The order of the superior court judges does not require a list of all cases pending in the district attorney’s office, indicted or otherwise. As we read the order it requires a list of cases in which an ". . . indictment was returned or ... the case was made absent indictment.” As we read the order it requires information where formal charges have been entered by indictment, accusation or warrant for arrest. It does not request information concerning investigations that may be in progress by the district attorney where neither an indictment, accusation or warrant for arrest has been issued.
The separation of powers is fundamental to our constitutional form of government. However, it does not follow that a complete separation is desirable or was intended. Most state constitutions blend these powers to a certain extent.
*266Argued February 10, 1975 Decided April 29, 1975. Richard E. Allen, District Attorney, for appellant. John F. Hardin, William M. Fleming, Jr., Edwin D. Fulcher, Franklin H. Pierce, in propria persona.The three departments of government are not kept wholly separate in the Georgia Constitution. Such is the case here. Our Constitution requires a district attorney, ". . . to perform such other services as shall be required of him by law.” Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. XI, Par. II (Code Ann. § 2-4602). One of these statutory requirements is that district attorneys are ". . . otherwise to aid the presiding judge in organizing the courts as he may require.” Code § 24-2908.3. District attorneys are also required to prosecute all indictable offenses. Code § 24-2908.4. They may not nolle prosequi a case without the consent of the court. Code § 27-1801. In certain instances the presiding judge may appoint a special prosecutor or "command the services of a district attorney of any other circuit accessible.” Code § 24-2913.
In view of the foregoing we conclude that the functions of district attorneys are not exclusively executive and that the presiding judge may call upon the district attorney to furnish the information requested here as to pending criminal cases if for no other reason than to schedule trials which we conceive to be "organizing the courts” so as to dispose of criminal matters promptly and efficiently.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Ingram, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Gunter, J., who dissents.