¶ 1 This case concerns the workers’ compensation claim of Terri Reinholtz for disability based on psychological overlay.
¶ 2 Claimant, a Wal-Mart employee, was forcefully and brutally raped by her supervisor while at work in the early working hours of February 19, 1995. The assailant-supervisor had been in the employ of Wal-Mart for over ten (10) years. Claimant was employed in an assistant customer service position at the automotive department at a Tulsa area store. Her duties included opening and closing the automotive store, securing the register and conducting inventory assessments. The rape occurred in the automotive store at Wal-Mart, on a morning when Claimant was scheduled to open the store and would have been there alone for several hours.
¶ 3 Claimant suffered a back injury during the course of the rape, when she was pinned to the wall and thrown onto the floor. Additional injuries to the head and left arm were reserved for future hearing and are not at issue in the instant cause. Claimant does not now receive treatment for her back injury, but has sought continuous treatment for her psychological overlay and a skin rash for which there is no apparent physical cause.
¶ 4 The trial court found Claimant’s back injury compensable and ordered benefits based upon Claimant’s psychological overlay claim. Wal-Mart appealed this order to a three judge panel, where the rate of compensation was modified and certain probative value objections were ruled upon, but the trial court’s order remained essentially unchanged. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the award insofar as it awarded benefits for Claimant’s psychological overlay and continuing treatment for the skin rash. This Court granted certiorari to address the issue of compensability of psychological overlay in the context of the forcible rape experienced by Claimant.
¶ 5 Claimant asserts on certiorari that rape is a physical injury, and as such the psychological disability she suffers as a result of that physical work related injury is com-pensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 6 For the reasons herein stated, we find Claimant’s rape was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and sustain the trial court’s award with regard to the psychological overlay benefits and treatment for Claimant’s skin rash.
¶ 7 The trial court’s award to Claimant with regard to her back claim was sustained by the Court of Civil Appeals and we do not disturb that award.
I. A Willful, Intentional Act as an Accidental Injury.
¶ 8 A compensable work related disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act must be the result of an accidental injury which arises out of and in the course of a claimant’s employment. 85 O.S.1992 Supp. § 3(7)(a).
¶ 9 Although the rape committed against Claimant was a willful and intentional criminal act on the part of the assailant, it is considered accidental for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
“When a willful injury is inflicted by a third party, who is the aggressor, upon a workman discharging the tasks he is engaged to perform, and the assault is not motivated solely by personal animosity, wholly disconnected from the employment, the resulting injury is regarded as accidental and as having arisen out of and in the •course of employment. Samara v. Lusk, Okl., 364 P.2d 1113, 1114; Royster v. McCoy, Okl., 293 P.2d 587; Eason Oil Co. et al. v. Neal, 166 Okl. 40, 26 P.2d 197; *225Town of Granite et al. v. Kidwell et al., Okl, 263 P.2d 184.”
Mullins v. Tanksleary, 1962 OK 239, 376 P.2d 590 (citations in original); See also Burrell v. Prewitt, 1968 OK 128, 445 P.2d 279, 280-81. The accidental nature of a -willful injury is examined from the perspective of the injured worker rather than the aggressor or assailant responsible for the injury. As a result, Claimant’s injury in the instant cause is properly viewed as an accidental injury in' the context of workers’ compensation.
¶ 10 Further, given the fact the injury was caused by an employee of the Petitioner, Wal-Mart, and that Claimant’s employment at Wal-Mart put her in greater danger than those in the general public, it is clear the injury arose out of the employment. American Management Sys. v. Burns, 1995 OK 58, 903 P.2d 288, 291; Superior Stucco v. Daniels, 1995 OK 127, 912 P.2d 317, 318.
“[Ojnly injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal but one that is reasonably connected with the conditions of employment shall be deemed to arise out of the employment.”
85 O.S.1992 Supp. § 3(7)(a). In addition, there is evidence in the record that Claimant’s assailant, who was also her supervisor, used his knowledge of the employee scheduling to attack Claimant while she was alone, and while the automotive department was closed to the public.
¶ 11 In the course of employment refers to the time, place and circumstances under which an accidental injury occurs. Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 1982 OK 120, 653 P.2d 201, 202. The incident clearly occurred in the course of Claimant’s employment, because it happened at Petitioner’s place of business, while Claimant was employed with Petitioner and engaged in tasks pursuant to her work as an employee of Petitioner.
II. Necessary Relationship Between Psychological Overlay and Physical Injury.
¶ 12 The Act requires any psychological or mental injury be accompanied by physical injury in order to receive disability benefits for a debilitating psychological condition:
“ ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ shall not include mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury.”
85 O.S.1992 Supp. § 3(7)(c).1
¶ 13 Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 1990 OK 47, 792 P.2d 60 (Okla.1990) marks one of the Court’s more recent efforts to comprehensively address the issue of com-pensable psychological overlay and its necessary relationship to work related physical injury. Fenwick predates the advent of the Legislature’s 1992 revision of § 3(7)(e), however, the lack of physical injury in Fenwick makes it unlikely that § 3(7)(c) would have been a factor even had it applied in 1990.
¶ 14 Claimant-Fenwick was a psychological assistant at the state penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma. In August 1979, Fen-wick was involved in a hostage situation at the prison where he negotiated the release of three hostages in exchange for himself. After being held for over four hours, Fenwick was released without any evidence of physical injury, in contrast to the instant case.
¶ 15 Fenwick returned to work shortly thereafter, but was eventually diagnosed with “depression, generalized anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.” Id. at 61. According to the medical evidence and Fenwick’s own testimony, Fenwick’s psychological disorder was the result of the hostage ordeal. In sustaining the trial court’s order denying workers’ compensation benefits to Fenwick, the Court cited the long-standing rule that:
“ ‘[a] disease of the mind or body which arises in the course of employment, with nothing more’ is not an accidental injury and, thus, not compensable.”
*226Id. at 62 (quoting Keeling v. State Indus. Court, 1964 OK 25, 389 P.2d 487, 491, which quoted Shoren v. United States Rubber Co., 87 R.I. 319, 140 A.2d 768 (1958)).
¶ 16 Petitioners argue that Fenwick precludes a psychological overlay award in the instant case, because Claimant’s psychological disorder is the result of the traumatic event of rape, as Fenwick’s post-traumatic stress disorder was the result of the trauma of being held hostage. However, Claimant’s injury at the hands of the rapist has the necessary element of physical injury accompanying psychological injury, which was lacking in Fenwick.
¶ 17 Petitioners also assert that Teel v. Tulsa Mun. Employees, 1993 OK 74, 859 P.2d 1079, 1080 controls the instant ease. Importantly, Teel addresses an injury which occurred prior to the effective date of the 1992 statutory revision. Teel required that “the psychological injury must result from or arise out the physical employment-related injury in order to-be compensable [.] ” Id. at 1080. The Court of Civil Appeals used Teel in deciding the instant cause, citing it for the proposition that simply the accompaniment of physical and psychological injury is insufficient to support a claim under the Act.
¶ 18 The Legislature’s 1992 revision of the statute carves out those mental injuries “unaccompanied" by physical injury. The ihstant cause clearly entailed physical injury within the scope of the statute, which is accompanied by psychological injury, Claimant being unable to function outside her home as she had before the events of February 19, 1995. This accompaniment is all the statute requires. The Court of Civil Appeals attempt to place an additional requirement that Claimant’s mental injury arise from her injury to the back, instead of resulting from the physical trauma of rape, is not persuasive as it obligates Claimant to establish more than the Legislature has required. As written, 85 O.S.1992 Supp. § 3(7)(c) does not prevent Claimant from supporting a mental injury claim upon the results of the accidental injury, the forcible rape; such rape also included the essential element of physical injury to accompany the mental infirmity.
¶ 19 Under the set of circumstances in the instant case, the statutorily required accompaniment of compensable physical injury, which includes Claimant’s injury to the back, and psychological injury exists and resulted from accidental injury. Claimant’s resulting psychological disability is within the parameters of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 20 The record contains competent medical evidence and testimony of Claimant’s psychological disability, as well as competent evidence regarding her back injury and the on-going skin rash. Where competent evidence supports the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court, we will not disturb the order here on appeal. Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 1984 OK 53, 684 P.2d 548.
¶ 21 Certiorari having previously been granted, we vacate the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, and the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Court is SUSTAINED.
KAUGER, C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, ALMA WILSON and WATT, JJ., concur. SUMMERS, V.C.J., concurs in result. HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., dissent.. 85 O.S.1998 Supp. § 3(10)(c) has taken the place of § 3(7)(c) which was in effect at the time of Claimant's workers' compensation claim. Section (c) now reads as follows:
"Injury” or "Personal injury” shall not include mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury, except in the case of rape which arises out of and in the course of employment^]"
The new statute makes an exception to the required accompaniment of physical injury in cases of rape arising out of and in the course of employmentf.]”