I agree with the majority that both petitions should be denied for the reasons stated.
I respectfully differ, however, with the finding of fact which concludes that the only reasonable interpretation of the Governor’s letter of August 28, 2009, is that it constitutes a complete waiver of confidentiality under S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-320(10)(g). Though the letter of August 28 certainly constitutes a waiver, I am not persuaded that the evidence before us demonstrates that the Governor knew that he was waiving all confidentiality. See Eason v. Eason, 384 S.C. 473, 682 S.E.2d 804 (2009) (waiver requires a party to have known of a right and known he was abandoning that right); Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 433, 673 S.E.2d 448, 456 (2009) (waiver is the voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right by a party that knew of its rights, or of all the material facts upon which they depend). To the contrary, I conclude that the letter of August 28, 2009, though grandiose and poorly-articulated, is clearly the end-product of negotiations between the Governor’s counsel and the executive director of the Ethics Commission. In making this finding, I have considered Mr. Hayden’s letters of *501August 18 and 27, 2009; the Governor’s counsel’s letter of August 24, 2009; the Governor’s affidavit filed herein; and, of course, the Governor’s letter of August 28, 2009.
I would have allowed the Ethics Commission to determine in the first instance the meaning and scope of the August 28, 2009, letter in the proceeding referenced by the majority. That avenue is now foreclosed. To the extent that the majority may suggest that a waiver submitted pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-320(10)(g) cannot be limited, I would find that the Governor’s attempt at doing that which cannot be done, constitutes a nullity.