This Court has accepted on certification from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina the following question of law:
*536Under South Carolina law, are punitive damages recoverable in a cause of action based solely on the theory of strict liability?
We hold that punitive damages are not recoverable in a cause of action based solely upon the theory of strict liability.
FACTS
Clarence Barnwell sued Barber-Colman Company for injuries sustained when his hand was badly mangled in a piece of textile machinery manufactured by Barber-Colman. Although his complaint stated various causes of action, Barnwell elected to proceed to trial solely under the theory of strict liability, alleging that the machinery was equipped with a defectively designed guard. The jury returned a verdict for Barnwell in the amount of $1 million actual damages and $2.8 million punitive damages.
DISCUSSION
Strict liability in tort was not recognized in South Carolina prior to enactment of 1974 Act No. 1184.1 Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E. (2d) 735 (1983); Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises, Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E. (2d) 900 (1980). The Act incorporated almost verbatim the definition of strict liability from § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Adoption of this theory, based upon a no-negligence concept of liability, effected a profound change in the law of this State. See Schall, supra.
Where a cause of action is created by statute, the statute determines what damages may be recovered. Garrick v. Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R., 53 S.C. 448, 31 S.E. 334 (1898);2 see also Patterson v. I.H. Services, Inc., 295 S.C. 300, 368 S.E. (2d) 215 (Ct. App. 1988). Here, the Act does not specify that punitive damages are recoverable. *537Rather, it provides that the seller of a defective product “is subject to liability for physical harm caused. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-73-10(1) (1976) (emphasis supplied). The question, then, is what damages appertain to physical harm?
While actual damages are awarded “in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained,”3 punitive damages are not assessed to compensate the plaintiff for physical harm suffered. Their purpose is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter him and others from engaging in similar misconduct. See cases collected at 8 West’s S.C. Digest, Damages, Key No. 87.
We conclude that punitive damages are not recoverable under the Act. Recovery is limited to actual damages, which compensate “for physical harm caused.” See Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E. (2d) 206 (1964) (damages for “bodily injury” do not include punitive damages).
Citing numerous decisions from other jurisdictions which permit recovery of punitive damages in strict liability, the dissent concludes that our decision places South Carolina in a minority. The conclusion is misleading, in that this Court is compelled to interpret the laws of the General Assembly in their plain meaning, whether or not the result places South Carolina in the minority among jurisdictions. Our State is one of a small number which initially adopted strict liability, not by judicial decision, but through legislative enactment. See 2 American Law of Products Liability (3d) §§ 16.8-16.27 (1987 & Supp. 1989); Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview of State Law, 10 J. Prod. Liab. Ill (1987); see also 63 Am. Jur. (2d) § 537 (1984). Accordingly, the cases relied upon by the dissent are irrelevant and inapplicable. Indeed, none of the cases cited allows recovery of punitive damages based solely upon the theory of strict liability under a statute comparable to § 15-73-10.
Where the legislature has, by statute, acted upon a subject, the judiciary is limited to interpretation and construction of that statute. The principle was well stated by this Court in Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 146, 20 S.E. (2d) 645, 652 (1942):
*538It is perhaps unnecessary to say that Courts have no legislative powers, and in the interpretation and construction of statutes their sole function is to determine, and within the constitutional limits of the legislative power to give effect to, the intention of the Legislature. They cannot read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of legislation rests with the Legislature, and it is the province of the Courts to construe, not to make, the laws.
If the Act is to be amended so as to provide for the recovery of punitive damages, this must be accomplished by the legislature, not the courts.4
CONCLUSION
Recovery of punitive damages is not allowed under a cause of action based solely upon the South Carolina strict liability statute.
Certified question answered.
Ness, C.J., not participating. Finney, J., dissenting in separate opinion.1974 S.C. acts 2782 [codified as S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-73-10 to -30 (1976)].
The question in Garrick was whether punitive damages were recoverable under the original Wrongful Death Act. The statute provided for the recovery of damages, but was silent as to punitive damages. This Court held that, absent specific provision for such damages, the plaintiff was limited to actual damages. Subsequent to the holding in Garrick, the General Assembly amended the Act to specifically allow recovery of punitive damages. See Act No. 579, 1902 S.C. Acts 1071 [now codified as S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-40 (1976)].
Bowers v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 210 S.C. 367, 378, 42 S.E. (2d) 705, 709 (1947).
The dissent further contends that punitive damages are compatible with the strict liability in tort theory. We decline to address this contention, having determined that the Act does not provide for recovery of such