dissenting in part.
The majority today holds that because the order of the superior court directed defendant to provide the ¡State access to “all files relating to these cases” without limiting the ordered disclosure to matters relevant to issues raised by defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, such order was overbroad and exceeded its authority. I respectfully dissent' because I am convinced that when a defendant attacks his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of his counsel, the State is entitled to review that attorney’s entire file in order to ascertain whether that counsel covered all reasonable bases and rendered effective assistance.
In this case, defendant contended he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel. His contentions regarded prior crimes committed by defendant many years before the murder and during the course of a crime spree leading up to the murder for which he was being tried. In particular, defendant alleged that his trial counsel (1) failed to investigate the other crimes, (2) failed to cross-examine witnesses to these crimes, and (3) offered no rebuttal evidence concerning these witnesses and crimes.
Defendant additionally set forth the following allegations of ineffective assistance with regard to his counsel’s preparation of his appeal:
*1591. the failure to raise on direct appeal certain issues and claims set forth in the amended motion for appropriate relief;
2. the omission of certain portions of the events at trial from the record on appeal, in particular, the jury conference and the closing arguments during the penalty phase;
3. the failure to organize the sixty-two assignments of error in the brief on direct appeal, which resulted in a confusing presentation of the claims presented to the appellate court;
4. the failure to provide an adequate statement of the facts or to relate the arguments to the specific facts of the case;
5. the failure to argue specific prejudices to the defendant in the context of the assigned errors, in light of the evidence and events that occurred at trial; and
6. the failure to submit a record and brief adequate to give the court a full understanding of the significance of the errors assigned.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court enunciated the test to be utilized in determining whether a defendant has established that his counsel was ineffective. In order to prevail on such a claim, a defendant must prove (1) that his counsel’s performance was defective, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This test has been adopted in North Carolina. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d 241 (1985). Because the test incorporates the element of prejudice, it is necessary to view the strategic decisions of counsel in the context of the entire trial. Counsel’s performance must be judged “according to the circumstances of each case.” Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1496 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 94 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1987). An attorney’s actions are often based upon information from his client, and this information forms the basis of counsel’s strategic choices. When a client gives his counsel reason to believe pursuing a certain line of investigation would be fruitless or harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue this investigation may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674; Clanton v. Bair, 826 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036, 98 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1988). For these reasons, the State must know the extent of defense counsel’s investigation in order to learn what she knew about defendant’s alleged prior *160crimes and whether there were tactical reasons for failing to investigate further. Counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and her failure to raise certain issues on appeal were the result of strategic decisions which were not made in a vacuum. Access to counsel’s work product is necessary for a proper understanding of defendant’s allegations, and it can only be obtained in the proper context through a review of the entire file.
This Court has never addressed the extent of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege on an ineffective assistance motion before today. My review of the relevant decisions of the Court of Appeals and of decisions handed down in other jurisdictions, however, convinces me that when a client alleges incompetent or ineffective performance on the part of his counsel, such an allegation serves to abrogate the privilege previously existing between them.
The majority relies on the two decisions handed down by our Court of Appeals on this issue, State v. Battle, 8 N.C. App. 192, 174 S.E.2d 299 (1970), and State v. White, 1 N.C. App. 219, 161 S.E.2d 32 (1968), in making its assertion that the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in this situation is a limited waiver. My reading of these two cases, however, leads me to believe that these holdings were not intended to impose a limitation upon the waiver, but were rather an invitation for the attorney to disclose any and all information relevant to his defense, to the extent necessary to defend his rights. In a case such as the one at bar, where defendant is asserting a general failure of his counsel to perform a wide range of duties, it is necessary to review the entire file in order to permit counsel to defend against such a claim. I do not read Battle and White as decisions which limit this judge’s ability to order such a result. In fact, the Court of Appeals held in White that “[i]n a determination by the court as to whether the confession or inculpatory statement of the defendant was a substantial factor in his decision to plead guilty, based upon recommendations by his attorney testified to by the defendant, the State is entitled to have the court consider full disclosures by defendant’s attorney of conversations had between him and his client.” White, 1 N.C. App. at 222-23, 161 S.E.2d at 34 (emphasis added).
Holdings in other jurisdictions, both on the federal and state levels, support this view. Particularly instructive is Harris v. Comm., 688 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, *16188 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1985), in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that when ineffective assistance of counsel is raised via a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence, the attorney-client privilege is lost. The court reasoned that only when all aspects of the relationship are explored can it be determined whether counsel was reasonably likely to render effective assistance. The court further held that all contact between a party and his counsel in his professional capacity must be deemed to be in anticipation of litigation or in furtherance of legal services being offered, thus eliminating the need for dividing the contact into privileged and nonprivileged categories.
In Morris v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 907, 96 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1987), in which the defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the court held that defendant committed a procedural default in failing to pursue his ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas proceeding and was therefore barred from bringing his habeas claim in federal court. The court noted in its holding that defendant’s habeas counsel asserted during the first proceeding that he was not making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “and thus had not effected a general waiver of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 1501. The court went on to say that such a claim “would have waived the [attorney-client] privilege entirely.” Id. at 1502 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals discussed this issue at length in United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933, 29 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1971). The defendant in that case sought to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were not intelligently made since he lacked knowledge of the sentencing consequences. Defendant had additionally filed an affidavit asserting that coercion existed which voided his plea changes by virtue of pre-plea advice he received from his original attorney. The court held that defendant had waived his right to claim privilege as to his entire conversation with the attorney. The court relied in part upon an early and often-cited opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 32 L. Ed. 488 (1888), which held that when one has entered upon such a line of defense, it constitutes a waiver of the right to bar the reception of evidence as privileged. In analyzing this issue, the court noted that waiver involves two basic elements:
*162The first is subjective — Does the person holding the right to claim the privilege intend to waive it? The second element is objective —Is it fair and consistent with the assertion of the claim or defense being made to allow the privilege to be invoked? This objective determination should be based upon whether the position taken by the party goes so far into the matter covered by the privilege that fairness requires the privilege shall cease even when, subjectively, he never intended that result.
United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d at 1324.
The effectiveness of counsel’s representation in this case depends upon many aspects of the preparation of the trial and appeal. Without access to the entire file, the State cannot adequately determine whether the representation was ineffective. It does not seem logical to permit defendant to control access to his prior attorney’s file, either directly or through a sympathetic defense attorney. The rule should be, as Judge Hobgood found it, that the State is entitled to access to the entire file upon a defendant’s allegation of ineffectiveness. Because I believe that Judge Hobgood did not err in entering his order, I respectfully dissent.