concurring in result. I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion and in all parts of that opinion except the approval of the trial court’s denial of the request by counsel for the defendant that he, himself, be permitted to address questions to prospective jurors individually. In my opinion, this was error but, since the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, no prejudice to the defendant has been shown in this case.
As the majority opinion states, G.S. 9-15(a) provides: “The court, or any party to an action, civil or criminal, shall be allowed, in selecting the jury, to make inquiry as to the .fitness and competency of any person to serve as juror * * (Emphasis added.) In State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 558, 169 S.E. 2d 833, this Court said:
“In selecting the jury, the court, or any party to an action, civil or criminal, has the right to make inquiry as to the fitness and competency of any person to serve as a juror. G.S. 9-15(a). ‘The voir dire examination of jurors is a right secured to the defendant by the statutes and has a definite double purpose: First, to ascertain whether there exist grounds for challenge for cause; and, second, to enable *658counsel to exercise intelligently tbe peremptory challenges allowed by law.’ State v. Brooks, 57 Mont. 480, 188 P. 942.”
Unquestionably, the trial judge has wide discretion in the conduct of the interrogation of prospective jurors so as to avoid needless repetition and waste of time. The requirement, however, that counsel relay through the court all questions to prospective jurors does not have the virtue of saving time except insofar as it may discourage inquiry by making it a tedious and laborious process. The statute seems to contemplate that a party may propound his own questions directly to the jury, assuming the propriety of the question. Such has been the prevailing, if not the universally accepted, practice under the statute in the courts of this State. I see no virtue and some danger in departing from it.