(concurring in reversal and dissenting as to nature of remand). The majority opinion states that the question in this case is: Who had the authority to remove the petitioner? The opinion concludes that be*419cause the petitioner was originally appointed by the governor, he can only be removed by the governor for cause under sec. 17.16, Stats. To reach this conclusion, the majority determines that a public officer has tenure rights apart from his office. The majority fails to give full effect to sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats, as amended and the legislative intent expressed by that amendment.
The legislature may change or completely eliminate a public office if it so desires.1 As this court stated in State ex rel. Reuss v. Giessel, 260 Wis. 524, 529, 51 N.W.2d 547 (1952),
“All such offices and their respective tenure had been created by the legislature; they can be changed or abolished entirely by the legislature. That ‘whatever is created by statute may be taken away by statute’ is a well-settled principle of law.”
The majority does not contend that the petitioner’s office can not be abolished or amended by statute, rather it contends that the legislature only changed the means of appointment to petitioner’s office. This change supposedly left the means of removal of this particular officer, the petitioner, unaffected.
This court has never before held that a public officer can gain some right, not inherent in the office itself.2 The legal status of an officer can only derive from the character of the office held. This court has stated that it
. . is concerned not with the panoply of the ceremonials by which the position is assumed but rather the *420nature of the power that devolves upon the position by virtue of the legislative delegation.” Burton v. State Appeal Board, 38 Wis.2d 294, 303, 156 N.W.2d 386 (1968).3
On March 5, 1977 the legislative delegation of power to the petitioner was changed by Senate Bill No. 63, Ch. 4, Laws of 1977 amending sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats. The amendment repealed the language stricken below.
“. . . If a department is under the direction and supervision of a board, the board shall appoint a secretary to serve at the pleasure of the board, except that the secretary of veterans affai-r3-shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and-eonsent of--thc senate for a-n-indcfinitc-torm, outside the classified service.”
By this amendment, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs was to serve “at the pleasure of the Board of Veterans Affairs” and could be removed at any time “at the pleasure of the Board.”
This amendment conflicts with sec. 17.07, Stats, providing that an officer appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate may only be removed for cause pursuant to sec. 17.16, Stats. The majority implies that there is no uncertainty here, that the statutes are unambiguous and that the petitioner may only be removed for cause. A cursory reading of sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats, demonstrates that there is considerable doubt as to whether the petitioner has any other tenure right than the right to serve at the pleasure of the Board.
A conflict exists between these statutes and that conflict allows a consideration of the legislative intent behind the amendment to sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats. The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the *421intent of the legislature. In Matter of Estate of Walker, 75 Wis.2d 93, 102-104, 248 N.W.2d 410 (1977). That which is intended or implied by the legislature is as much a part of the statute as that which is expressed. State Medical Society of Wisconsin v. Comm. of Insurance, 70 Wis.2d 144, 154, 233 N.W.2d 470 (1975).
There is ample evidence that the legislature intended that the amendment of sec. 15.05(1) (b), Stats, should apply to the petitioner. Prior to the amendment, all other secretaries of departments with boards served at the pleasure of their boards. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs was the only exception. That exception was removed by the amendment. If the legislature had intended that the petitioner, the only person who could possibly be affected by the amendment, was to be excepted from its operation it could have done so. The petitioner might have been “grandfathered” into his position, but as the trial court noted, he was not.
That part of the statute which affected the petitioner was completely repealed. That alone is evidence that the legislature intended the change to operate retroactively on any tenure rights the petitioner may have had. State ex rel. McKenna v. District No. 8, 243 Wis. 324, 10 N.W. 2d 155 (1943).
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the amendment can not be totally ignored. As the trial court stated in its decision,
“. . . it might be noted as a matter of public knowledge, as well, that the specific language deletion of importance here, was the subject of public and legislative debate prior to the passage. . . . Further, the petitioner, before passage of the bill, stated that he would resign if the bill was passed and he subsequently did tender a resignation.”
The legislature determined that, as a matter of public policy, the petitioner, like all other secretaries should be *422responsible to a citizen board appointed by the governor. This was to prevent the existence of a public officer with permanent tenure who, short of a discharge for cause, was answerable to no one. That policy decision was clearly within the power of the legislature.
Before this court the petitioner now argues that “no intent can be inferred from the enactment of ch. 4, Laws of 1977, which would compel or justify the conclusion that the tenure acquired by petitioner was to be abolished.” (Petitioner’s Brief, p. 10.) That was clearly the only purpose of the amendment.
The majority opinion does not consider the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner.
Petitioner argues that even if the legislature intended the amended statute to permit the Board to discharge him, it could not do so since he has a “property interest” in the job. Thus he could only be removed by the governor for cause. The argument is that this “right” accrued to him at the time of his appointment and is protected under the fourteenth amendment.
- For the petitioner to have a property interest in continued public employment protected by the fourteenth amendment, he must show that he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. That reasonable expectation must be based on state law. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed.2d 548 (1972). What has already been stated above shows that in Wisconsin a public officer’s tenure may be changed or abolished entirely by the legislature. State ex rel. Reuss v. Giessel, supra. Based on Wisconsin law, the petitioner could not have had a reasonable expectation that the legislature would not change his tenure in office. Therefore this tenure was not a property right protected under the fourteenth amendment.
The petitioner also contends that he was deprived pf a due process liberty interest protected under the *423fourteenth amendment. The trial court did not reach that issue because it was not clearly raised in the amended writ of certiorari. Both parties briefed and argued the liberty interest issue before the trial court. Under these circumstances, the Board could not have been prejudiced by an amendment of the pleadings and I would deem them to be so amended before this court pursuant to sec. 802.09(2), Stats, and Krudwig v. Koepke, 227 Wis. 1, 3, 277 N.W. 670 (1938) .4
The petitioner contends that his due process rights to liberty were infringed because of a derogatory four page statement read by Board member Carbonneau at the May 20,1977 meeting.
“Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 27 L. Ed.2d 515, 519, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971).
A due process liberty interest may be affected when a person loses their job or is charged with wrongdoing. *424For an employee to demonstrate such a loss of liberty, they must have: (1) suffered a stigma or other disability that forecloses their ability to take other employment or, (2) had their good name, reputation, honor or integrity impugned in such a way that it might seriously damage their standing and associations in the community. Board of Regents, supra, at 408 U.S. 578, 574, State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis.2d 672, 678, 679, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976).
In DeLuca, supra, this court found that a public official’s liberty interest was adversely affected where he was charged with performing services for personal friends that he would not perform for others, leaving the implication that he was dishonest. “Charges of this nature that reflect or imply unsavory character traits affect the liberty of a public employee.” DeLuca, supra, at 72 Wis.2d 679 citing Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, Etc., 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972).
In Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir., 1976), the court found a denial of a liberty interest where the governor of Illinois dismissed public officials and accused them of abuse of their positions for trying to force an employer to dismiss criminal charges against an employee.
In Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1974), no denial of liberty was found where an official was charged with incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeasance in office. These terms were used to satisfy the requirements of the Illinois Constitution for removal of officers.
At the May 20, 1977 meeting Board member Carbon-neau stated,
“And, incredibly, now we learn of yet another pay-off by the Secretary — the full-time employment of the former chief spokesman for the Vietnam Veterans’ Advisory Council by the Department of Veterans Affairs at the *425same time this individual is employed by the University of Wisconsin.”
This statement implies unsavory character traits at least as much as the charges in DeLuca, supra. These charges would tend to affect the petitioner’s good name or reputation and in making them the Board deprived the petitioner of a due process liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.5
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, at 408 U.S. 570, 571, the Supreme Court stated that,
“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”
In a footnote to that statement, the court said,
“Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.”
The Roth court also stated: “The purpose of such notice and hearing is to give the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.” Roth, supra at 408 U.S. 573.
The petitioner was entitled to a pre-termination hearing to respond to the charges made against him. Until that hearing, he should be reinstated with back pay. McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973); Stewart v. *426Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973). I dissent to that part of the majority opinion which holds the petitioner may only be discharged by the governor for cause. I concur in that part of the opinion that reverses the trial court’s judgment affirming the Board’s dismissal of the petitioner. But in mandating this case, I would remand to the trial court with instructions to order the Board to reinstate the petitioner and provide him with a due process hearing on the charges made against him. I therefore concur in reversal and dissent as to nature of remand.
See also, State ex rel. Anderson v. Barlow, 235 Wis. 169, 292 N.W. 290 (1940). In that case it was determined that statutory tenure under the civil service system must give way to the legislature’s power to restructure a state department.
To support the Board’s position, it is not necessary, as the majority contends that the term “officer” must embrace the term “office.” It is only necessary that the rights of an officer should not be broader than the office he holds.
The majority contends that this case is inapplicable because it deals with whether or not a person holds a public office. The question of the petitioner’s rights to hold the office of Secretary of Veterans Affairs is precisely the question at issue here.
“802.09. Amended And Supplemental Pleadings. . . . (2) Amendments To Conform To The Evidence. If issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleading's, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice such party in maintaining the action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. . .”
In Krudwig, supra, this court considered pleadings on appeal as conforming to the proof in the trial court even though there was no formal motion to amend.
The Board claims that these were Mr. Carbonneau’s private opinions, but they were made at a meeting of the Board by a Board member, and given as a reason for dismissal by that member.