The fundamental issue in this case has to do with the constitutionality of the Michigan "no-fault” divorce statute, MCLA 552.6; MSA 25.86.
The pertinent facts giving rise to the instant appeal involve a divorce action instituted by plaintiff on March 17, 1975. Plaintiffs complaint originally alleged that there had been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony had been destroyed and that there remained no reasonable likelihood that the marriage could be preserved. Such language followed the "no-fault” statute enacted in 1971. On September 11, 1975, plaintiff filed an amended complaint incorporating the "no-fault” grounds and added a separate allegation claiming extreme cruelty.
The trial was had on June 21, 1976, at which *131time the trial judge ruled Michigan’s "no-fault” divorce statute to be unconstitutional and required plaintiff to present his proofs under the old law with respect to extreme and repeated cruelty. During the trial, at which only the plaintiff testified, evidence was brought out that approximately 2-1/2 months following the filing of the original complaint plaintiff and defendant engaged in an act of sexual intercourse. This was more than a year prior to the trial in this case. The trial judge found that the isolated act of sexual intercourse constituted condonation and denied the divorce. Plaintiff appeals as of right.
The constitutionality of the Michigan "no-fault” divorce statute, MCLA 552.6; MSA 25.86, appears to be one of first impression in this state. Hence we find it necessary to look to certain California decisions relative to attacks on similar statutes. In California a statute providing for dissolution of a marriage upon a finding of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage was held valid over objections that it violated the constitutional guaranty of due process, that it was too vague and ambiguous to assure uniform application, that it impaired the obligations of contract, and that application of the statute in the instant case constituted a retroactive application of law depriving the wife of her vested interest in her married status, In re Marriage of Walton, 28 Cal App 3d 108; 104 Cal Rptr 472 (1972).
In another California decision a contention that the statute was unconstitutional, in that it laid down absolutely no guidelines as to what constitutes irreconcilable differences, with the result that the marriage might be dissolved "on the whim and caprice of the particular judge”, was *132rejected in In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27 Cal App 3d 424; 103 Cal Rptr 733 (1972).1
The pertinent part of the Michigan statute, MCLA 552.6; MSA 25.86, reads as follows:
"(3) The court shall enter a judgment dissolving the bonds of matrimony if evidence is presented in open court that there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.”
While the Michigan statute reads somewhat differently than the California statute the meaning and import are nearly identical. We choose to follow the view taken by the California court and hold our own Michigan "no-fault” divorce statute, MCLA 552.6; MSA. 25.86, to be constitutional. Moreover, we would hold that a marriage is based on more than just sex so that an isolated instance of sexual intercourse occurring after the commencement of a divorce action but more than one year prior to trial is not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis to deny a divorce under the "no-fault” divorce statute.
Since the trial court held the "no-fault” divorce statute to be unconstitutional and applied an erroneous principle of law relative to the instant case by requiring plaintiff to proceed under previous, no longer existing, law we reverse and remand to the trial court for rehearing and redetermination pursuant to the provisions of MCLA 552.6; MSA 25.86.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs, construction of a statute being involved.
*133Allen, J., concurred.For a detailed explanation of the California court’s reasons see 55 ALR 3d, 590-592.