dissenting:
Because I believe there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that Harding’s proposed testimony would be confusing to the jury and therefore more prejudicial than probative, I respectfully dissent.
Rule 403, SCRE provides that evidence, even if relevant, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury_” (emphasis added). Although the trial court’s decision on the admission of an expert’s testimony is largely discretionary, “the exercise of this discretion will be reversed where an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 61, 495 S.E.2d 205, 211 (1998).
The trial court’s only reasons for deciding Harding’s testimony would confuse the jury were that Harding “doesn’t understand [biomechanics] himself’ and that he “contradict [sic] himself on numerous cases [sic] as for the basis for his opinion.” To the contrary, in my view Harding’s proffered testimony clearly demonstrates his understanding of physics *541as it applies to the human body, and furthermore that his alleged contradictions are not contradictory at all.
Harding’s deposition testimony was based on his expertise in medicine and biomechanics, “a branch of physics that deals with the understanding of what happens when people ... are exposed to forces.” In reaching his conclusions, he considered Wilson’s medical records, the depositions of Wilson’s treating physicians, the accident report, and photographs of and repair cost estimates for both vehicles, along with his knowledge of impact tests by Consumer Reports and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety on the Mazda 626, the type of car in which Wilson was riding. As a result, Harding opined that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the forces involved in the accident were not of a sufficient magnitude or direction to cause the disk herniating suffered by Wilson.
Harding further testified his conclusion was based on a measured calculation called the impact-related change in velocity, or “delta V,” which he explained “represents the difference between the velocity of [Wilson’s vehicle] before the accident to the velocity of [his] vehicle as a consequence of the accident.” He stated that “the higher the delta V, the more likely it is to cause injury, because the change in velocity occurs over a very short period of time and, as such, imposes accelerations and therefore force on the individuals in the vehicle.” Based on his review of the documentary evidence, Harding concluded the delta V on the Mazda “was no greater than five miles an hour.”
The majority proposes to affirm the trial court based on allegedly contradictory answers by Harding. As to the issue of the property damage, Harding testified that one factor he reviewed in evaluating the case was the damage to both vehicles; on cross-examination, he freely admitted he would not testify “that the amount of property damage to a car ... determines the extent of injury [to] an occupant.” Regarding the speed of Rivers’ vehicle, Harding specifically stated it was not a relevant consideration in his analysis because the delta V is the change in speed of Wilson’s vehicle. Finally, Harding’s testimony evidenced an understanding of Wilson’s position when the accident occurred. As Harding reviewed an illustration drawn by one of his medical artists showing an individual *542bent over by “about 45 degrees,” the following exchange occurred:
Q. [A 45 degree angle] wouldn’t be a realistic example in this case because Mr. Wilson had his chest on his knees and his hands in the floorboard at the time of the wreck. Are you aware of that?
A. Well, I know that’s what he said on occasions. He’s also just said he was leaning forward and couldn’t recall precisely how he was postured at the time of the impact. But that he was leaning forward.
Q. So you don’t know what his position was at the time of impact yourself?
A. Not precisely. That is correct.
In my opinion, there is nothing contradictory or remotely confusing about this testimony. In a recent case on similar facts, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held a trial judge improperly excluded testimony from a biomechanics expert. See Fussell v. Roadrunner Towing & Recovery, 765 So.2d 373 (La.Ct.App.2000). There, as here, the expert was asked to determine whether a low-speed collision could have caused the plaintiffs herniated disk based on a review of vehicle photographs, repair estimates, driver statements, and the plaintiffs medical records. Id. at 377. The court stated that “[a]ny alleged failure to visit the scene or supply specific facts in the analysis or conclusion provides a basis for attack [on] cross-examination.” Id. More specifically, the court found the expert’s references to “force vector and injury mechanisms at various speeds” supported his proffered opinion and would not prejudice or confuse the fact finder. Id.; see also Berkeley Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Common, 304 S.C. 15, 20, 402 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1991) (“Where the expert’s testimony is based upon facts sufficient to form the basis for an opinion, the trier of fact determines its probative value.”).
Moreover, I would find the exclusion of Harding’s testimony prejudiced Rivers, who offered it to support his defense that the low-speed, low-impact accident could not have caused Wilson’s back injury, the major issue in dispute at trial. As noted by the Fussell court, the relative importance of such expert testimony increases in low-speed collisions which involve serious injuries:
*543As the force of impact in a collision lowers, and the seriousness of the injury rises, expert testimony becomes more relevant. An expert’s commentary on speed, rate of acceleration, force of impact, and the correlation to injuries suffered as exemplified in reliable published studies would become an integral part of the defense or plaintiffs case. A plaintiff or defendant cannot be deprived of their right to offer a reasonable presentation of issues....
Id. at 376.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Harding’s testimony, and would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. See Means v. Gates, 348 S.C. 161, 171, 558 S.E.2d 921, 926 (Ct.App.2001) (finding the exclusion of expert testimony “not harmless error as there was no equivalent testimony presented”).