concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s opinion that the trial court erred by concluding that Richard N. Mills (“respondent”) neglected Ashley Nicole Mills, Samantha McNeill Grigg, and Ryan Alexander Mills (collectively “minor children”) based on his failure to appear at the underlying juvenile action adjudicating the minor children neglected. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that clear, cogent and convincing evidence exists to support the trial court’s remaining findings of fact. I would reverse the judgments of the trial court.
I. Termination of Parental Rights
Trial courts conduct termination of parental rights proceedings in two phases: (1) the adjudication phase governed by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 and (2) the disposition phase governed by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. In re Mitchell, 148 N.C. App. 483, 488, 559 S.E.2d 237, 241 (2002) (citations omitted). The petitioner, DSS, carries the burden of proof to show that one or more of the statutory grounds set forth in G.S. § 7B-1111 exists by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence during the adjudicatory phase. Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(e)-(f) (1999)). We review the adjudicatory phase to determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and, if so, whether these findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law. In re Ballard, 63 N.C. App. 580, 306 *10S.E.2d 150 (1983); modified on other grounds, 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984).
Only after the trial court finds that one or more of the statutory grounds exists may the trial court proceed to the disposition phase to determine whether termination of the parent’s rights are in the best interest of the child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2001); Mitchell, 148 N.C. App. at 488, 559 S.E.2d at 241; In re Carr, 116 N.C. App. 403, 448 S.E.2d 299 (1994). At the disposition phase, the trial court must exercise its discretion to determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Id.; see also In re Tyson, 76 N.C. App. 411, 419, 333 S.E.2d 554, 559 (1985).
II. Respondent’s Alleged Neglect
The trial court found that respondent neglected all three children as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(1) (2001). Neglect was the only statutory ground the trial court found to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
The trial court, using identical language in three separate judgments, concluded that:
the Respondent Legal Father neglected the minor child pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(1) after he learned of the existence of the minor child in that he never visited with the minor child, he never appeared in court in the underlying juvenile file concerning the child, he has only had contact with the social worker concerning his child three times since October 1999 and the last contact on March 22, 2000, and it is reasonable to assume that she [sic] would continue to neglect the minor child if the child were returned to her [sic] care and supervision.
The majority’s opinion lists findings of fact found by the trial court. The majority’s opinion concludes that “[t]he evidence presented at trial clearly indicated that respondent, after learning of .the children’s existence, displayed merely minimal interest in their welfare.” The majority’s conclusion is based entirely on the testimony of Todd Mitchell Hayes (“Hayes”), a social worker with the Department of Social Services (“DSS”). The trial court made no findings on credibility of the witness or the probative value of the evidence. Respondent rebutted every critical point made by Hayes, offered an alternative explanation, and submitted additional evidence. The majority opinion does not mention any of respondent’s testimony or other evidence.
*11The trial court’s findings of fact, and the majority’s reliance thereon, to support the conclusion that respondent neglected the minor children can be summarized as follows: (1) respondent is the legal parent only and has no biological relationship to the children, (2) the children were conceived after respondent and Charlene separated, (3) respondent has no.relationship with the minor children, (4) six months after respondent separated from Charlene he ceased further contact with her, (5) respondent has never seen the minor children, (6) respondent indicated in a telephone call that he might relinquish his legal rights to the children, (7) respondent never provided any love, nurturance, or support for the minor children, (8) respondent never requested to visit with the children even after finding out that he was the legal father of the minor children, (9) respondent did not file a motion with the court requesting visitation with the children, (10) respondent did nothing other than appear in Court in Ohio concerning Ashley’s child support action after DNA testing statistically excluded him from paternity, (11) respondent told a social worker on the telephone that he “desired visitation if it were shown that he was the biological father of Ashley,” (12) respondent made no requests for visitation after paternity tests statistically excluded him as the biological father of Ashley, (13) respondent is not employed and receives $700.00 per month SSI, (14) respondent was diagnosed twelve to fifteen years ago with Schizophrenia, (15) respondent visits a psychiatrist every six months, (16) respondent has difficulty with nerves, and (17) respondent is unaware of the special needs of the children.
III. Respondent’s Evidence
None of the findings of fact offered in support of the conclusion that defendant neglected his children are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The first four findings of fact listed above are irrelevant given respondent’s presumption of paternity that was unchallenged and not rebutted. The last four are absolutely irrelevant to whether defendant neglected his children, and are more directed toward a “best interest” analysis, which is not reached unless grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights are found to exist by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Rights of parents cannot be abrogated or balanced until a parent is found to have acted in a manner inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status. See Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 62, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001).
*12A. Respondent’s Presumption of Paternity
“North Carolina courts have long recognized that children born during a marriage, as here, are presumed to be the product of the marriage.” Jones v. Patience, 121 N.C. App. 434, 439, 466 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1996) (citing Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197, 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968); 3 Robert E. Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 250 (4th ed. 1981) (citing cases dating back to 1862)). “ ‘[T]he presumption is universally recognized and considered one of the strongest known to the law.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 419, 334 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1985); citing 3 Lee, North Carolina Family Law, § 250); see also 3 Lee, Family Law, § 16.11 at 16-28 (5th ed. 2000). Among the reasons for this long-standing and consistent rule is “[t]he marital presumption reflects the force of public policy which seeks to prevent ‘parent[s] from bastardizing [their] own issue.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 408, 133 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1963)).
During all proceedings before the trial court, DSS considered respondent as the legal father. The trial court found that respondent was, in fact, the legal father of the minor children. Respondent’s standing as the legal father of the three minor children is uncontested.
B. Respondent’s Efforts
As to findings of fact five through twelve, respondent was sued for child support on 26 October 1999. Respondent testified during the termination hearing that he immediately called DSS upon learning that he was identified as Ashley’s father. Respondent testified that during that phone call he learned for the first time that two other children, Ryan and Samantha, existed. Respondent testified that he experienced difficulty obtaining any information from DSS, and that he received mixed messages from DSS after he inquired about obtaining custody of all the minor children.
Respondent testified that it would be best for all the minor children to live in his home with Casey, their brother, rather than to subsist in different foster homes, separated from each other and living with strangers. Casey is the closest familial link to all the children because they share a common mother. All children except Samantha bear respondent’s last name. Respondent testified that DSS informed him that it was in the “children’s best interest” for none of them to have any contact with respondent. Respondent also testified that DSS *13informed him that North Carolina courts would not allow him to obtain custody of all three minor children.
As to finding of fact five, seven, eight, ten, eleven, and twelve, respondent testified that DSS prevented or thwarted his numerous efforts to visit his minor children. He testified that DSS repeatedly told him that he would have to wait until a hearing to do anything. Respondent also testified that even after the DNA excluded him as the biological father of Ashley, he continued to seek custody of the three minor children. At trial respondent was asked during cross-examination: “It’s also true is it not, that you had no phone contact with these children since [learning of their existence].” Respondent answered: “I wasn’t allowed, nobody would give me the numbers or addresses to even — I asked to write them a letter to let them know about me and Casey, to send pictures, to do whatever I could do, and I was always denied.” This testimony was not refuted.
As to finding of fact seven, respondent testified that once he learned of the existence of the three minor children, he offered to financially support all of them. DSS failed to co-operate. Respondent’s telephone bill, introduced into evidence, indicated over twenty phone calls placed from his home in Ohio from 21 January to 5 May 2000 concerning his minor children in North Carolina.
IV. Clear. Cogent and Convincing Evidence
“A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 650 (1981); See also In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 600, 281 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1981). “The burden of DSS on the merits of the petition is a heavy one.” Clark, 303 N.C. at 604, 281 S.E.2d at 55.
“The burden on DSS to prove facts which would support termination is by ‘clear, cogent and convincing evidence.’ ” Matter of Bradley, 57 N.C. App. 475, 480, 291 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1982) (citation omitted). “Clear, cogent and convincing describes an evidentiary standard stricter than a preponderance of the evidence, but less stringent than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 73 N.C. App. 349, 354, 326 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1985) (citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984)). “It has been defined as ‘evidence which should fully convince.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. Blue Ridge Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 207 N.C. 362, 177 S.E. 176 (1934)).
*14North Carolina courts require the State to present strong evidence to support termination of parental rights. See e.g. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 405, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982) (held that three grounds for termination were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and as to one of these grounds “there was no evidence to the contrary”); In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 355-56, 555 S.E.2d 659, 664 (2001); (held that the evidence was “neither plenary, nor overwhelming, nor uncontradicted” to support termination of parental rights); Alleghany County Dept. of Social Services v. Reber, 75 N.C. App. 467, 331 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985) (court held case law requires stronger evidence to terminate parental rights); In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1984) (court found the totality of evidence to support termination “was plenary, clear, cogent and convincing”); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 343, 274 S.E.2d 236, 243 (1981) (court found “overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence” to' support termination).
Here, the additional evidence provided by respondent is uncon-tradicted and fully explanatory. Respondent’s credibility was not impeached, nor did the trial court find him unbelievable. The trial court was not free to disregard or ignore contradictory, explanatory, or other competent evidence offered by respondent. When respondent’s evidence is considered alongside the testimony of Hayes, there is no evidence which is “overwhelming,” “uncontradicted,” “plenary,” or “fully convincing” to support the trial court’s findings of fact. The majority’s holding eviscerates the clear, cogent, and convincing standard in this case. The majority’s opinion would reduce the clear, cogent and convincing requirement to nothing more than a preponderance of the evidence standard. Such a holding places DSS on equal footing with a parent’s constitutionally protected status, which is contrary to well-established precedent and is impermissible.
V. Conclusion
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion which reverses and remands the trial court’s judgments. DSS failed to prove that respondent’s conduct is inconsistent with his protected status as a legal parent of the minor children. No findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to uphold the trial court’s conclusion that respondent neglected the minor children. Respondent’s testimony and other evidence presented, the great majority of which is uncontradicted and undisputed, shows substantial evidence contrary to the trial court’s findings of fact.
*15After review of the entire record, I would hold that the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. I would reverse the remaining parts of the trial court’s judgments terminating respondent’s parental rights.