dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that there is substantial evidence plaintiff suffered special damage as a result of the prohibitions in the ex parte domestic violence protective order. I, therefore, dissent.
In a malicious prosecution claim based on the institution of a prior civil proceeding,1 a plaintiff must prove “that there was some arrest of his person, seizure of his property, or some other element of special damage resulting from the action such as would not necessarily result in all similar cases.” Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 203, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979). “The gist of such special damage is a substantial interference either with the plaintiffs person or his property such as . . . causing an injunction to issue prohibiting [the] plain*173tiff’s use of his property in a certain way.” Id. (citations omitted). A slight interference with a person’s movement is not enough to cause special damage as there must be a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s right of movement. U v. Duke Univ., 91 N.C. App. 171, 179, 371 S.E.2d 701, 707 (no special damage where the plaintiff was restricted from entering a building owned by the defendant and from using the defendant’s instrument), disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988). Likewise, if the interference is “merely an interference with some right of use” and not with the plaintiff’s property, a party has suffered no special damage. Id. at 180, 371 S.E.2d at 707.
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, see Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 527, 340 S.E.2d 408, 411 (1986) (evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict), there was no substantial evidence plaintiff suffered special damage, see Cobb v. Reitter, 105 N.C. App. 218, 220, 412 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1992) (if non-moving party has not presented substantial evidence of the elements of his claim for relief, the moving party is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict). The ex -parte order required plaintiff to not “assault, threaten, abuse, follow, harass or interfere” with defendant, to “stay away from” defendant’s residence, and to stay away from defendant’s place of employment. Plaintiff cannot claim any damage arising from an order that directs he not assault or harass his wife. Furthermore, any restriction on plaintiff’s right to be on the property where defendant resided2 and the place where she worked was not substantial. In fact, as long as plaintiff did not harass, follow, or interfere with defendant, he remained free to move about in any place other than defendant’s residence and her place of employment. In any event, the ex parte order was valid for only ten days and thus any interference was minimal.3 See N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(c) (2001).
*174Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment determining there was insufficient evidence to establish plaintiff suffered special damage.4
. The filing of a complaint for a domestic violence protective order is a civil action. N.C.G.S. § 50B-2(a) (2001).
. The record shows defendant’s residence was owned by plaintiff and defendant and had once served as their marital home. Plaintiff, however, had not resided there in more than a year and indeed had agreed, pursuant to a consent order, that those premises were to be “temporarily sequestered for the exclusive use and benefit” of defendant. The consent order did not fix an expiration date but, because it was entered pursuant to chapter 50B, it expired by operation of law on 11 May 1995. See N.C.G.S. § 50B-3(b) (2001). There is no evidence in the record plaintiff had made any attempt to visit defendant’s residence after the expiration of the consent order.
. The ex parte order was issued on 5 June 1995 and dissolved on 14 June 1995.
. While I do not believe plaintiff has a claim for malicious prosecution, I do note that others who find themselves in situations similar to plaintiff’s situation, without proof of special damage, may move for Rule 11 sanctions to be imposed against the opposing party. This motion may be made if the plaintiff believes the defendant’s complaint for a domestic violence protective order was filed without sufficient basis in fact, existing law, or “a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” or that the complaint was filed for an “improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 11(a) (2001). These sanctions may include “an order to pay the [plaintiff] . . . the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the [complaint].. . including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Id.