dissenting.
I concur fully in Division 1 of the majority opinion. However, it is with the greatest reluctance that I join the dissent of Judge Sognier with regard to Division 2 of the majority opinion. I certainly understand the motivation of the majority because of the recent Supreme Court decisions of Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 (298 SE2d 484) (1983) and Hart v. Eldridge, 250 Ga. 526 (299 SE2d 560) (1983). If the rationale of Clark had been applied at the time of the rendition of the decision in Allrid v. Emory Univ., 249 Ga. 35 (285 SE2d 521) (1982), appellant’s cause of action for wrongful death would not have been held to be barred by the statute of limitation. Thus, clearly, fairness and justice would be served by the result approved by the majority. Unfortunately, however, we cannot ignore the procedural imperfections in a case at our bar in order to improperly achieve in that case, a result which would — under other circumstances — be just and proper. Accordingly, I agree with Judge Sognier that we are bound by the law of the case and that we have no alternative but to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Therefore, I must dissent.