concurring.
I agree with the opinion of the Court. I write separately to note the constitutional infirmity of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-03.3 as effective at the time of the district court action, and as amended by the 1995 legislature. As discussed in part 4 of the opinion of the Court, the legislature has attempted to delegate to the legislative council’s committee on administrative rules the authority, by objecting, to shift the burden of persuasion in court cases involving administrative rules. The 1995 legislative assembly attempted to give the legislative council’s committee on administrative rules the authority to veto rules adopted by administrative agencies. 1995 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 310.
Ours is not a parliamentary system. Under our constitutional system, the legislature may not delegate to itself, or to a subset of its members, executive or judicial functions; neither may the legislature delegate legislative power to a subset of its members. See N.D. Const. Art. IV, §§ 1, 13, 32, 40; Art. V, §§ 1, 9, 10; Art. VI, § 1; Art. XI, § 26; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); State ex rel. Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392 (N.D.1987); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 167 W.Va. 155, 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Rep., 236 Kan. 45, 687 P.2d 622 (1984); Iowa Fed. of Labor v. Dept. of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1988).
The legislature was apparently well aware of the questionable constitutionality of its action. The legislative veto bill provides:
“Section 4 [relating to shifting the burden of persuasion] of this Act is suspended from operation and becomes effective retroactive to August 1, 1995, upon a ruling by the North Dakota supreme court that any portion of subsection 1 [relating to the administrative rules committee declaring a rule void] of section 28-32-03.3 as created by section 3 of this Act is unconstitutional.”
1995 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 310, § 5.