(dissenting). This case, which concerns when a circuit court may issue an order of superintending control, was remanded to us from the Michigan Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of In re Payne, 444 Mich 679; 514 NW2d 121 (1994).
In our original opinion, our Court disagreed that the commission had made a clear error of law and reversed the trial court. In re Loose, 201 Mich App 361, 367; 505 NW2d 922 (1993). Petitioner, Antoinette Loose, appealed from that decision to the Supreme Court which initially denied the application.
She moved for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court then remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Payne. The remand order provides no additional instruction or guidance. See Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47; 420 NW2d 87 (1988). Upon reconsideration, under the standard of review which I believe the Supreme Court established in Payne, I would affirm the decision of the circuit court.
I do not disagree with the majority’s general expressions of deference to the doctrine of the law of the case. But I note that the doctrine is discretionary and procedural. United States v United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co, 339 US 186, 198-199; 70 S Ct 537; 94 L Ed 750 (1950); Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n; 438 Mich 84, 109, n 13; 476 NW2d 112 (1991). Moreover, it is inapplicable in cases where the Supreme Court vacates our decision and remands to us for reconsideration in light of a cited Supreme Court decision. A case on point in which I took part is Hill v Ford Motor Co, 183 Mich App 208, 212; 454 NW2d 125 (1989). The only difference in the remand order in Hill and this case is that the order in Hill specifically vacated the decision of this Court. *656Here, the order remanded for reconsideration in light of new Supreme Court law. If the intent of the Supreme Court was not to vacate our previous decision, one would have expected it to specify what part remains viable. In any event, as the majority admits, no holding in our previous opinion has precedential effect in light of the remand. The entire opinion has been vacated effectively, if not explicitly.
In analyzing the law of the case doctrine, it is helpful to contrast the ruling in Int’l Union, UAW v Michigan, 211 Mich App 20; 535 NW2d 210 (1995). In Int’l Union, we affirmed a trial court order granting a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and let our ruling stand. It remanded the case to the trial court, directing it to adjudicate whether a permanent injunction should be issued. Following entry of the trial court’s order, defendants appealed, raising issues that we had decided during the first appeal. Id., pp 22-23. We held that the law of the case precluded our review of the previous decisions of this Court. Id., p 27.
Here, on the other hand, the Michigan Supreme Court has, in effect, vacated our prior holding by remanding the matter to us for reconsideration. No appellate holding remains which could properly be construed as the law of the case. Hill, supra.
I conclude that, when a remand order cites new precedent, it is our responsibility to thoroughly review the remanded case. We should adopt and apply the correct standard to the facts and issues, engaging in whatever extensive review it may require. Otherwise, orders of remand for reconsideration would require no more than rubber stamping previous opinions as they travel up and down the appellate ladder. Surely, that cannot be the *657purpose of the order of remand which was issued here. Additionally, the essential question in this case is whether the correct standard of review was applied. To resolve it by application of the law of the case begs the question, leaving it unanswered.
With this background in mind, I now turn to Payne and the guidance it offers.
THE PAYNE STANDARD
A
In Payne, the Supreme Court attempted to develop the standard of review for cases where a circuit court grants superintending control following a decision by a civil service commission.
First, because the issue was apparently unresolved, the Supreme Court concluded that decisions of municipal civil service commissions are reviewed through original actions for superintending control. Payne, p 687. Our earlier opinion reached the same conclusion. Loose, p 364.
However, based on the standard of review developed in Justice Riley’s concurrence and Justice Levin’s dissent in Payne, our original analysis did not go far enough. We limited our review to the traditional analysis of a writ of superintending control and considered only: 1) if the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction; 2) whether the inferior tribunal exceeded that jurisdiction; and 3) whether the inferior court proceeded according to law. Loose, p 365.
B
In their concurrence/dissent, Justices Riley and Griffin considered the appropriate standard for review of a writ of superintending control directed at a municipal civil service commission. They con-*658eluded that it is the substantial evidence standard of Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Payne, p 698 (Riley, J.).
The concurrence/dissent noted that the constitutional substantial evidence test is far less deferential than the common law substantial evidence test generally associated with the writ of certiorari.
While not an examination de novo, the substantial evidence standard involves more stringent review than the scintilla rule or any evidence standard of the writ of certiorari.
After all, the substantial evidence test of art 6, § 28 mandates meaningful evaluation of the "qualitative and quantitative” aspects of the evidence relied upon by the lower tribunal whereas the writ of certiorari prohibits any such evaluation. To equate the two standards of review is improper because it either significantly strengthens the scrutiny under certiorari or significantly weakens the scrutiny of art 6, § 28. [Payne, pp 703-705 (Riley, J.).]
The concurrence/dissent extensively describes the breadth of the standard of review set forth in § 28. It contains an historical analysis of § 28’s purpose: to protect citizens from administrative decisions insulated from all except the most cursory review. It concludes:
In the instant case, the intention of the ratifiers and framers was to guarantee a minimal standard of judicial review for all administrative agencies affecting the rights of Michigan citizens — and we must enforce the intention. Defendant’s attempt to engraft upon the language and intentions of art 6, §28 meaning almost certainly unintended by the framers and ratifiers of the fundamental charter must be rebuked. [Payne, pp 717-718 (Riley, J.).]
*659In his dissent, Justice Levin, joined by Justice Mallett, similarly concluded that:
[A] decision to discharge a civil service employee after a hearing is subject to judicial review, pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 28, to determine whether it is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, and not merely to determine whether there is any evidence to support the decision. [Payne, pp 718-719 (Levin, J., dissenting).]
C
Four justices in Payne approved application of § 28 to the review of decisions of civil service commissions. Section 28 provides:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
At issue in Loose is the meaning of certain language in the collective bargaining agreement:
Any employee who is absent without leave for five (5) or more consecutive days without notification to the employer as to the reason for *660said absence, shall be deemed to have resigned from the employ of the employer and shall forfeit all seniority rights.
The trial court believed that the civil service commission committed a clear legal error in concluding that this language permitted it to require "sufficient notice”. In our original analysis of this issue, we disagreed and used this as the basis for reversing the decision of the trial court. However, § 28, which the remand from our Supreme Court instructs us to apply, provides:
This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law
This provision has become part of the standard of review. It requires reconsideration of findings of fact and conclusions of law absent direction from the Supreme Court to leave untouched any issue which should have been subjected to it. See Johnson, p 53; Hill, p 212.
APPLICATION OP THE PAYNE STANDARD
I would find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the commission made a clear error of law in requiring "sufficient notification” when the contract requires "notification”.
The primary role of the court in construing a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. Kassin v Arc-Mation, Inc, 94 Mich App 520, 524-525; 288 NW2d 413 (1979). Construction of unambiguous and unequivocal contracts is a question of law. See Mt Carmel Mercy Hosp v Allstate Ins Co, 194 Mich App 580; 487 NW2d 849 (1992).
*661The language of the contract is unambiguous. It permits the employer to discharge an employee who is absent without leave for five or more days without notifying the employer. Specifically, it does not require "sufficient notification” or contain provisions giving the employer unilateral authority to determine what constitutes "sufficient notification.” Consequently, the trial ruling that the Civil Service Commission committed an error of law by upholding Loose’s dismissal for failure to provide "sufficient notification” of her absence should be affirmed.
The second requirement of the standard of review set forth in § 28 is:
[I]n cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same [final decisions, findings, rulings and orders] are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.
Loose notified her employer, Wayne County, that her physician had advised her to remain home in bed until he next saw her. She later notified the county that her physician had been unable to see her at the scheduled time because of his illness.
According to the Payne standard of review, since a hearing was required, the court had to reach beyond the evaluation of whether the commission proceeded according to law; it had to consider whether the decision to terminate Loose’s employment was supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Our Court must apply the same standard of review in considering the action of both lower tribunals.
I would find that the decision of the Civil Service Commission was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. Justice Boyle wrote in Payne:
*662The underlying purpose of judicial review of the factual findings of administrative agencies relates to the comparative expertise of the two institutions. A court is expert at adjudication — determining disputed facts by holding hearings. A municipal civil service board, on the other hand, the administrative agency in this case, is expert at determining job requirements for a city employee. To this end, the agency may establish qualifications and rules for employee conduct on the job. These rules will be considered promises to employees that their jobs will be secure as long as they perform them acceptably, and that this security is not subject to, in Professor Nozick’s words, "[t]he [zjigzag of [pjolitics.” In that sense, the province of a city’s civil service commission, should it choose to have one at all, is to decide what qualifications and behavior the city will require of its employees and how much security it will promise them. The role of the reviewing court is to ensure that the city’s employees receive what they have been promised by reviewing whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. [Id., pp 694-695 (Boyle, J.).]
"Substantial evidence” means the competent material and substantial evidence required by article 6.1 have considered the evidence in light of the role of a reviewing court described above. I find that the Wayne County Civil Service Commission’s decision was not supported by the quantum of evidence the standard of review requires. The record favors Loose. It establishes that she notified the county that her physician advised her to remain at home until she saw him again. It shows that she sent a second notice to her employer explaining her continued absence. Thus, the commission’s decision to discharge her for failure to provide "sufficient notification” of her absence was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.
I would affirm.